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When Germany forced China to surrender part of the province of Shantung and 
the village of Tsingtau in 1897, it secured the long-standing wishes of a German China 
lobby that had articulated visions of empire that would achieve their individual 
objectives. While their various ideas were broad and not well defined, at their heart was 
that Germany should embrace a liberal, commercial model of empire: a “German Hong 
Kong” that would be a paradigm of colonial rule and a major power center in Asia. 
There exists a critical need to place Germany’s colonial experience in China in its 
proper historical context and appreciate its role in German imperialism and the 
development of a more globalized world at the turn of the twentieth century.  
This study critically analyzes the colony of Tsingtau in order to elucidate 
German ideas about empire during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
3500 Germans in Tsingtau and their supporters created a nexus of associations to build a 
commercial center to rival British Hong Kong. Inspired by new historical trends, this 
work examines mid-level state and military officials, diplomats, businessmen, and 
religious leaders, the “middle management of empire,” that helped develop Tsingtau. In 
doing so, it studies the colonial experience as “history from the middle,” highlighting 
the critical role Tsingtau played in Germany’s emergence as a world power.   
To tell the story of Tsingtau, my research utilizes sources from German, 
Chinese, and American archives, ascertaining how leaders in Germany and Tsingtau 




This is supplemented with records of imperial officials, colonial leaders, corporate 
organizations, and other influential members of the community. These mid-level 
individuals devised and implemented projects to enhance life for the colonists and, 
sometimes, natives. Their records show how economic, political, and cultural interests 
worked together to develop the colony and enhance Germany’s status as a world leader. 
My research identifies new ideas about German visions of empire-particularly 
that a strong liberal impulse existed in German imperialism-and shows that Germany 
was a key player in early globalization and that its East Asian presence was an integral 
part of its global power projection. Consequently, this transnational study substantially 
enriches our understanding of imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century and our 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
A LONG-DISTANCE RELATIONSHIP - UNDER THE EAGLE IN THE 
EMPIRE OF THE DRAGON 
On 6 March 1898, Germany formally established its first colony in China on the 
Shantung (Shandong) peninsula after German forces seized control of the region at the 
end of 1897. According to the “Atonement Treaty” it signed with China, Germany 
would lease the city of Tsingtau and a fifty square kilometer zone of occupation from the 
Chinese government for ninety-nine years, to be known as the Kiaochow Leasehold.1 
Upon arriving in Tsingtau-the major prize acquired in the 1898 treaty-German officials 
found little more than a series of fortifications, a small army barracks, and an 
impoverished fishing village. The village’s main street was a narrow and dusty dirt road, 
and the buildings lining it were the former homes of fishermen and farmers, who, upon 
the German occupation of the village, sold their property to the newly-established 
colonial government and resettled in the villages further east.2 Kiaochow Bay, directly 
                                                 
1 As a result of changes in transliteration and translation, Chinese names have several variations. To avoid 
confusion, I use the older English transliteration of Kiaochow (as opposed to the German Kiautschou or 
the contemporary transliteration Jiaozhou) to refer to the German leasehold proper. When discussing the 
administrative center of the colony, I will use the German designation Tsingtau (Tsintau during the first 
year of German occupation and Tsingtao in English) to refer to the colonial city established on Jiaozhou 
Bay. Qingdao refers to the contemporary city that ultimately passed into Chinese hands after World War I 
as a provision of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. The fishing village that was originally 
located on the future site of the German colonial city was also named Qingdao (and which Germans called 
Tsingtau), though its distinction from the contemporary city should be evident. In identifying other 
locations in China, I will generally utilize the spelling common during the period, with the contemporary 
name and spelling appearing in parentheses at the first mention, e.g. “Shantung (Shandong)” above. 
2 Otto von Diederichs, “Die Besatzung von Tsingtau am 14.XI.1897,” Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv 
hereinafter cited as BA-MA, Nachlass Diederichs, N 255/24. Regarding the Chinese military installations 
that had been established after 1892, see, Zhang Shufeng, “Li Hongzhang yu Jiaozhouwan [Li Hongzahng 
and Jiaozhou Bay],” in Liu Shanzhang and Zhou Quan, eds., Zhong De guanxi shi wencong [Collected 
 2 
off the village’s coast, provided an excellent natural harbor that represented one of the 
major attractions of Tsingtau as a site for a German colony. The Imperial Russian Pacific 
Fleet had wintered its vessels in the bay as late as 1894, and the harbor served as the 
base of operations for the recent German siege of the city following the murder of 
German missionaries at Juye in November 1897. Nevertheless, while the harbor was a 
suitable location for European naval vessels to anchor safely, it could only support a 
limited number of the modern vessels demanded by the growing Anglo-German naval 
rivalry. As the newly crowned center for Germany’s imperial presence in China and the 
Far East, Tsingtau was long on potential, but short on immediate value.  
Today, Qingdao is a modern, bustling metropolis and one of the most important 
cities in China.  Although the train station was recently renovated and expanded as part 
of Beijing’s successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games (Qingdao was the site of the 
Olympic and Paralympic open water sailing competitions-a lasting legacy of the modern 
harbor that Germany built), the contemporary Chinese architecture is dwarfed by a 
Gothic German style a century old.  Exiting the train station on Qingdao Road, salient 
features such as Gothic architecture, German churches, and German signs-below the 
Chinese name “Qing dao lu” on street signs appears “Qingdao Road,” “Qingdao Straße,” 
and “Wilhelmstraße”-come into view. German-style Ratskellers are a popular dining 
option in the city along with its signature local seafood, and many shops in Qingdao’s 
active downtown sell local beer from the world-renowned Tsingtao Brewery bottled and 
                                                 
Essays on the History of Chines-German Relations], Qingdao: Qingdao Publishing House, 1991, pp. 66-
80. 
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in kegs. Since its inception as a German colonial center, Qingdao has remained a 
European-style enclave in a land home to one of the most ancient and advanced 
civilizations in the world.  In a place where the legacy of colonial domination has left a 
strong and bitter aftertaste, the people of Qingdao have a much more positive view of 
their past that is true nowhere else in China. 
Such sights are a reminder of the complexities of German and Chinese history. 
The story of Germans who arrived in Tsingtau with visions of transforming a tiny 
fishing village into a bustling colonial center and built their homes and careers in 
Tsingtau is the basis of the global interaction between these cultures. From its 
foundation in 1898 until its formal surrender in 1918, Tsingtau and the Kiaochow 
Leasehold were an important part of the German Empire and an anchor of Germany’s 
presence in the Pacific. By establishing this colony on the Shantung Peninsula, Germany 
secured the long-standing wishes of a German China interest group that had been calling 
for a greater presence in Asia. In demanding a colony, members of this China lobby 
articulated unique visions of empire that would bring further prestige to Germany 
through the colony’s success and secure their individual objectives. While their specific 
ideas varied greatly, at their heart was that Germany should embrace a liberal, 
commercial model of empire: creating a “German Hong Kong.”   
 This study of the colony of Tsingtau examines German ideas about empire at the 
turn of the twentieth century. The 3500 Germans in Tsingtau and their supporters at home 
relied on a nexus of associations to create a commercial center to rival British Hong 
Kong, shaping attitudes at home and abroad about Germany’s imperial mission. Inspired 
 4 
by new historical trends, this work examines mid-level state and military officials, 
academics, businessmen, and religious leaders, whom I call the “middle management of 
empire,” that built Tsingtau. The individuals who comprised this group of mid-level 
actors formed the bridge between the masters, commanders, company heads, and leading 
political officials that shaped policy and strategy in Germany and the actual experiences 
of establishing a meaningful German presence on the northern coast of China. These are 
the individuals who answer the critically important questions of how the German colony 
of Tsingtau came to be and who was responsible for understanding orders and objectives 
and implementing them as coherent visions of empire. How, for example, did you 
interpret broad directives from your superiors and turn them into successful expressions 
of policy that secured the support of the Imperial government in a land thousands of miles 
away from home; how did you develop an administrative structure that preserved 
Germany’s territorial security and dominance while also cooperating with a native 
population that outnumbered the non-native; how did you develop the infrastructure 
necessary to turn an undeveloped harbor and coastal village into a central axis of 
commerce and industry; how did Germany, relatively new to the “game” of imperialism 
and the practices of empire, turn a tiny fishing village with no infrastructure and a 
relatively small non-native population into a premiere naval base, commercial hub, 
trading entrepôt, and cultural center that rivaled the other major port cities of East Asia; 
and who were these individuals that worked under the decision-makers in Germany and 
what, exactly, did they do; who put the pieces of the “German Hong Kong” puzzle 
together, and how? In answering these questions, this work studies the business 
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managers, middle-men, officers, diplomats, missionaries, innovators, risk-taskers, and 
visionaries, as well as the new technology, improved tools, and ground-breaking systems 
that comprised the German colonial experience in China. This work examines the 
Germany’s imperial presence in China as “history from the middle,” exploring networks 
and ideas moving between Europe and Asia and the critical role Tsingtau played in 
Germany’s emergence as a world power. 
 The story of Tsingtau and the attempt to bring a liberal form of empire to bear 
undercuts and confirms our understanding about the intellectual and social history of 
German colonialism. While scholars of empire have shown an increased desire to look at 
colonial administration from the perspective of the colonists themselves, German 
colonial practices are still seen following a trajectory towards certain twentieth century 
illiberalisms. Tsingtau, then, offers a better understanding of liberalism within German 
imperialism. Creating a German Hong Kong thus reaffirms that a strong liberal impulse 
existed overseas in the Wilhelmine era. This global look at German colonial practices 
also helps reframe our understanding of evolving visions of empire and the alternate path 
this imperial project offered. The China interest group that pushed for a colony saw 
Hong Kong not just as an objective reality, but also a model for an international cultural, 
trade, and military center in which Germans and Chinese shared management of the 
colony, making it the central axis of influence in East Asia: a port that would rival and 
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even surpass the great centers of Asia, as well as a comfortable place to visit and conduct 
business: a mini-Germany in a foreign land.3 
In studying the development of Tsingtau, I examine the creation and self-identity 
of a powerful colonial interest group in Asia. This group, which I call the “Middle 
Management of Empire,” included mid-career officers and diplomats, religious and 
colonial leaders, and commercial officials, all of whom had command authority in this 
far-flung outpost and substantial responsibility to their superiors in Germany. They had a 
vested interest in making Tsingtau appealing to their superiors because doing so 
enhanced their status, creating a vast nexus of associations as they pursued a variety of 
“fantasies” about the role and importance of the colony. As a result, they articulated 
liberal visions of empire that greatly shaped attitudes at home and abroad about 
Germany’s imperial mission. The modification of imperial policy that occurred as a 
result was influential in shaping the behavior of the colonials in Tsingtau. While 
contemporary historians looking back at the German colony might deem the pursuit of 
this insignificant because it did not last long enough for the different imperial vision 
pursued in Tsingtau to be fully realized, the colonists and the middle managers in charge 
of the Leasehold believed they were building a sustainable enterprise that would last for 
generations. That World War I interrupted their pursuits and brought and early end to 
this project is irrelevant. Rather, by understanding the colony from the perspective of 
                                                 
3 Terrell Gotschall, By Order of the Kaiser: Otto von Diederichs and the Rise of the Imperial German 
Navy, 1865-1902 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003); John Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese 
Nationalism: Germany in Shantung, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1971); George Steinmetz, The 
Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest 
Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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those responsible for this endeavor, we can gain a full picture of the various forms that 
German Hong Kong vision of empire took and the ways in which German colonial 
leaders sought to make this vision a reality. 
Examining the imperial project through the thoughts and actions of, and polices 
pursued by, Tsingtau’s middle managers provides a new lens through which we can 
view imperial projects that other sources cannot provide. This is largely due to the fact 
that these men and women on the ground in Tsingtau and the Leasehold needed to find 
practical solutions to enormously complicated problems that could not be solved easily 
in a region so far from home surrounded by a state whose population vastly 
outnumbered the Germans and other Europeans living and working within the 
Leasehold. One of the main reasons that colonial, naval, commercial, and diplomatic 
leaders placed these middle managers in the German colony was because they possessed 
the sort of intellectual flexibility that in turn fueled a desire to find compromise solutions 
like that captured in the phrase “German Hong Kong.” By studying the actions of 
colonial leaders in Tsingtau, this work explores networks and ideas moving back and 
forth between Europe and Asia. As a result, I will show how Germany’s projection of 
world power was built by people in a region far from home. 
This study continues the efforts of historians to re-conceptualize the relationship 
between central authorities and actors on the ground, contributing to our understanding 
of German imperialism and its past in Asia. It tells the story of Tsingtau as the growth of 
foreign policy from the ground-up: from the words of colonists directly responsible for 
developing and implementing the agenda for Germany’s pursuit of global power. It also 
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explores Tsingtau as a part of the first wave of globalization, looking at this colonial 
project from a transnational perspective. I do this by studying the self-imagination of a 
global imperial project based on the interactions of middle managers with European and 
non-European empires. For many Germans, particularly ones with strong commercial 
ties, the creation of a colony in China would “fulfill the long-standing desire for a 
foothold on the coast that would serve German interests as Hong Kong served British.”4 
Advocates for a colony in China constantly invoked this vision, calling upon a model of 
colonial rule that envisioned a commercial capital that would be a comfortable place for 
Germans to visit: an international and culturally rich city. At a time when European 
powers began carving up China, Germany secured a foothold in Asia that the new 
colonists believed would allow them to implement their vision of a commercial empire 
that would rival all others: a “German Hong Kong.”  
What, precisely, this phrase meant, however, and how this concept should 
become a reality remained broad and not especially well-defined, resulting in a variety 
of visions that both agreed and competed with each other. Some in the colony believed 
the best way to accomplish the goal of creating a German Hong Kong was to focus less 
on large-scale developmentalism and extensive territorial rule, turning their attention 
towards building a colonial base for the economic, cultural, and military penetration of 
the extensive hinterland outside the formal borders of the Leasehold. Rather than have 
this developmentalism result in the control over a large dependent territory, however, 
                                                 
4 John Schrecker, “Kiautschou and the Problems of German Colonialism,” in Germany in the Pacific and 
Far East 1870-1914, edited by John Moses and Paul M. Kennedy (St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1977), p. 185. 
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Germany could establish and maintain a broad but informal presence and influence in 
the regions beyond the German colony. Proponents of this particular vision of Tsingtau 
emphasized the role of the colonial government itself in supervising and guiding the 
growth and development of the colony. Furthermore, in order to create this “German 
Hong Kong,” leaders in Tsingtau would need to bring the Chinese in as partners in this 
colonial endeavor, finding ways in which German hegemony in the region could co-exist 
with vestiges of China’s formal political control. As such, the colonial government 
needed to devote considerable attention to creating a class of elite interlocutors who 
could operate in both the Chinese and German systems, offering these natives something 
akin to legal equality, even if they would not be treated as fully equal partners in the 
colonial project. Consequently, Tsingtau would become both a colonial base for the 
projection of German power and influence in China and East Asia, as well as a place 
where cultures interacted more freely, promoting commercial, industrial, and cultural 
projects that could aid Germany in its competition for control over global resources. This 
vision of a German Hong Kong saw Tsingtau as a representation of a more flexible form 
of empire that was more efficient, more dynamic, and less violent. 
Other Germans in the colony, however, saw otherwise. Influenced by the 
prevalence of Sinophobia and more general racist notions about the superiority of 
western civilization, these Germans preferred to embrace the more traditional models of 
imperial rule that prevailed in European colonies throughout the nineteenth century. 
While agreeing that Tsingtau should become a modern cultural and economic center, 
these individuals advocated using “nation building” as the foundation for the control 
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over and development of a large dependent territory. By creating this central axis of 
German influence and power projection, colonial leaders could this make the areas 
outside their direct authority accessible to colonial agents for their economic, political, 
and cultural projects of domination. Supporters of this version of a German Hong Kong 
believed that establishing and maintaining clear boundaries and distinctions between 
native and non-native populations was a core tenant of imperial rule. Thus, while the 
Chinese would have to play a valuable role in creating a German Hong Kong, they 
would need to do so within a segregated colonial space that entailed scientific 
epistemologies, spatial segregation, and a dual legal system, all emphasizing 
German/European primacy and authority. 
As the notion of creating a German Hong Kong predominated throughout the 
majority of the German occupation of Tsingtau and thoroughly permeated the life and 
governance of the Leasehold, this work examines the pursuit of this vision thematically 
rather than chronologically. Nevertheless, certain events took place in East Asia-often 
near to or around Tsingtau-that were important to the development of Germany’s 
presence in the Far East, even if they may not have been critical to the rule over and 
development of Tsingtau. These moments often formed the backdrop for Tsingtau’s 
growth and are worth bearing in mind.  
Germans first established a sizeable presence in Shantung in the late 1870s and 
1880s after the arrival of the first missionaries from the Steyl-based Catholic Society of 
the Divine Word. Establishing themselves in Hong Kong in 1879 under the leadership of 
Johann Baptist Anzer, these missionaries rapidly expanded their work into southern 
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Shantung, making this region the base and focus of their operation. Over the course of 
the 1880s, the German Navy began its quest for a base in China that it could use as an 
anchor for its presence the Far East, both to protect German merchants in the growing 
Chinese marketplace, as well as demonstrate the power and prestige of the newly-formed 
German Empire. On an 1882 visit to China to conduct geological and geographical 
surveys for the German government, Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen-an academic 
polymath who had established himself as a leading expert on China-identified Kiaochow 
Bay as “the biggest and best ocean harbor in all of northern China,” and drew attention 
to its “past and future importance.”5 Von Richthofen and Anzer-along with prominent 
commercial, naval, diplomatic, and mercantile leaders in East Asia-were driving forces 
in calling for the acquirement of territory in China. 
As the debate over what role Germany should play in China took shape in the 
years following German unification, three elite classes emerged in Wilhelmine Germany 
that fought for control and influence: a modern economic bourgeoisie, whose status 
came from wealth and property; nobility, derived from land and titles; and a middle-
class intelligentsia (Bildungsbürgertum), based around education and culture.6 Each of 
these groups dominated various aspects of German politics, but none could claim 
predominance, as their individual views and interests could, and often did, converge. 
                                                 
5 Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen, China, vol. 2 (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1877), p. 262. Von 
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6 Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting, p. 49. 
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This was certainly the case in the debates about German China. The arguments for 
acquiring Tsingtau were marked by many of the same arguments that the other Western 
powers made about involvement in the conquest of China. Though no one group 
represented a single view on China, these voices were derived from the varying views on 
China that had existed since at least the end of the eighteenth century, Sinophilia and 
Sinophobia. Much of the complexity that later occurred in laying out a concrete policy in 
Tsingtau stemmed from intra-elite battles centered on securing a specific vision for 
Tsingtau. 
Nevertheless, even as Sinophobia was reaching its peak during the late 
nineteenth century, German discourses on China at the time of the annexation of 
Tsingtau remained exceedingly multivocal and deeply layered. While Sinophobia 
attempted to condemn the Chinese, it also inherently recognized China’s continued 
cultural and political power, which could not be subjugated fully. Consequently, 
Sinophobia contained an implicit understanding that some sort of partnership with the 
Chinese had to exist, even if it were on a very limited basis. Meanwhile, the exaltation of 
the Chinese that came from Sinophilia usually construed China as a place that did not 
even need colonization. This meant that individuals in Tsingtau were often both 
sinophilic and sinophobic, either at the same time or vacillating over the course of a 
career and depending on circumstances. As Tsingtau was an enterprise that always 
depended on partnership with the Chinese, however, there was an inherent bias toward 
those who wanted to treat the Chinese well, even if there also existed a great deal of 
ambivalence (and hesitation on the part of some) about making them equal partners.  
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Occupying a space somewhere between Sinophobia and Sinophilia was a third, 
and wholly unique, view on China: Sinomania, an offshoot of Sinophilia based on the 
writings of the French philosopher, Voltaire, that held considerable sway in intellectual 
circles.7 Sinomania was centered on the empirical study of China in order to find ways to 
better European civilization.8 Often, sinomaniacs took their Sinophilia to the extreme, 
creating hybrid identities for themselves by embracing certain Chinese beliefs and 
practices they found appealing and fusing them to their own cultural traditions as 
necessary.9 It was this coterie of academic sinomaniacs that played an important role in 
complicating and refining the views of prominent Germans involved in the debate on 
China such as von Richthofen and Bishop Anzer.  Scholars such as Johann Heinrich 
Plath, one of the first German historians to study Chinese history, wrote numerous books 
and articles defending China and rejecting “the huge prejudice that Chinese history 
shows no progress or development.”  In many cases, Plath drew upon Chinese sources in 
his studies, something few of his peers even considered.10  Other academics such as Otto 
Franke, a professor at the University of Berlin, criticized those who believed that China 
threatened to poison the rest of Europe with its decadence unless forcibly checked.  He 
agreed with his colleague, and fellow sinomaniac, Wilhelm Gruber that the notion of 
Chinese cultural stagnation was the result of a complete ignorance of Chinese culture 
and society.  Ultimately, these sinomaniacs argued that Germany needed to take a more 
                                                 
7 Arnold H. Rowbotham, “Voltaire, Sinophile,” PMLA, vol. 47 (December 1932), p. 1053. 
8 Basil Guy, The French Image of China before and after Voltaire (Geneva: Musée Voltaire, 1963). 
9 Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting, p.  376. 
10 Herbert Franke, Zur Biographie von Johann Heinrich Plath (1802-1874) (Munich: Verlag der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1960), p. 144. 
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pragmatic approach in China. Germans should pursue something akin to a fusion of the 
best features that German and Chinese culture offered, allowing for the creation of a 
hybrid native elite that could guide Chinese growth and development.  These individuals 
shared a view of China that was positive and came to believe that this country could 
develop and modernize on its own, with just the support of Europeans to guide this 
process. 
 By the 1890s, as Germany came to play an increasingly prominent role in 
Chinese affairs, including acting as the lead mediator in negotiating the peace treaty that 
ended the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, demands for securing a sphere of influence in 
China grew louder and more frequent. Nevertheless, it was not until the academic, 
religious, naval, and commercial leaders in East Asia were able to take advantage of 
domestic politics that they were able to turn their desires into state policy, leading to the 
creation of a powerful, largely Catholic, interest group.  Initially a faction of loosely-
connected partisans centered around the leading academic on China, Ferdinand von 
Richthofen, these individuals pushed for a German colony in China on the basis of an 
enduring cultural critique of China.  When the interests of these academics, businessmen 
and other mid-level officials met with those of the Catholic German politics, this group 
became politically useful to a party that was also politically valuable to the Imperial 
Naval Secretary, Alfred Tirpitz.11 As the demands of the Anglo-German Naval Race 
compelled Tirpitz to turn to the Catholic Center Party for their crucial vote of support for 
his Naval Bill,  he promised to promote an increased German presence in the Far East to 
                                                 
11 Tirpitz was not ennobled until 1900, at which time he became known as Alfred von Tirpitz. 
 15 
protect the increasing number of Catholic missionaries there. As Bishop Anzer’s 
leadership and actions in Shantung continued to irk Chinese provincial leaders, attacks 
on missionaries and Chinese Christians became increasingly frequent and violent. 
Following the murder of two prominent members of the Steyl Mission on 1 November 
1897, Germany finally had the pretext to take control of Qingdao (an ancient Chinese 
fishing village upon which the German colonial city would be built) and establish a 
sphere of influence in China, the Kiaochow Leasehold.12  
Upon establishing the Leasehold, German policymakers in the Foreign Office, 
the Colonial Office, and the Reichsmarineamt (among others) advised Kaiser Wilhelm II 
and Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow that Germany should not make Tsingtau a settler 
colony, as the logistics and the costs were prohibitively high. As Wilhelm and von 
Bülow agreed that this seemed the best course of action, the German population in 
Tsingtau remained relatively small. Germans with special skills and experiences in trade, 
engineering, construction, geology, and Chinese studies were specifically targeted and 
encouraged to populate Tsingtau, with less emphasis placed on the recruitment of 
families and women. As a result, the colonial leadership recognized the Chinese would 
have to play an important role in the colony. What role and to what extent that would be, 
however, remained open and up for debate throughout the period of German occupation. 
Initially, Colonial policy limited the natives’ role in the Leasehold. In laying out early 
plans for the colony’s development, the naval administration built a “racially segregated, 
                                                 
12 For more on the history of the original village, including the army barracks that had been established 
there in 1892, see, Zhang Shufeng, “Li Hongzhang yu Jiaozhouwan,” pp 66-80. 
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military-bureaucratic enclave” that sought to impose German dominance built on 
territorial control and bounded space.13 Such a plan of development was based on the 
classical imperial vision of empire in which “‘nation building’ and developmentalism 
went hand in hand with extensive territorial rule” that dominated nineteenth century 
imperialism.14  
 Colonial practices and responses to Chinese activity within the Leasehold and 
Shantung proper during the first years of the colony were generally harsh, predicated on 
segregation and anti-Chinese hatred, not unlike how German imperialists treated the 
native population in its African colonies. Chinese settlements, including the original 
fishing village in Kiaochow Bay, were razed and the resident population forced to 
resettle, usually far away from new German developments or, at best, in one of the 
segregated districts in the newly constructed city. The colonial government established a 
dualistic legal system in which the Chinese were held to the standards of both German 
and Chinese law, whereas Germans and other Europeans and Americans were only 
bound by the laws of their country of origin.15 As Chinese villagers attempted to protest, 
disrupt, and harass German attempts at constructing roads and railroads to important 
                                                 
13 Bardley A. Naranch, “German Colonialism Made Simple,” in German Colonialism in a Global Age, 
edited by Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014) p. 12 
14 Klaus Mühlhahn, “A New Imperial Vision? The Limits of German Colonialism in China” in Naranch 
and Eley, p. 124; Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan, “Refiguring Imperial Terrains,” in Imperial 
Formations, edited by Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Purdue (Santa Fe: School for 
Advanced Research, 2007), p. 5. 
15 The legal aspects of Germany’s rule in Tsigntau in this early years is treated in greatly detail in Chapter 
II. For a thorough analysis of this colonial legal system, see Schreker, Imperialism and Chinese 
Nationalism, pp. 59-78, Dirk A. Seeleman, The Social and Economic Development of the Kiaochou 
Leasehold (Shantung, China) under German Administation, 1897-1914, Ph. D dissertation, University of 
Toronto, 1982, pp. 50-108, and Klaus Mühlhahn, Herrschaft und Widerstand in der “Musterkolonie 
Kiautschou: Interaktionen zwischen China und Deutschland 1897-1914 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000.), pp. 
185-236. 
 17 
cities such as Tientsin (Tianjin) and the provincial capital of Tsinan (Jinan), the Germans 
responded by burning and sacking Chinese villages and temples, seizing prominent 
village leaders as hostages, participating in the wholescale massacre of entire villages, 
and even establishing military fortifications and garrisons well outside the leasehold’s 
borders. 
 The tensions that developed between Germans and Chinese in these early years 
occurred against the backdrop of the growth of anti-Western secret societies in Shantung 
(one of the hotbeds of such activity in China) in the late 1890s that culminated in the 
Boxer Rebellion in 1899-1900.16 Although the Boxer Rebellion was directed more 
generally at the unfair treatment of China at the hands of foreign powers, the German 
missionary and colonial presence in Shantung played an important role in sparking the 
uprising. As the rebellion had its origins in regions of Shantung close to the Leasehold, 
Germany played a critical role in the joint expedition of the Great Powers that was 
dispatched to quell the revolt and liberate the diplomatic legations in Peking (Beijing), 
agreeing to send twenty thousand troops to China. Tsingtau played a key role in this 
regard as well, as its newly established military force, the III. Seebattalion, sent divisions 
to Tsinan and Peking, where they participated in some of the major battles of the 
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Rebellion. Divisions of the battalion also engaged in expeditions against the Boxers and 
their supporters in the Leasehold. The first few years following the Boxer Rebellion 
represented perhaps the apogee of Sinophobia in German colonial discourse, just as the 
colonial regime in Tsingtau was beginning to firmly establish its policy of colonial rule.   
At the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1906, however, German policy shifted 
away from this traditional model of colonialism, based around violent expansionism and 
racial separation. Following a series of conflicts, protests, rebellions, and increased 
competition from its rivals (most notably the recently concluded war between Russia and 
Japan that occurred largely in Tsingtau’s backyard), the naval administration began to 
embrace an alternate vision of empire. This vision, despite its lack of clear articulation, 
had persisted since the inception of an active pursuit of a German presence in China: the 
creation of a German Hong Kong. Instead of dominating and developing a large 
dependent territory, colonial leaders in Tsingtau focused their efforts on building up 
Tsingtau as a colonial base from which German officials could establish and preserve a 
much larger, informal colonial presence committed to influencing the native population 
to support German interests in the Leasehold and beyond. Consequently, colonial leaders 
withdrew German troops back into the Leasehold’s borders and stopped trying to 
provoke conflict with the provincial government, instead trying to find common ground 
for compromise to ensure, at least on some level, that both sides could secure their 
policies objectives. The naval administration implemented and supported a program of 
cultural interaction and rapprochement between Germans and Chinese that would 
encourage something akin to a partnership, even though it remained unequal. Although 
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Chinese elites never gained fully equal rights to Germans and other foreigners in the 
colony, they colonial government came to regard them as citizens (Bürger), the hallmark 
of which was that these wealthier Chinese were allowed to participate in the election for 
the governor’s mixed Chinese-European advisory council, an institution of native “self-
government” unique to the German colonies, and fairly rare in other European ones. 
As a result of this change in policy, Tsingtau grew rapidly. The completion of 
roads and railroads, as well as the modernization of the harbor allowed trade, commerce, 
and industry to flourish, and the rise of the burgeoning tourist industry in Europe and the 
United States saw Tsingtau emerge as a premier travel and tourism destination in the Far 
East. The native Chinese population steadily rose, bolstered further by the influx of 
Chinese capital and Chinese-owned businesses into Tsingtau. Many of the individuals 
who swelled the ranks of the Chinese elite in Tsingtau came from the Leasehold and 
other parts of the province, particularly major centers such as Tientsin and Tsinan, but 
also from neighboring regions and cities as well. Although their reasons for joining the 
Tsingtau community varied, many of these elites were attracted by the modern, high-end 
facilities the naval administration built, as well as the city’s reputation for promoting a 
relatively good working relationship between Europeans and Chinese. 
This development was particularly acute following the Xinhai/Republican 
Revolution of 1911, which saw many Chinese elites aligned with the newly-deposed 
Qing Dynasty fleeing to the city in exile. These individuals saw in Tsingtau an example 
of what China could become with proper channeling of the impulse for modernization 
and development, as well as the means to achieving this goal. During a September 1912 
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visit to Tsingtau, Sun Yat-sen, the former president of Republican China, told students in 
a speech at the newly-established German-Chinese college that Kiaochow was “a model 
settlement for China,” and continued by saying, “in three thousand years, China has not 
achieved what Germany did in Kiaochow in fifteen years.”17 If China wanted to return to 
prominence once again as a leading power in the world, these intellectuals argued, it 
needed to develop more places like Tsingtau, replete with citizens who had the modern 
education, training, and inspiration to transform their country.  
During this period, the colonial government partially lifted its ban on Chinese 
living in the European districts of Tsingtau, a recognition of the prominent and important 
role these exiles could play in furthering Tsingtau’s evolution into a German Hong 
Kong.18 Working with the progressive Weimar Mission, the naval administration 
invested heavily in education in the Leasehold, including establishing Chinese schools at 
all levels that utilized a mixed European and Chinese curriculum. The hallmark of this 
policy was the establishment of the Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule, which employed 
both German and Chinese teachers and offered degrees in a variety of fields that would 
easily support the colonial vision for Tsingtau and which the Chinese government 
recognized as an acceptable prerequisite for the entrance examinations to the national 
university in Peking. The law and politics faculty at the Hochschule taught Chinese and 
European law and encouraged a cross-cultural interaction that would allow Chinese 
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lawyers to fill out German legal documents using Chinese legal terminology and 
procedures, as well as help German students learn from the traditions of Chinese law.19 
In this decade before the start of World War I (and the de facto and abrupt end of 
German rule in the Leasehold), this cross-cultural exchange with the Chinese saw many 
middle-class translators and Sinologists working within and alongside the colonial 
government and the German foreign service stationed in China come to identify with and 
admire Chinese mandarins. As these educated middle-class Germans-many seeking 
ways to live and work with Chinese elites-rose to prominence, they gained greater 
influence in shaping the direction of Tsingtau and the Leasehold’s growth, further 
enshrining a policy committed to their particular vision of a German Hong Kong. Such a 
plan for development found considerable support and encouragement from the colonial 
government, the Reichsmarineamt, the Foreign Office and the legation headquarters in 
Peking, all of whom agreed that the best path for ensuring Tsingtau’s future success was 
to move away from the direct colonialism based around cajoling the native population to 
submit to imperial rule and instead make use of less direct methods of rule that were 
focused on influencing and working with the Chinese as a  potential ally. 
As Prasenjit Duara argued in his study of Japan’s rule of Manchucko, this shift in 
colonial policy represented a form of “new imperialism,” in which the link between 
empire and nation-building was weaker and much more tenuous. Duara rightly points 
out that, while this form of empire-building was a hallmark of the Cold War, much like 
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globalization, its origins can be dated to the turn of the twentieth century.20 Indeed, while 
colonial powers still sought to limit native sovereignty through force or the threat of 
using it and relied on the notion of benevolent influence to “uplift” native populations, 
the reasoning for doing so had shifted. This new vision of empire, in which the creation 
of German Hong Kong clearly fits, was “much more global” in its outlook “yet made 
fewer commitments involving any particular place.”21 
Consequently, in pursuit of this new vision for Tsingtau, the naval administration 
and colonial leaders sought to make Tsingtau into “a colonial base for the projection of 
German power in East Asia, as well as a fluid zone of contact between cultures and a 
place where experiments in commerce and communication emerged.” The colony 
expanded greatly as a result of this shift in outlook, and colonial leaders initiated a 
program of cultural interaction and exchange, allowing Tsingtau to flourish. The colonial 
society that developed was “a highly diffuse zone of contact [that] produced a broad 
range of liminal identities and collaborations that thrived in its ambivalent 
circumstances.”22 “Zone of contact” as a term that Eric Wolf coined in his study of 
cultural identity in the Italian Alps describes an area where “foci of cultural contact in a 
zone of dispute can stimulate cultural dissonance” as well as conflict, cooperation, and 
engagement.23  
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In the case of Tsingtau, the zones of contact that Germans and Chinese found 
themselves in were places where different social groups and networks could exercise, 
contest, negotiate, and cooperate in demonstrating their power and agency. In governing 
Tsingtau and the Leasehold Germany had to move beyond the practices and limits of the 
formal colonialism of the nineteenth century in order to gain greater control over global 
resources and power and secure its position as a Weltmacht. As settler colonies became 
more the exception rather than the rule in colonial models by the end of the nineteenth 
century, European states had to figure out how to staff and manage colonial enterprises 
without a massive influx of European personnel as colonizers. This meant some sort of 
arrangement with local elites, whether in “direct” or “indirect” models of rulership. The 
semi-colonial condition that manifested itself in Tsingtau challenged the middle-
managers in the colony to rethink and reform German colonial policies and practices, 
particularly in terms of how to convince the native population that it was in their 
interests as well to support such a policy. Given the small size of the German colonial 
population relative to the Chinese and the fact that a sovereign Chinese state surrounded 
the Leasehold on all sides, the Germans certainly needed the Chinese more than the 
Chinese needed the Germans. One of the appeals of the German Hong Kong model from 
the Chinese side, then, stemmed from the fact it provided an opportunity for the 
provincial government in Tsinan to exercise greater authority vis-à-vis the Leasehold, 
limiting the direct advance of German power beyond the Leasehold’s borders. 
While Tsingtau might be seen as an afterthought today, on the eve of World War 
I that perception was neither pre-ordained nor evident. Not only does this reveal new 
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ideas about how Germans envisioned colonization, but that Germany was a key player in 
early globalization and that its presence in East Asia was an integral part of Germany’s 
global power projection. The German Hong Kong vision that colonial leaders embraced 
reflected a new and far-reaching step in transforming the practices of empire, from 
“direct control over territory to a flexible deterritorialized form of domination that 
cultivates imperial connections to noncitizen subjects in ambivalent and opaque 
circumstances.”24 
 Although the concept was relatively fluid and ever-changing, the idea of a 
German Hong Kong was, at its core, modeled on British commercial centers in East Asia 
and India. While a colonial governor would control Tsingtau, Germans and Chinese 
would engage in a peaceful coexistence. Access to China’s markets was critical, and so 
Germans needed to work with the Chinese, even as they held racist attitudes toward 
them. The problem of racial thought in Germany and Europe at the turn of the twentieth 
century is critically important to understanding how Germans in China tried to find a 
means to bring the German Hong Kong vision to fruition. With the conquest of Africa 
and the subjugation of the Pacific and Southeast and East Asia, modern colonizers found 
specific ways in which they could justify to themselves their domination over native 
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populations. As Partha Chatterjee has argued, “the assumption of the essential difference 
and incorrigible inferiority of the subject population is structurally inherent in the 
modern colonial state. Barriers are erected against recognizing the colonized as 
civilizational or human equals.”25 The seizure of power by a foreign state, as well as 
what Chatterjee calls “the rule of difference” are the defining characteristics of modern 
colonialism, something that the Germans who came to Tsingtau in 1897 certainly had in 
mind as they sought to realize their visions of Empire. This form of political dominance 
in the colonial context, in which “a group of people actively maintain their strangeness 
from the population whom they dominate”-was one of the important lessons that the 
Germans drew from British efforts in India and Hong Kong, as well as an important 
point of divergence from the British model in the later years of the German colony.26 
Such a rule of difference was necessary because, as Hannah Arendt wrote, “no nation 
state by the nineteenth century could try to conquer foreign peoples with a clear 
conscience, much less keep foreigners in a permanent state of unequal rights, unless it 
could define those peoples as inherently inferior.” The arguments for treating native 
populations as inferior drew on concepts of biological race, civilizational decline, social 
underdevelopment, and cultural shortcomings.27  
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In applying the rule of difference, colonial governments sought to impose dual 
structures that applied separately to nonnatives (in the case of Tsingtau, this meant 
Germans, Europeans, Americans, and Japanese) and natives (Chinese). In the early years 
of Tsingtau the colonial administration expressed this dual structure most clearly through 
separate legal systems and the initial plans for the city. The architects of the new 
colonial city designed separate neighborhoods for the Chinese middle-class and laborers, 
and the only Chinese initially allowed to live in the European districts were servants. 
Although recent scholarship has revealed the “fragile and porous character of the binary 
identities…on which the colonial other depended,” the state’s continued effort to 
reinforce such a binary served as a guide for much of the activity that took place in the 
colony.28 
Despite the racist attitude and ideologies that overlay the German presence in 
China, many of the Germans on the ground in the colony quickly recognized that, 
regardless of what they might think of the native population, they needed the assistance 
of the Chinese in order to help create a German Hong Kong and make it a success. As a 
result, while colonial leaders in Tsingtau did not usually look upon the local populace, 
particularly the more well-educated and skilled Chinese, as equals, they rather saw them 
as people who could play a key role in the colony as a special interlocutor class. In 
devising this policy-which I call Bildungsauftrag-colonial leaders supported plans to 
train, educate, and support the native population in order to create a class of local elites 
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who identified with both German and Chinese culture. This policy would provide the 
cutting-edge training and education necessary for Chinese citizens to rise to prominent 
positions in the Chinese civil service, courts, industry, businesses, and local 
administration, while also engendering a cross-cultural identification that would 
encourage them to be sympathetic and loyal to German interests in China and the Far 
East. In doing so, Germany added to the growing list of methods that the powers of the 
world pursued in seeking power and dominance in China and the Far East. Whereas the 
United States tried to save the Chinese soul through missionary work, the British and 
French tried to secure Chinese wealth through investment, trade, and commerce, and the 
Russians and Japanese sought to utilize military might to conquer the Chinese, Germany 
sought to win over China by targeting the Chinese mind. 
Nevertheless, there existed a great deal of ambiguity about just what the Tsingtau 
project was supposed to be and how it was supposed to work.  Although all parties 
involved in this colonial endeavor shared the vision of a German Hong Kong, they 
agreed on little else, particularly when it came to turning theory into practice. The 
Chinese were supposed to be partners in pursuit of this goal, but there was clearly a great 
deal of reticence on the part of some Germans to allow the Chinese-even those that 
became a part of the special interlocutor class-to participate fully.  Chinese elites were 
encouraged to partake in a variety of social organizations and activities in order to 
encourage the Chinese to visit and be a part of the life of the colony and show how 
modern and developed Tsingtau had become, for example, but whether they could be co-
equal members of the same with Germans varied considerably. In the case of the elite 
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Tsingtau-Klub, German businessmen and other prominent individuals showed little 
desire to invite their Chinese counterparts to join until very late in the life of the colony, 
leaving native elites to form their own social organizations that operated alongside the 
club. Conversely, however, prominent Chinese businessmen were permitted to becomes 
members of the local Handelskammer (Chamber of Commerce) as early as 1904, an 
early moment in recognizing the important role of the Chinese in the colony’s success.  
Not only did parts of the German population hold such reservations, but also 
certain members of the native elite as well. These Chinese wanted to see the German 
influence limited in the Leasehold and the region more broadly; while they may have 
envisioned a partnership with the Germans, it was one in which China, not Germany 
took the lead. Chinese guild and trade organizations remained extremely popular among 
native business leaders, and these groups remained a major factor in shaping commercial 
policy in the Leasehold throughout the colony’s life. Furthermore, although many of the 
exiled intellectuals that came to Tsingtau after the 1911 republican revolution lauded the 
city as a model for what needed to occur in cities across China, they expressed this view 
with an eye towards what the Chinese themselves needed to accomplish, without formal 
assistance or interference from foreign powers. Nevertheless, other prominent Chinese 
individuals, such as Yuan Shikai (the governor of Shantung, 1899-1902), worked with 
colonial leaders to promote close cooperation between Chinese and Germans in the 
pursuit of shared interests. The working arrangement that Yuan formed with Tsingtau’s 
governor, Oskar von Truppel (1901-1911), was instrumental in laying the foundation for 
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the educational system in the leasehold that ultimately resulted in the establishment of 
the Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule. 
The German Hong Kong project, then, reflected a spectrum of engagement on 
both sides, from Chinese elites who enjoyed living or spending time in Tsingtau to 
Germans who truly wanted to develop a modus vivendi with the Chinese – all the way to 
people on both sides who distrusted or disliked each other.  Despite these ambiguities, 
however, both parties recognized certain core ideas that could help define the German 
Hong Kong vision, even as it remained difficult to pin down its exact meaning. Rather 
than create a colony that would just funnel raw materials and manufactured goods to 
Germany, local elites-both German and Chinese-would create an international port, 
cultural center, and military base: a rich and prosperous city the other Great Powers 
would envy. Tied up with this vision of an East Asian commercial center was the idea of 
extending the German Heimat.29 While this idea was applied differently in Tsingtau than 
in West Prussia or Africa, a “German Hong Kong” elicited an image of Tsingtau as an 
integral part of the German empire, as much German as Hamburg, Bremen, or Munich.30 
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As a result, not only Germans, but Europeans, Americans, Japanese, and Chinese would 
find it desirous to travel to and do business in Tsingtau, further enhancing the city’s 
reputation and prestige as a thoroughly modern, culturally developed, and prosperous 
locale that fused the best features of modern Europe with Chinese traditions. 
In making Tsingtau a significant colonial enclave, the colonists formed large 
diverse networks as they positioned Tsingtau as crucial to Germany’s emergence as a 
global power. To the Germans in Tsingtau, the colony stood for many things: a base to 
spread Christianity and western ideals; a chance for glory and furtherance of one’s 
career; the opportunity to derive great wealth and profit; a place to build a colony that 
was the envy of other Imperial Powers; even a chance to spread German culture and 
Heimat. To meet these expectations, the colonials created a vast network of associations, 
forming a society that developed as a result of concerns stemming from the major events 
of this era.  The colonists believed they were a valuable piece of the Empire and crucial 
to its claims as a world power, seeing Tsingtau as a port that would rival and even 
surpass the great centers of Asia: Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Tokyo.   
The arrival of World War I in 1914 brought an abrupt and unexpected end to the 
colonial project in Tsingtau. While the standing military forces stationed in Tsingtau-the 
III. Seebattalion and the East Asia Kreuzergeschwader-and the various ad hoc infantry 
and volunteer defense forces fought valiantly to defend the city, the colony ultimately 
surrendered after a three-month siege by a joint Japanese-British force. Although it is 
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impossible to predict what Tsingtau might have become had colonial leaders been able 
to continue their pursuit of a German Hong Kong, Tsingtau was well on its way to 
securing this objective reality. Tsingtau had achieved a thoroughly modern character, 
was well-connected to major cities in China, the Far East, and overseas, and was proving 
to be a signficant draw to Chinese, European, American and Japanese investors, 
travelers, and mid-level elites. Though it would never become immensely profitable as a 
colony-something that Tirpitz and his supporters recognized was highly unlikely-it 
served as a key projection of Germany’s global power projection and a critical 
component of its presence in China and the Far East. 
In surveying the corpus of literature on the German Empire and the theories and 
analyses scholars have produced, Bradley Naranch very aptly observed that “writing the 
history of German colonialism has never been simple.”31 Although researchers have 
produced histories and studies of Germany’s overseas territories since Germany actually 
possessed its colonies,32 the field of German colonial studies itself did not truly begin to 
take off until more recently. The 1980s saw an increased interest in Germany’s colonies, 
and in the early 1990s colonial scholars began examining German imperialism in new 
ways.33  Even with this explosion in literature and exploration of new topics and ideas, 
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the overarching theme of many of these works continued to treat German colonialism as 
a supporting character in the wider sweep of modern German history. Given Germany’s 
tragic path in the twentieth century, many of these histories viewed the colonial era as 
directly connected to Nazi racial policies and imperialist designs in Eastern Europe.34 In 
pursuing such lines of study and inquiry, scholars “did little to alter the dominant tone or 
trajectory of historical research; [they] merely confirmed what was already known from 
other sources about the dynamic but unstable nature of German society prior to World 
War I.”35 Despite the perhaps limited scope of the conclusions that those works reached, 
however, they provided tremendous value in laying bare Germany’s exceedingly violent 
and brutal colonial past (particularly its treatment of native African populations) at a 
time when other former colonial powers were still coming to terms with their own. 
Furthermore, these studies offered a critical counter-narrative to Weimar and Nazi 
histories of German imperialism that attempted to present German colonial endeavors as 
“progressive” and “beneficial” in helping Africans, Asians, and Pacific Islanders enter 
into the modern world.36 
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As academic and scholastic circles in German history finally began to feel the 
effects of the end of the Cold War in the mid-1990s, German colonial studies began to 
experience a bit of a renaissance, as scholars took on new topics, narratives, ideas, and 
approaches to this important part of Imperial German history.37 As the looming spectre 
of the Sonderweg began to fade from view and Germany no longer had to be seen as 
inextricably following a single path forward towards Nazism, new models and analyses 
emerged that were inspired by the myriad theories and practices of postcolonial studies, 
a field that was also seeing something of a revival at this time.38 With such a great 
preponderance and flourishing of new works on the various colonial empires of the past 
not just in Germany but also in Europe and North America, combined with a strong push 
to help Germany come to terms more fully with its difficult past, Germany’s overseas 
empire and its legacy finally began to occupy a space of prominence in the study of 
modern German history.39 
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With the shift in the narrative of German imperialism and its interpretation, the 
field of German colonial studies took off in a multitude of new directions. Freed from 
having to pursue studies whose logical endpoint had to be the two world wars, the first 
wave of new scholars were able to approach German colonialism from a much longer 
and wider view, a critical step forward in understanding “an extensive genealogy of 
racism, xenophobia, and right-wing violence.”40 Scholars also looked for links to 
Nazism through colonial policies, especially the annihilation of the Herero and Nama in 
Southwest Africa.41  The rise in prominence of women’s history and gender and 
sexuality studies further expanded the reach of this renaissance in German colonial 
historiography, as some of the most prominent works in these fields explored German 
settlements overseas and delved deeper into the colonial movement at home.42  
Another fertile ground of development came from scholars studying the 
Holocaust and the Third Reich, who have examined ways in which the racial policies 
and genocide of this era were connected to German colonialism.43 Colonial warfare and 
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native resistance, particularly in German Southwest Africa inspired new debates about 
the genocide of the Herero and Nama and the role it played on influencing future Nazi 
ideology and practices.44 Other works studied generational connections of Nazi leaders 
like Hermann Goering, whose father was the first governor of Southwest Africa.45  
A further critical recent development in the historiography is the reexamination 
of earlier works on German imperialism and its legacy, shedding new light on core texts 
with the benefit of new primary source and archival materials.46 Most recently, scholars 
have moved towards situating imperialism at the heart of popular culture, treating 
colonialism as a key part of the Second Reich.47 As a part of this new direction—and 
building upon the work of Sebastian Conrad, Shelley Baranowski, Suzanne Marchand, 
and Kristin Kopp—I will write a history that sees colonialism as a nexus of interests 
centered on the colony itself. 
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While German colonial studies continue to branch out, Germany’s role in the 
Pacific remains understudied, although the corpus of literature has continued to grow.48 
None of the works that study Qingdao offer a complete examination of the colony. 
Rather, these works put the colony into broader contexts such as German navalism, or 
make it the focus of theoretical works, such as George Steinmetz’s sophisticated study of 
colonial identity and ethnography.49 As scholars explore new methodologies, they have 
moved away from seeing German colonial policy as monolithic. By shifting the focus to 
life in the colony, scholars have found other ways in which Germans envisioned their 
role in the empire. The models that garner the most attention are ones directly related to 
German Africa (exploitation of the native populations and raw materials) or Eastern 
Europe, which stressed the expansion of Heimat and preservation of ethnic purity in 
historically German lands.50  In the few studies of German colonialism in Asia, the 
concept of a German Hong Kong (and the competing visions therein) has received little 
attention; some works note this vision of empire and its use, but none have studied it in 
particular detail.51   
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In studying middle managers of empire, I am building upon a new emphasis on 
“History from the Middle.” In a recent article, Paul Kennedy noted a neglect of “mid-
level History, the analysis of how things got done, and who did it.”52 Such an approach is 
common in other fields, especially business.53 Historians, however, have been slow to 
study mid-level actors.54 Mid-level causal history is key to understanding the 
significance of history from above and below. While imperialism itself is an abstraction, 
it was the middle management of empire who were the faces and voices of that 
abstraction and who lived and shaped the colonial experience in Tsingtau. 
 Recently, historians have had increased interest in breaking away from national 
narratives and exploring topics such as nationalism and state expansion globally and 
transnationally.  As a result, scholars are now examining globalization during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as transnational studies of colonialism 
and imperialism.55 With this rise in interest in the roots of globalization and transnational 
history, scholars have identified German colonial history as a field filled with possibility 
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in enhancing our understanding of both areas.56 My dissertation is an important step 
forward in this regard, as one of the appeals of the short-lived project in Tsingtau was 
that colonists and colonial administrators emphasized cooperation with the native 
Chinese. While earlier studies wrote the Chinese out of the story of Tsingtau, I explore 
transcultural borrowings and influences that affected Germany’s globalization and the 
ways in which it viewed its growth as a world power. 
 Each chapter of this work studies an element of the colony crucial to expressing 
the German Hong Kong vision for Tsingtau. Treated thematically, they focus on major 
developments in the colony, problems and challenges encountered in trying to define 
what the colony should be, and the overall progress made in laying the foundation for 
Tsingtau’s further growth and success. Chapters I and II detail the pre-history and early 
history of Tsingtau and the Kioachow Leasehold, before the German Hong Kong vision 
began to take serious hold. The first chapter studies the foundation for the Hong Kong 
model, examining how a diverse collection of academic, religious, and commercial 
interests fused their interests in China with those of the Imperial Navy in order to secure a 
greater presence in China and, ultimately a formal colony. This chapter also explores the 
Navy’s role in selecting Tsingtau as the location for a naval port and colony and the 
actions that turned the seizure of Tsingtau into a matter of formal state policy. Although 
the notion that Germany needed a colony like Hong Kong existed during this early 
period, it was far from being well-defined as a potential policy; nevertheless, this chapter 
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shows that the foundations for this method of colonial rule were clearly being laid. 
Chapter II examines the administrative structure of the colony and the early years of the 
colony as the new naval administration sought to demonstrate it was capable of running a 
colony and was better equipped to do so than any other branch of the German government 
or even any other colonial power. This chapter shows that this early phase of the colony 
(1898-1905) were the most difficult years for Tsingtau, as colonial leaders struggled to 
define what Tsingtau should be, what role, if any at all, the Chinese should play in the 
Leasehold, and how to attain the goals laid out prior to the acquisition of the colony. 
By 1905, however, colonial policy and governance in Tsingtau began to shift, as 
the objectives of the various colonial leadership groups coalesced into the pursuit of a 
German Hong Kong. Although this vision remained only very broadly defined throughout 
the remaining years of the German colony, it provided exactly the guiding principles that 
allowed Tsingtau to grow and flourish. Chapters III through V, then, study the different 
visions of German Hong Kong, how they interacted and competed with each other, and 
how they helped spur Tsingtau’s rise as one of the premiere colonial entrepôts in East 
Asia. One of the central elements discussed in each of these chapters-and perhaps the 
most difficult issue for colonial leaders to reach consensus on-was the role that Chinese 
should play. As these chapters will show, German and Chinese elites both recognized that 
the Chinese needed to be an important element in the life of the colony as a go-between 
for German and Chinese authorities, but how and where those interactions should take 
place remained a hotly contested and debated issue. Chapter III examines the Tsingtau’s 
rise as an international port and trade center vis-à-vis the construction of roads and 
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railroads and the expansion of the harbor and port. The next chapter describes the growth 
of trade and industry, focusing on both the industries supported and subsidized by the 
German government and colonial administration, as well as efforts made to encourage the 
Chinese businessmen and traders to invest in Tsingtau and establish businesses there. The 
cultural, social, and political aspects of the vision for Tsingtau are treated in the final 
chapter by examining the culmination of the pursuit of a German Hong Kong: the 
development of education in the colony, focusing particularly on the founding of the 
Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule. Employing both German and Chinese teachers that 
taught a mixed curriculum whose advanced degrees served as acceptable prerequisites for 
German and Chinese officials, the Hochschule and its mission easily supported the 
colonial vision for Tsingtau by providing the tools necessary to create a special 
interlocutor class.  
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CHAPTER II  
FROM THE NORTH SEA TO KIAOCHOW BAY: THE EMERGENCE OF 
GERMAN INTERESTS IN CHINESE TERRITORY 
 
 On the night of All Saints’ Day, 1 November 1897, three members of the 
German religious organization the Society of the Divine Word (Societas Verbum Divini, 
or SVD, also known as the Steyl Society), George Stentz, Richard Henle, and Francis 
Xavier Nies, gathered at the missionary residence in Zhangjiazhung, in the Juye county 
of Shantung province.  The residence was Stentz’s main base of operations, and Henle 
and Nies were his honored guests on this night.  Henle was particularly discouraged by 
the lack of progress he perceived in his work, and so Stentz treated the visit as an 
opportunity not only to revive Henle’s spirit, but also for the three SVD leaders to renew 
their strength and commitment to their cause.  They sang songs and shared stories from 
their childhoods in Germany as well as preparing for the next day’s Requiem before 
retiring for the night.   
Just before midnight, the sounds of guns and indecipherable voices filled the 
courtyard, and the blazing light of torches illuminated the night.  Suddenly, a group of 
twenty or thirty men rushed towards Stentz’s rooms, but did not find him; instead, they 
stumbled upon Henle and Nies, as Stentz had lent his own quarters to his visitors.  
Although these men were not the ones whom the band sought, the invaders hacked and 
beat Henle and Nies to death.  Still determined to take Stentz’s life, the band rampaged 
through the church, bent on finding him, but to no avail; Stentz had retired to the 
servant’s quarters for the evening.  The invaders never found him, for by this time, the 
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Christians in the village finally arrived to defend the mission, forcing the invaders to 
disband and retreat into the darkness from whence they came.57 
 Although attacks on Christian missionaries in China were not uncommon, the 
murder of Henle and Nies set off a chain of events that had important consequences for 
the future presence of Germany in China.  When word of the deaths of the two 
missionaries reached Kaiser Wilhelm II on 6 November, he immediately authorized the 
dispatch of the German East Asia Cruiser Division-currently based at Shanghai-to sail 
northward and occupy Kiaochow Bay, on the southern coastline of the Shantung 
peninsula.58  At the center of the occupation was the tiny fishing village and port of 
Qingdao.59  Over the next several months, as the German government negotiated the 
retribution and repayment for the deaths of the two missionaries, Qingdao and its 
environs ultimately came into Germany’s possession, launching not only the Scramble 
for Concessions in China, but, more importantly, the beginning of a concrete German 
presence in Asia and the Pacific.   
Although the seizure of Qingdao itself was sudden and unexpected due to the 
chaos of the events precipitating it, it represented the culmination of decades of work to 
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convince leaders in Berlin that the Reich needed to have a strong presence in China if it 
ever wanted to be considered a global power on par with its European rivals.  From 1860 
until the mid-1890s, the definition of German interest in gaining territory in China was 
relatively narrow.  Prominent individuals such as Ferdinand von Richthofen, Otto von 
Diederichs, and Bishop Johann Baptist Anzer were all significant in the formation of a 
coterie of religious/spiritual, commercial, and academic interests that pushed for Chinese 
territory, but found little support within the German government.  Although a coalition 
of influential single-issue advocates, the members of this group were not necessarily 
politically powerful. While it was able to catch the attention of prominent government 
officials at times, this conglomeration of interests generally failed to make any real 
headway in advancing its agenda; it remained a powerful set of voices that was unable to 
wield much influence until they it could match its desires with the interests of the state.  
The only government department that supported this interest group with any consistency 
was the Imperial Navy, as it not only shared the beliefs of these advocates—particularly 
from the commercial angle—but also because leaders in the navy felt they could benefit 
from the support of the leading individuals who formed this collection of interests. 
 This chapter will show how it was not until this group of academic, religious, 
naval, and commercial interests was able to take advantage of domestic politics that it 
was able to turn its desires into state policy, leading to the creation of a powerful, largely 
Catholic, interest group.  Initially a faction of loosely-connected partisans, these 
individuals pushed for a German colony in China based on an enduring cultural critique 
of China.  Despite the influence this group could wield over specific single issues, it 
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remained on the margins of the political scene until its interests aligned with those of 
more significant political factions. When the interests of these academics, businessmen 
and other mid-level officials finally met with those of the Catholic German politics, this 
group became politically useful to a party that was also valuable to the Imperial Naval 
Secretary, Alfred Tirpitz.  In 1897, the demands of the Anglo-German Naval Race 
compelled Tirpitz to turn to the Catholic Center Party for their crucial vote of support for 
his Naval Bill, resulting in his promise to promote an increased German presence in the 
Far East to protect the increasing number of Catholics there.  As a result, Germany 
secured Tsingtau and parts of the Shantung peninsula.   
Nevertheless, while it was the combination of domestic politics and the timely 
attack on and murder of German missionaries that provided the casus for the creation of 
a German colony in China, the story of how Germany finally acquired a colony in China 
has much deeper routes than the policy debates of the 1890s. The story of the 
establishment of a German colony in China is one of more than fifty years of prior 
engagement with China, the slow creation of an “interest group,” and a sustained interest 
on the part of the Prussian-German state in some type of German presence in East Asia. 
This is punctuated by moments at which that engagement accelerated, providing a 
durable foundation for advancing the desires of the German-China interest group that 
culminated in the establishment of Tsingtau. From the dispatch of a trade mission in 
1853 to take advantage of the Unequal Treaties that ended the Opium Wars and protect 
commercial interests at home and abroad to Ferdinand von Richthofen’s chronicles of 
his travels in China in the 1860s, the Prussian government seized the momentum that 
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these events generated to establish the East Asia Squadron in 1869, a critical decision 
that further deepened German involvement in China in the years just prior to unification.  
Once the political scene in Europe calmed following the upheavals caused by 
Bismarck’s foreign policy, the Imperial Navy’s tour of the East Asia station in 1878-
1880 provided another signal moment for German political figures interested in China to 
advance their cause and make a compelling argument for further interaction with and 
development in East Asia. This tour was also crucially important for the development of 
Germany’s presence in China as the Executive Officer of SMS Luise, the flagship of this 
expedition, was Otto von Diederichs. Diederichs would come to play a crucial role in the 
acquisition of Kiaochow, when, in 1897, he replaced Rear Admiral Tirpitz as the 
Commanding Officer of the East Asian Cruiser Division. One of Diederichs’ first tasks 
was to suggest a suitable site for a German naval base as strategic interests finally 
convinced the German government it should acquire territory in China. Drawing upon 
his experiences in East Asia-particularly the 1878-1880 tour of the East Asia Station-his 
further investigations in China, and his knowledge of von Richthofen’s studies, he 
recommended Tsingtau as the most suitable location.60 
In the 1890s, following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the 
Sino-Japanese War (the negotiation of which German played a leading role), and with a 
growing desire for a more powerful overseas force that could compete with that of 
Britain and-to a lesser extent-France, the Naval Bill debate and then the murder of the 
Chinese missionaries presented the German government with a chance to deepen its 
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involvement in China in a much more concrete and lasting fashion by establishing a 
formal colonial presence there.  
This chapter, then, explores how Germany came to Shantung by examining the 
steady development of German interest in East Asia and the moments that punctuated its 
growing engagement and interaction with China, the culmination of which was the 
crucial role strategic concerns played in the formation of a foreign policy that resulted in 
the foundation of Tsingtau and Germany’s emergence as a global power.  While it is 
unclear whether the murder of Henle and Nies provided the pretext for the acquisition of 
Tsingtau or was simply the cause of it, it is certain that Germany would not have been 
able to take advantage of this circumstance without the presence of a sizable Pacific 
naval squadron, created as a result of nuanced and developed policy regarding China that 
played a key role in a significant political back-room agreement in the halls of the 
Reichstag a few years earlier.  
German imperial interests in China dates back much further than the madcap 
scramble for colonies and colonial enclaves at the height era of New Imperialism in the 
1880s.61  Germans had been highly involved in China and East Asia for nearly two 
centuries, including a major flourishing of interest during the reign of Frederick the 
Great (1740-1786). Inspired by the enlightened philosopher and writer Voltaire, 
Frederick, and those who followed his example, developed a considerable passion for all 
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things Chinese, particularly Chinese art, porcelain, philosophy, and other exotic goods, 
leading to the rise of the Chinoiserie aesthetic style. Overland trade routes to North 
China were quite popular, and sea trade with Canton provided excellent access to 
Chinese markets as well. Though this passion for China would wane, particularly due to 
Napoleon’s rise to power and conquest of Europe, connection with the Far East never 
fully dissipated. As peace slowly returned after 1815, businessmen across Germany 
sought to reinvigorate the old Chinese markets, as well as develop new ones. As a result, 
as relations with China began to stabilize in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
Chinoiserie saw a revival in popularity in Europe and the United States that lasted 
through the 1920s.62  
With the start of the Opium War in 1839, commercial interests in the German 
Bund first began to express the concerns that continued to occupy attention of all 
German businessmen until Germany seized control of the Kiaochow Leasehold. While 
excited that an increased British presence in China would open a variety of new 
commercial ventures and increased trade, Prussian merchants feared Britain would gain 
too much influence, resulting in a de facto monopoly over Chinese trade.  As a result, 
these merchants and traders pleaded with the Prussian government to enter the conflict 
as well to defend their interests.  Prussian leaders, however, opposed becoming involved.  
In refusing to join the Opium War, the government cited concerns that came to link the 
interests of a narrow commercial pressure group with those of the navy: “even 
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if…interests in China warranted intervention, and it [the Prussian government] did not 
believe they did, such intervention was impossible because Prussia had no fleet.”63   
Beginning with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking with the British at the end 
of the First Opium War in 1842, China was compelled to sign a series of “unequal 
treaties” with foreign powers that eroded its territorial integrity and its power and 
authority as an independent state. The treaty of Nanking forced China to surrender the 
island of Hong Kong to the British-creating the first sphere of influence in China. Over 
time, Britain came to exert its control over the lower Yangtze River from its bases in 
Hong Kong and Shanghai, whereas France established its sphere over southern China 
from Canton (Guangzhou), and Russia moved in from the north and west. While the 
privileges granted by an Unequal Treaty were extended to all Europeans (in Shanghai, 
for example, European freely worked and mingled in a designated “international zone”), 
the benefits of controlling territory of one’s own were considerable.64 
Following the war and the first treaty settlements, the Prussian government 
remained limited in pursuing action in China, forcing any German commercial ventures 
to depend upon the protection of England or France.  The experience of subordinating 
themselves to foreign power was influential in galvanizing support for an increase in the 
official presence of Prussia or another of the leading German states in East Asia and the 
Pacific. Although expressing his views long after the First Opium War, Ernst Friedrich 
Addickes, a ship owner in Bremen and member of the Reichstag representing the 
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National Liberal Party, expressed that he found it “scarcely tolerable that [German] 
seafarers…have had [since 1839] to depend on foreign powers for their protection in the 
Pacific and South Seas.”65 A decade later, Addickes’ friend and business colleague, 
Adolf von Hansemann, the head of the prominent German banking firm, Diskonto-
Gesellschaft, captured the views of business and commercial leaders of both his 
generation and that of his father (a banker and railroad entrepreneur who founded 
Diskonto) when he wrote in a later memorandum:  
A state with colonies requires its own productive enterprises, its trade, and its 
shipping lines so that these provide a significant advantage in the economic 
relations with the colonies, and naturally a meaningful step ahead in the 
competition with other states…Germany’s justification [for a permanent 
presence in East Asia] lies in the numerous and extensive German settlements 
and Hanseatic trading establishments scattered about [East Asia’s waters], in the 
share its trading flag has in the shipping in the South Seas…and in the harbors 
which German sea power has secured. The next task lies therein to strengthen 
this claim.66 
 
Strengthening official ties between the German interests in East Asia and the 
Prussian/German government remained a critically important policy point for liberal 
businessmen and corporations throughout the nineteenth century. While the Asian and 
Chinese markets were ripe for generating considerable profits, those interested in 
deriving the wealth they believe could be found overseas recognized early that, without 
the support and protection of the government, German trade would always lag behind its 
competitors in Europe. 
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 One of the first major turning points regarding the German presence in China 
occurred in 1859 when the Prussian government bowed to growing pressure for active 
involvement in China by sending a diplomatic expedition to China to negotiate trade 
treaties on behalf of all the German states.  At this time, Britain and France begun to 
reach a new set of agreements with China that expanded and consolidated the privileges 
that they had secured following the Opium Wars. The Prussian government wanted to 
secure similar concessions for the German states, over which it was gaining an increased 
influence.  This decision to act more decisively in East Asian affairs was also motivated 
by a shift in Prussian politics whose intent was to convince a liberal middle class 
advocating German unification that Prussia was the modern progressive state best 
handled to do so. Consequently, the Prussian government used this opportunity for 
intervention in China to bolster both its influence in Germany and its power projection in 
East Asia.67 Not only was this the first time that Prussia stepped forward to represent the 
interests of all Germans in international negotiations—an important moment in the 
unification movement—but it was also the first time that a Prussian fleet was used to 
intervene in Chinese affairs.   
Authorizing the creation of a squadron of four ships under the command of 
Commander Henrik Sundewall, the East Asian Expedition (1859-1861) sailed from 
Prussia in October 1859. In addition to visiting German nationals scattered across 
various coastal cities in East Asia, Sundewall had orders to show the Prussian flag at 
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major ports-of-call in Southeast and East Asia-both those under British and French 
control as well as non-colonial ones-and also investigate the potential growth and 
development of German trade in the region.  At the head of the expedition was Friedrich 
zu Eulenburg, the future Interior Minister of Prussia (1862-1878), and Maximilian von 
Brandt, the future ambassador to Peking (1875-1893) as well as an advocate of opening 
relations with Japan.  A junior member of the expedition was Ferdinand von Richthofen, 
whom the German government asked to head a team of scientists to survey and study the 
regions the expedition traveled to with an eye towards the future development of trade. 
As one of Germany’s leading sinologists, his influential position as the foremost expert 
on China would play a major role in the push for a colony in China and the selection of 
Tsingtau in the decades to follow. Furthermore, a number of promising young officers 
and cadets staffed the crews of the four vessels, several of whom would attain high-
ranking and influential positions in the imperial navy at exactly the time that Germany 
decided to investigate securing a colony in China more seriously. Otto von Diederichs, 
an aspiring young schoolboy who dreamed of service in the navy (and who would come 
to be heavily involved in naval matters in the Far East), followed news of this mission 
with rapt attention.68 
In what was becoming a recurring theme in Germany’s quest for a stronger 
presence in East Asia, Germany sought to follow the example of the British. Eulenberg 
was ordered to secure the same concessions, rights, and protections that the British had 
obtained in the Treaty of Nanking, as well as investigate the prospect of obtaining a 
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sphere of influence that could be developed into a commercial port and naval base on par 
with Hong Kong; Eulenberg deemed Formosa (Taiwan) the best potential option, 
although other locations could be considered. 
Although he ran into initial difficulties in his negotiations due to the fact that the 
Chinese were not especially impressed with the Prussians, Eulenberg proved to be 
extremely successful in his carrying out his duties, as he signed treaties with China, 
Japan, and Siam in 1861. The treaties were landmark agreements, as they placed 
Prussian merchants and businesses on equal footing with the European and American 
counterparts; Prussians were allowed full access to the new markets in Japan, and the 
treaty with China granted the same rights as the “unequal treaties” that France and 
Britain had already signed. Germans were granted access to the treaty ports of Canton, 
Amoy (Xiamen), Shanghai, and Swatow (Shantou), and naval vessels had express 
permission to conduct operations in Chinese waters in order to protect its vessels and 
trade interests. Prussia also secured financial remuneration from the Chinese government 
in the event of losses suffered at the hands of pirates, as well as the right to Prussian 
legal justice in the case of crimes committed by Chinese against Germans nationals and 
vice-versa. According to the agreement, Prussia would continue to represent its fellow 
German states at the ministerial level, though the various Hansastädte (independent 
trading cities, such as Bremen and Hamburg) could still have their own consuls in the 
newly-opened ports.69 
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At the conclusion of negotiations with the Qing government, von Richthofen and 
another member of the Prussian expedition traveled to Formosa, with the express 
purpose of determining whether the island would be suitable for the construction of port 
that could serve both naval and commercial interests, or as von Richthofen put it, the 
“creation of a German Hong Kong.”70  While von Richthofen’s report was positive, 
Eulenburg remained disinterested and informed his superiors that it lacked suitable 
harbors and, in general, was not the best choice for a naval station.  Nevertheless, he 
made it clear that “in the not too distant future [Germany] would require a base in China 
if the privileges obtained in the treaty were to be fully realized.”71   
Over the course of the 1860s, commercial and naval elites interested in China 
continued to press the Prussian government to take a firmer stance in East Asia and 
present itself as a leading power in that region of the world. With stronger connections to 
East Asia firmly established, and as Prussia began dominating affairs and consolidating 
its hegemony in the German Bund, the navy started to make the Far East a part of its 
strategic operations. As Albrecht Roon-Prussia’s Minister of War (1859-1873) and one 
of the main architects of German unification-sketched out the need an imperial navy in 
his development plan of 1865, he considered overseas missions to be one of its key 
duties. Consequently, leaders in the academic and commercial circles found new life for 
their dream of acquiring German territory in China. Von Richthofen, in particular, 
remained firm in his beliefs that Prussia (and the entire German Bund) could profit 
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immensely from a stronger Sino-German relationship.  Following his time as a member 
of the Peking Expedition, von Richthofen spent six years in the United States working as 
a geographer during the California gold rush. The growing racist sentiment against 
Chinese workers in the United States at this time seemed to have a strong impact on von 
Richthofen, for he expressed his belief that “the Chinese question would soon replace 
the ‘Negro question’ in importance in the United States.72 In 1868, von Richthofen 
returned to China, where he spent four years traveling throughout the country with the 
express purpose of surveying and mapping the mining potential of China’s interior for 
the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. Von Richthofen also used this excursion to gather 
materials for what became his multi-volume geographic study of the country.   
Throughout his travels, von Richthofen built upon his task from the 1859 diplomatic 
mission, keeping his eyes open for the best location for a German colony.   
Like many others in Europe and America at this time, von Richthofen expressed 
a clear interest in “opening up” China and making it useful for western capitalism and 
missionary work. During the time he spent traveling across China, he took the 
opportunity to write two memoranda to Otto von Bismarck—the first in 1868 and the 
second in 1871—in which he stressed the importance of acquiring a permanent foothold 
in East Asia for the newly emerging German state.73  In the opening volume of his five-
volume study of China, published in 1877, von Richthofen emphasized that he was 
searching for a spot “which not only could serve as a naval base but which could also 
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become an important trading center.”74  Von Richthofen continued to push this point to 
the German government, never relenting in his interest in China or his search for a 
suitable colonial enclave. 
Initially, von Richthofen found the island of Tschusan (Chusan/Zhoushan), 
located off the southern coast of Shantung at the mouths of Hangzhou Bay and the 
Yangtze River, as the ideal location for a German port, although he remained open to 
other possibilities as well.75  Tschusan’s location (or a similar spot nearby) offered, 
according to von Richthofen, “limitless commercial opportunities because it was located 
directly off the Yangtze River, China’s chief avenue for commerce.”  In further 
advocating for a port such as Tschusan, von Richthofen argued that the island’s central 
location on the East China Sea made it the perfect spot for Germany to establish itself as 
a major player in China.   
Prior to the Opium Wars, Tschusan had served as a major trading entrepôt for 
western merchants, along with Shanghai and Nanking. During the First Opium War, 
Britain seized the island as one of its main prizes and only surrendered Tschusan when 
Captain Charles Eliot, the Chief Superintendent of British Trade in China, agreed to 
exchange the island for Hong Kong, then a barren and undeveloped island much further 
south, a blunder that incensed Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston and cost Eliot his 
position. Britain ultimately lost interest in Tschusan following the signing of the Treaty 
of Nanking, which opened Canton, Foochow (Fuzhou), Amoy, Ningpo (Ningbo), and 
                                                 
74 Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen, China, volume 1 (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1912), p. 44. 
75 von Richthofen, Tagebücher, volume 1, p. 44. 
 56 
Shanghai to British trade, making the island redundant to British plans.76 With the island 
off the radar of established powers Britain and France, von Richthofen argued that the 
development of a port there would “quickly attract a large part of the trade from 
Shanghai” (located 200 kilometers to the north), and, since it would serve as “a free port 
under foreign protection” more centrally located than Hong Kong (nearly 1500 
kilometers to the south), it could “take over the combined role of Hong Kong and 
Shanghai for the greater part of Chinese commerce.”77   
Additionally, von Richthofen advised German leaders to “improve the means of 
transportation… [and promote] the growth of industry and trade” by laying telegraph 
lines and building railroads in Shantung and other parts of northern China.  Although 
these measures would also benefit other European powers, most notably Russia given its 
close proximity to the region, their implementation, von Richthofen argued, would 
bolster German penetration of Chinese markets and establish a stronger base for a new 
colony that would be at the center of a modern rail and telegraph network for which 
Germany would be largely responsible.78 
The large corpus of articles, studies, and monographs that von Richthofen 
produced during the late 1860s, the 1870s, and the 1880s were integral in helping frame 
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the growing debate in Germany over what to do with China.  Nevertheless, despite the 
growing interest in China and the urging of members of this informal agglomeration of 
interests, the government made no serious attempts to act on these recommendations.  In 
the early stages of his work on China, von Richthofen encountered some success, as the 
memorandum he wrote to Bismarck in 1868 appeared to help push the Chancellor to 
action. After considering von Richthofen’s support and engaging in a series of 
discussions with Roon, Bismarck authorized the designation of East Asia as a formal 
area of action, and the creation of an East Asia Station patrolled by two corvettes and 
two gunboats, ships that were commonly used by other powers to facilitate diplomacy 
with China. This was the first command of the Prussian Navy (later the Imperial German 
Navy following unification in 1871) in foreign waters.  
Lacking any formal colony or naval base in the region, however, the warships 
stationed in East Asia were highly reliant on ports and stations such as Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, Nagasaki, and Canton, all of which were under the control of other states. The 
absence of a base quickly proved to be a major hindrance, particularly in times of crisis 
(both European and Asian), as it could be difficult to maneuver the warships on short 
notice. The weather conditions in East Asia, especially in the spring and summer, also 
meant that the Prussian ships needed constant maintenance and provisioning, which 
could become considerably expensive, as contractors and suppliers charged a premium 
to foreign vessels. The considerable demands of the East Asian Station caused enough 
concern that Chancellor Bismarck authorized an exploration of potential sites for a base 
in 1869. At the same time, German politicians, merchants, and academics began to push 
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the Chancellor for the seizure of a colonial base in China with the goal of creating “a 
German Macao or Hong Kong.”79 
Responding to this increased pressure, Bismarck took the opportunity to advance 
German engagement and presence in East Asia. In 1870, Bismarck authorized the 
Prussian Minister to China, Guido von Rehfues (1864-1875), to negotiate with the Qing 
government about the acquirement of a naval base and port for the North German 
Confederation.  Rehfues’ attempts at negotiation with the Chinese did not proceed very 
far, for, as he reported, “China would not agree to the German demand and Berlin could 
expect no support from the other European powers.”80  Bismarck’s plan ultimately had 
to be postponed due to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War and the new concerns 
following German unification.81 As a reflection of Prussia’s commitment to increasing 
its presence abroad, however, the navy opened its first coaling station in East Asia, 
providing greater support and resources for merchant and naval vessels in the region.  
Despite the unrealized objectives, Bismarck’s decision to investigate this 
possibility is significant, as Bismarck was reluctant at best to pursue overseas 
entanglements.  According to Jonathan Schrecker, “Bismarck generally supported 
colonial ventures only when they were warranted by genuine commercial interests or by 
the exigencies of internal politics.”82 During this period of German politics, Bismarck 
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showed a greater desire to support liberal commercial policies domestically, opening the 
door for him to do so externally as well. Between 1867 and 1870, Bismarck’s 
government introduced and passed a series of bills intended to help unify and liberalize 
the newly created German Bund, including a new law on freedom of trade and crafts-
breaking traditional guild restrictions on the practice of a trade-as well as the Public 
Company’s Act, which made it considerably easier to establish and support new limited 
liability corporations.83 This desire to support more liberal trade policies domestically in 
the pursuit of a strong and unified Germany under Prussian leadership offered space for 
those who desired overseas colonies to seek Bismarck’s support for their objectives, 
particularly if they could then help the Iron Chancellor secure his own. Furthermore, as 
Paul Kennedy argues, Bismarck was not unresponsive to the cries for help from North 
German colonial traders during this period. While viewing colonies as an expensive 
luxury, providing a calculated response to the pressures placed on German trade in the 
Pacific and South West Africa was one of the motivations for Bismarck’s willingness to 
investigate-and in later years actively pursue-the acquisition of overseas territory.84 
Bismarck’s early interest in a German base in China is indicative of the power 
and influence that men who supported a German presence there, such as von Richthofen, 
could wield as influential voices in state politics and that there existed an increasingly 
widespread understanding that Germany had a strong economic stake in China. The 
failure to push Bismarck to continue to pursue this action, however, also exposed the 
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inability of this interest group to wield enough political clout to force the government to 
take definitive action. Although Bismarck chose not to act in 1870, von Richthofen 
refused to give up, and he continued publishing works on the vast potential of a colony 
in China. These studies of China were quite influential, particularly in terms of the 
impact on naval officials like Otto von Diederichs, whose service as second-in-command 
on a mission to China in 1878 helped transform Germany’s presence in East Asia. 
Diederichs was a career naval officer, whose first experience with China and East 
Asia came with his dispatch to the Pacific in 1878 for a two-year tour of duty. With a 
growing German presence in the Far East over the course of the 1870s, the need for 
warships to conduct operations in and around China increased exponentially. In July 
1877, the German Ambassador to China, Maximilian von Brandt, pled with Bernhard 
Ernst von Bülow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (1873-1879), to send aid and support 
to protect the lives and property of German merchants under threat from xenophobic 
groups. Von Brandt reported that, according to local businessmen, “shops are vandalized 
and looted, and foreigners endure increasingly violent attacks from the Chinese because 
of poor harvest and famine.” As a result, von Brandt asked for the Imperial Navy to 
station a warship at Tientsin until the end of winter and for the ships of the East Asia 
station to undertake more regular patrols of Chinese waters.85 In response to the 
ambassador’s plea, the Reichsmarine ordered the SMS Luise, with Commander Rudolf 
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Schering at the helm and Otto von Diederichs as the ship’s executive officer, to conduct 
a two-year tour of the East Asia Station beginning on October 1878.86  
 Although the Luise’s orders also included testing several new torpedoes of the 
Whitehead class-whose technological development Diederichs had worked on personally 
while was a staff officer at the Marineakademie (Naval War College), 1875-1878-as 
well as conducting oceanographic research, its main mission took Brandt’s concerns into 
strong consideration. According to the official orders from Admiral Albrecht von Stosch 
(the first chief of the Imperial German Navy, 1872-1883), Luise was to “proceed to 
Hong Kong and station itself in Chinese waters to protect German interests.” While the 
warship’s main operations would take place in the waters around Amoy, China, and 
Yokohama, Japan, it was also instructed to “show the German flag on all parts of the 
station… [and follow the] Imperial Directions for the Operation of Ships in Station in 
East Asia…[and] Standing Instructions in regard to the Suppression of Pirates in 
Chinese Waters.” Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Schering was directed to 
provide whatever assistance Brandt might need as diplomatic concerns warranted, 
although Schering could “undertake no military action without first notifying imperial 
agents.” This was particularly the case in any crisis that might arise with the French, as 
tensions still rode high following the Franco-Prussian War; Luise and its crew were to 
avoid any confrontation with French ships and sailors while on station. Nevertheless, 
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Stosch’s instructions were clear: “Take all necessary precautions to ensure that the ship 
is prepared for combat and to carry out her anticipated military and naval duties.”87 
 By and large, Luise’s mission was a resounding success. Although Diederichs’ 
torpedo tests produced mixed results, he returned with extensive data that would help in 
improving the Whitehead’s design. Additionally, Luise made several important stops 
both on its way to Chinese waters (Bombay and Calcutta) and on it return journey home 
(Madagascar). At both Bombay and Calcutta, major ports of call on the western and 
eastern coasts of British India, Luise was the first German naval ship to anchor in their 
respective harbors. These official visits represented major opportunities to display the 
German flag and project German naval power. In Madagascar, Luise stopped at the port 
of Tamatave, the center of commerce for the island. Though the expatriate community 
was small-twenty-two Europeans, four of which were Germans, resided in Tamatave, 
and five firms-German businessmen there recognized the considerable potential Luise’s 
visit held for developing trade and good relations on the island. While Madagascar was 
still independent at this time, it had fallen under the increasing influence of the French, 
with whom it had formed strong trade and diplomatic relations. The German consul, who 
was also an employee of Hamburg-Amerika Linie, had been working to counter France’s 
efforts, and requested Luise’s visit with the hope that its presence would impress, or 
even pressure, Madagascar’s monarch, Queen Ranavalona I, to open formal relations 
and offer favorable trading rights, allowing Germany to take advantage of the island’s 
economic potential. Although the visit was not without its difficulties, it produced the 
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desired effect, as Ranavalona agreed to sign a commercial convention with the German 
government.88 
During their tour in East Asia, Schering, Diederichs, and Luise’s crew discharged 
their duties very much in accordance with Brandt’s wishes.89  After arriving at Hong 
Kong and then spending the winter of 1878-1879 in Japanese waters, Luise’s first stop 
upon its return to Chinese waters was at the small British treaty port on the northern 
coast of the Shantung peninsula, Chefoo (Yantai). Although not an ideal location for 
large ships to anchor, Chefoo was centrally located at the entrance to the Gulf of Chihli 
(Bohai Sea) and the naval routes to Peking. Given its proximity to the Chinese capital, 
violence against foreigners was quite commonplace, and a recent famine had led to such 
extreme tension between natives and foreigners that Ambassador Brandt now requested 
Luise’s presence to help protect German nationals and trade interests. While the German 
expatriate population was relatively small at this time (numbering about twenty 
individuals), 150 German vessels visited the harbor on an annual basis, and so the port 
was important to the merchant community in East Asia. Fortunately for Schering and his 
crew, no direct military or naval action was required, and the warship was able to 
continue its tour after the anti-western violence finally subsided. 
While on patrol in Chinese waters, Schering took time to assess the status of 
Germany’s naval presence in East Asia, particularly with an eye towards future German 
involvement in the region. Although Schering recognized that, from a strategic 
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standpoint, the resources that Germany could devote to expanding its presence in East 
Asia were limited, his time on tour also revealed the considerable potential that China 
offered Consequently, while the government might not be able to act on his 
recommendations, Schering wanted to lay the foundation for Germany to alter the 
balance of forces should the calculus on German involvement in the Far East change. 
Schering’s report, first and foremost, observed that the East Asia station could not 
successfully discharge its duties with only three permanent vessels and a rotation of 
larger vessels, such as Luise; the waters around China and Japan were too extensive, and 
the fast-paced development of trade and subsequent diplomatic crises that arose 
demanded an increased naval presence in the Pacific. Furthermore, Schering also 
commented upon the lack of a defined command structure within the East Asia 
Squadron. Though Schering was the most senior officer in the station, he had little 
authority to command the other vessels stationed there, as they were nominally under the 
direct control of the Admiralty in Berlin; such confusion, Schering asserted, could lead 
to difficulties in responding quickly and effectively should a truly major crisis erupt. 
This lack of a distinct chain of command also resulted in copious (and, in Schering’s 
opinion, highly redundant) paperwork having to be filed in order to accomplish 
objectives handed down by the Admiralty.90 
Despite the many success that Luise enjoyed, the ship also encountered a series 
of difficulties on its tour, further highlighting-to Schering and those who supported his 
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views-the necessity for a greater German presence in East Asia. On two separate 
occasions, Luise suffered damage that required extensive repairs while stationed in 
Chinese waters; these problems were hard to handle, particularly due to the fact that 
there were few places equipped to perform such repairs.  These experiences left a lasting 
impression on the young Diederichs, particularly as Luise sailed past Kiaochow Bay on 
its way to Shanghai for the second of its extensive overhauls after providing the 
assistance in Chefoo that Ambassador Brandt had requested.91  
One final crisis in China during Luise’s two-year mission again led to a call for a 
greater German naval presence in East Asian waters. Following the ship’s overhaul in 
Shanghai in October and November 1879, the colder weather that descended on the port 
in late December pushed Schering to sail further south for the winter. While most 
warships chose to winter in the ports of Hong Kong or Manila, Schering directed Luise 
to sail to Amoy, where Germans had enjoyed a close and very positive relationship with 
the local populace. Welcomed openly in the port, Luise and its crew continued its 
training and drills-and also performing valuable services for the port, including clearing 
a shipwreck in the harbor-until winter storms began to interfere with their work, 
requiring Schering and his crew to sail further south. As Luise prepared to depart Amoy 
for Hong Kong in late March 1880, several anxious dispatches from Ambassador Brandt 
resulted in Schering ordering Luise to divert its course to Shanghai. Russia had engaged 
in another imperialistic land grab in China-this time seizing control of the Ili prefecture 
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in western Sinkiang (Xinjiang)-and Brandt was afraid this action might lead to war 
between Russia and China. If war erupted between the two states, Brandt feared the 
renewal of violence directed against all foreigners, endangering German nationals and 
foreign interests. Consequently, Brandt requested the dispatch of Luise and one of the 
East Asia division’s gunboats, Wolf, to Shanghai and Tientsin, respectively, to safeguard 
Germany’s presence in North China.92 Schering knew all too well-and Brandt later 
agreed-that this small display would do little to deter China and Russia from engaging in 
any serious action. Not only was Germany’s ability to project naval power in East Asia 
limited at this time, but Bismarck was still in the process of rebuilding closer ties with 
Russia following the Congress of Berlin in 1878 that severely damaged the relationship 
between the two states. As the Congress, dominated by Bismarck as an “honest broker,” 
stripped Russia of many of its gains from its war with the Ottoman Empire, Russia 
generally viewed it as “a European coalition against Russia under the leadership of 
Prince Bismarck.”93 While relations were showing gradual improvement at this time, the 
likelihood of a successful German intervention designed to thwart Russian foreign policy 
appeared unlikely. 
Despite Germany’s limited ability to prevent the outbreak of war, Schering 
nevertheless agreed to provided whatever assistance he could, though Luise’s stay would 
have to be brief as the ship still had standing orders to be in Hong Kong by 20 April so 
the ship and its crew could prepare for their return voyage on 1 May.94 By the time Luise 
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reached Shanghai on 23 March, the Ili crisis had reached its breaking point: Brandt 
reported outbreaks of violence against foreign nationals in Peking and expressed grave 
fear that Russia was prepared to launch a preemptive strike at Shanghai or Tientsin, 
massing seventy thousand soldiers on the Sino-Russian border and dispatching twenty-
three naval vessels from Vladivostok into Chinese waters.95 
Although war seemed imminent at the end of March, by mid-April cooler heads 
prevailed and both sides backed down. While much of this was due to pressure from 
various members of the international community with a vested interest in preserving 
peace, it had not escaped Brandt’s attention that the presence of a large number of 
British naval ships in the waters surrounding Tientsin and Shanghai had helped convince 
the Chinese and the Russians that war would be inadvisable. Consequently, as Brandt 
wrote to Schering to thank him for his service, he expressed his own conviction that 
Germany desperately needed to increase its naval presence in East Asia and that he 
would write the Reichsmarineamt forthwith about this important issue.96 
With the Ili crisis resolved, Luise returned to Hong Kong to prepare for its return 
journey home. The reminder of the ship’s tour proceeded without much incident-save for 
Luise’s official visit to Tamtave-and Schering, Diederichs, and the rest of the crew safely 
docked in Wilhelmshaven on 9 November 1880. Upon his arrival, Schering received 
good news: not only had the Admiralty deemed Luise’s mission a success, but the 
dispatches from Schering, Diederichs, Brandt, and others about the inadequacies of the 
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East Asia station had made a profound impact in Berlin. With strong backing from the 
Foreign Office, the Reichsmarineamt had produced a report that recommended the 
formation of an East Asia Squadron that would significantly increase Germany’s naval 
commitment in East Asia. Ships dispatched to waters in the Far East would no longer 
operate independently, but rather under the aegis of a single flag officer. The gunboats 
Wolf and Iltis remained an integral part of Germany’s presence in the Pacific, but now 
received support from the steam corvettes Stosch and Hertha, as well as the sail frigate 
Elisabeth, all under the direct command of the squadron’s new commander, Captain 
Louis von Blanc.97 
Nevertheless, despite this increase in the Navy’s presence in East Asian waters 
and the advocacy of leading voices such as von Richthofen, Brandt, Schering, and even 
Tirpitz, high-ranking members of the Admiralty and the German government remained 
unconvinced that Germany needed a base in China. The newly-created East Asia 
Squadron would be able to project German power in the Far East much more effectively, 
and the logistical problems regarding provisioning and maintaining the fleet could still 
be easily handled by making use of friendly ports located in the waters around China and 
Japan. To leaders in Berlin, a limited German naval force in East Asian waters reflected 
a quite rational response to the real and existing needs of the imperial state in the Far 
East.  Until these circumstances changed, in their opinion, there was no need to 
accelerate Germany’s engagement in the region. 
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In the meantime, von Richthofen remained unwavering in his advocacy for a 
German port in China. Upon his return from China in 1873, von Richthofen served as a 
rector of the University of Berlin, while also establishing himself as a leading member of 
the Berlin Geographical Society by giving lectures and writing articles for public 
audiences.98 By the end of the 1870s von Richthofen had established himself as the 
leading expert on Chinese geography, history, and ethnography, all while continuing his 
search for a suitable location for a German colony in China and, in doing so, a means to 
convince the German government to increase its presence there.  As his own popularity 
in Germany grew, so too did a general interest in the pursuit of overseas colonies, 
providing von Richthofen with an ever-widening audience to which he could appeal for 
support. 
 In 1882, he published the second detailed volume on his 1868-1872 journey in 
China, in which he provided a glowing description of Kiaochow Bay and the many 
benefits of its location in Shantung. In doing so, von Richthofen attempted to appeal to a 
number of interests.  He called the bay “the biggest and best ocean harbor in all of 
northern China” which could serve as the logical outlet for the export of the rich mineral 
deposits nearby. Von Richthofen also found that this area would be “especially well-
suited to supply not only of all Shantung but large parts of the great plain with trade 
goods.”99  In his estimation, the construction of a railroad between the bay and the 
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provincial capital of Tsinan would have to traverse the coal-rich regions of the province 
and would also provide a convenient means to distribute the other chief products of the 
region, such as linen and silk.  There even existed the potential for further growth as von 
Richthofen saw Kiaochow Bay as the “only suitable location” for the terminus of a “far 
wider railroad network” that would cover the entirety of Northern China.  Furthermore, 
the location of coal deposits nearby also meant a harbor there could serve as an excellent 
coaling and refueling station for the navy.  Its proximity to Japan and some of the other 
major cities on the Chinese coast, such as Peking, Shanghai, and even Chusan, offered 
important strategic advantages, as a fleet based there could either make a quick strike 
against its enemies, protect its allies, or safeguard German commercial interests should 
the native population threaten them with violence.   
Although it still would be a few years before von Richthofen endorsed Kiaochow 
Bay as the best choice for a German colony, his impassioned appeal left a lasting 
impression on a host of different interests, whose desire for German involvement in 
China continued to grow.  In the early 1880s, for example, the German government—
particularly Bismarck—took a firmer stance in encouraging shipping and trade with and 
in China, culminating in the passage of a government subsidy for German steamship 
passages to and from China; Norddeutscher Lloyd was the first to receive this subsidy in 
1886, followed by Hamburg-Amerika Linie two years later.  German trade with China 
developed rapidly, such that, within a few short years, only Britain was a more important 
source for Chinese imports. As these shipping firms continued to see their profits 
increase, there arose a growing sentiment that Germany needed its own port not only to 
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further bolster trade volumes, but also to further cut out British middlemen, thus 
increasing profits and reducing London’s preeminence as China’s leading trade partner. 
Though Germany was gaining on Britain in the amount of tonnage going into and out of 
Chinese ports, it still lagged far behind its rival. 100 In 1895, Britain transshipped nearly 
20,500,000 tons, while Germany had 2,400,000; nevertheless, this far outpaced 
Germany’s next closest rival, Sweden, which carried only 400,000 tons.101   
German commerce in China flourished in the 1880s such that, by 1895, the 
volume of German business there was second only to Great Britain. Although Germany 
still had much work to do to catch up to and even surpass British numbers, the German 
rise had been so fast and considerable that a strong rivalry had developed between the 
members of the commercial communities in both states. In the economic sphere, just as 
in other areas of competition, the German government did everything in its power to 
support private ventures that would also enhance German’s prestige and power. Not only 
did this mean aiding projects that individuals brought to the Reich’s attention, but also 
encouraging companies, firms, and private citizens to undertake specific projects.102 On 
the eve of the occupation of Kiachow, the number of German business established in 
China stood second only to England, a considerably strong position given that the 
English had enjoyed a near monopoly in China for several decades prior to the 1880s. 
361 British firms were located in China compared to 92 German; Japan was a distant 
third with 34. Although it is difficult to determine an exact number, the returns from 
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China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service indicate that Germans also made up the 
second largest group of individuals conducting business in the Middle Kingdom.103 
The establishment of the German language newspaper in Shanghai, 
Ostasiatischer Lloyd, added further pressure on the German government, serving as a 
spokesman for German commercial interests in China, as it had the support of many of 
the German companies that had branches in China.  Over the course of the decade prior 
to the annexation of the Kiaochow leasehold, Ostasiatischer Lloyd published numerous 
articles calling for a German foothold in China.104  Although commercial interests, 
including the newspaper, were more hesitant in promoting a specific location for a 
German possession, their calls for a colony in China played a significant part in the 
growing voice of the pressure group.  The appeal of a location such as Kiaochow Bay 
was certainly well known to commercial interests, particularly due to their familiarity 
with the works and advocacy of von Richthofen.105 
German interests in China knew of the suitability of Kioachow Bay from the 
Chinese side as well.  In 1886, the Chinese minister to Germany, Hsü Ching-ch’eng 
wrote a memorandum to the Qing government that pointed out the strategic importance 
of Kiaochow Bay, telling his superiors, “western military ships have surveyed every 
point on the China coast, and all report that Chiao-chou [Kiaochow] Bay is the best spot 
for a harbor.”  Consequently, he advocated rapid development of the bay as a naval and 
trading base.  Perhaps most importantly, Hsü referenced a meeting with Ferdinand von 
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Richthofen as a basis for his recommendations.106  Several other officials echoed Hsü’s 
report, and, following a memorandum from the censor Chu I-hsin that also emphasized 
Kiaochow’s value, China slowly began to fortify the bay.107 In 1891, four battalions 
belonging to the Huai army based in Shantung were transferred from the interior to the 
coast to defend the harbor.  
Although Chinese efforts were limited, particularly in light of the crushing defeat 
that China’s navy suffered in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, China’s interest in the bay 
did not go unnoticed by the European powers, including Germany and its fledgling navy. 
In 1893, the North China Daily News published a letter from a local correspondent 
advocating Kiaochow Bay as a suitable location for a new treaty port, as it as the 
“strategic point of Shantung commerce [that held] great superiority…over any other 
location.”108 Furthermore, much to the concern of German China watchers, other 
Europeans powers were also beginning to recognize Kiaochow’s potential. Following 
the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Russia had grown more concerned with protecting 
its Pacific fleet. Questions about the security of wintering its fleet in Japanese harbors 
(Vladivostok routinely freezes over in winter) abounded in Russian naval circles, leading 
to the Russian government securing permission from China to anchor some of its ships 
in Kioachow Bay during the 1895-1896 winter. Although this was an extremely 
temporary and limited agreement, the Russian use of the port certainly caught the 
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attention of German naval officials just as the search for a suitable location for a port in 
East Asia was beginning to heat up. 
Despite increasing interest from religious, academic, commercial, and naval 
circles for the acquisition and creation of a German naval base and port in China, such 
demands were still unable to generate a substantial enough escalation in policy that 
would result in their fulfilment.  Although Bismarck occasionally considered pursuing 
this policy, he never took any definitive action, largely due to his preoccupation with 
securing Germany’s position in Europe—particularly through a closer relationship with 
Britain—which required minimizing friction over colonies.  When Kaiser Wilhelm II 
finally forced Bismarck out of office in 1890, Wilhelm’s more aggressive Weltpolitik, a 
policy centered on Germany becoming a world power rather than just a European one, 
replaced the Iron Chancellor’s more cautious foreign policy.  Although this provided an 
opportunity for those interested in a more assertive policy in China to push the 
government to act, Germany still lacked the means, ambition, and policy need to pursue 
this actively.  Nevertheless, the demand for a colony in China reached a fever pitch in 
the early part of the 1890s, and, coupled with Wilhelm’s new foreign policy, proved 
instrumental in the push to acquire Kiaochow Bay. 
China’s struggles in the Sino-Japanese War were especially significant for it led 
many advocates for a Chinese colony to believe China was even weaker than they had 
thought.  Max von Brandt’s successor as the ambassador to China, Baron Schenk zu 
Schweinsberg (1893-1896), even went so far as to suggest taking advantage of the war to 
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seize Kiaochow Bay in 1894. 109 At this same time, Wilhelm played an influential role in 
the debate on Germany’s presence in China.  The Kaiser increasingly worried about the 
presence of Russia, France, and Britain in the far east, and made it clear to his 
subordinates that if these states “attained important points in China, under no 
circumstances could Germany come up short.”110   
Keeping up with the other Great Powers in Europe was not the only thing on the 
Wilhelm’s mind, however.  Although German discourse on China continued to remain 
diverse and multivocal, notions about race and colonialism in Germany were changing 
rapidly in the final decade of the nineteenth century. At this time, the increasing 
frequency and importance of global cross-cultural interactions radicalized the study and 
interpretation of race, transforming notions of social, cultural, and religious identity and 
belonging and the role race played in the pursuit of empire. By the turn of the century, 
new “debates about degeneration, miscegenation, and assimilation, and about the 
‘backwardness’ of the Africans, Asians, and Slavs certainly gave racial identities new 
purchase.”111 Drawing on concepts of biological race, civilizational decline, social 
underdevelopment, and cultural shortcomings, proponents of colonialism were able to 
define foreign populations as inherently inferior, thus providing justification for imperial 
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conquest and the subjugation of native populations.112 Europeans-and the Germanic 
peoples in particular-had achieved an exalted position at the top of the racial and cultural 
hierarchy, and this position had to be guarded closely and protected to prevent, as Arnim 
Tille argued in a speech to the Pan-German League, “the permanent mixing between 
Germans and representatives of other peoples and races and the continued presence of 
racially poor elements inside our own Volkskörper,” thus preserving and cultivating the 
health and of the Germanic peoples.113 
As a result of the rapidly changing debate on race, Wilhelm himself grew more 
and more attracted to Sinophobia and beliefs on the exalted position of Europeans, 
leading him to boast that he coined the term “yellow peril” and fuel a sinophobic 
hysteria in Germany.114 This phrase found its greatest expression in 1895, when Wilhelm 
produced a sketch of a city awash in flames with a cloud of smoke above it taking on the 
form of a Buddha seated upon an Asiatic dragon preparing to do battle with the 
allegorical representations of the nations of Europe, led by Germany.  In the sketch’s 
final version, Germania was replaced with St. Michael, the patron saint of Germany, 
who was also commonly represented as a “war cherub” (Cherub des Kriegs).  The 
Kaiser was especially proud of this drawing, and had his royal painter, Hermann 
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Knackfuß, make copies of it so that he could present one to each of the major royal 
houses in Europe.115  Individuals like the Kaiser thus saw the influence of China—
marked by decline and decadence—as a growing threat to Europe that could only be 
quelled by complete and total dominance of the Chinese.  The best way to do this, in 
their minds, was through conquest and subjugation. 
Sinophobia gained further purchase in German foreign policy when Baron 
Edmund von Heyking replaced Schenk zu Schweinsberg as the German Ambassador to 
China in 1896 (a position Heyking would hold until 1899). Both Edmund and his wife, 
Elisabeth, shared the Kaiser’s strong anti-Chinese racism, adding a new layer of 
complexity to the rapidly changing discussion on race in Germany at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Elisabeth’s diaries from this period vividly capture German 
sinophobic sentiments. The baroness expressed her approval of an American official in 
China who expressed to her that “the Chinese are only fit to be sliced up by the different 
powers.” The Heykings were highly critical of the Chinese for their “inability to speak a 
European language passably.” Edmund von Heyking described the Chinese ministers in 
the Zongli Yamen (the Chinese Foreign Ministry) as “all complete idiots” and 
“forbidding, staring masks.”116 Elisabeth’s diaries reveal the Heykings as proud 
aristocrats that believed strongly in their exalted status and who felt no need or desire to 
cross cultural boundaries, identify with the Chinese, or display any specialized 
knowledge of China or its people. Otto Franke, one of Germany’s most prominent 
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sinologists who acted as an interpreter for Heyking during the negotiations concerning 
the annexation of Kiachow Bay, recalled in his memoirs that the Heykings adopted “an 
extremely high-handed manner with the Chinese,” regarding them as “dirty, cowardly, 
backwards, and disgusting.”117 
As imperialist and nationalist fervor demanded Germany show its place in the 
world as Great Power, it became clear that Germany needed to make a firm choice about 
what role it would play in China and East Asia. Even though Wilhelm’s whipped up 
hysteria about the “yellow peril” came to dominate German discourse on China at the 
end of the century, discussions about China and Germany’s role there remained complex 
and deeply layered, a multivocality that continued to exert a heavy influence on German 
colonial practices in Tsingtau and China as a whole.  In fact, in the precolonial discourse 
about China, neither Sinophobia nor Sinophilia offered a ready option for colonial 
government. As George Steinmetz argues, “by acknowledging China’s continuing 
cultural and political power and its radical alterity, European Sinophobia radically 
reduced the menu of options for colonial native policy. Sinophilia, by contrast, did not 
construe China as a place that even needed colonization.”118 As a result the predominate 
argument that emerged was a view that borrowed from them all, making practical and 
reasoned arguments that were decisive in the German decision to ramp up further its 
involvement in China and, ultimately, seize the fishing village of Qingdao and create the 
Kiaochow Leasehold: the notion of creating a “German Hong Kong.”   
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One of the most important reasons that the argument for a German Hong Kong 
gained so much influence was that it cut across the divides that existed in the other 
voices on German-China, as Sinophobes and Sinophiles alike found a place for their 
views within this argument.  Sinophiles, for example, saw a “German Hong Kong” as an 
opportunity to “open” China and “make it useful for Euro-American capital interests and 
missionary work.”119  This would allow further interactions with China, and, since a 
colony like Hong Kong required cooperation with locals, would provide opportunities to 
work among China’s ancient cultural backdrop with a people that had a long history and 
tradition of self-government.  Sinophobes, on the other hand, saw this model as their best 
chance to take the struggle against the Yellow Peril to the Chinese heartland, particularly 
since it appeared increasingly likely that the German Navy-where high-ranking officers 
were some of the strongest advocates of the Hong Kong model-would take charge of the 
colony.  This meant an increased German military presence in China and, if the Navy’s 
influence was strong enough, a firmer European administration of the colony that would 
keep the locals in check.  Doing so would also provide the opportunity to add a 
specifically German character to the process of “modernization/Westernization” already 
taking place across China. “In the eyes of German nationalists, Chinese modernity was 
already being given an overwhelmingly British (and French and American) stamp, 
threatening to shut Germany out in a much more fundamental way than the earlier lack 
of colonies.”120 The Navy’s role in the control of a Chinese colony was integral to both 
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sides that argued from colonization because it seemed to share the goals of the other 
major advocates of a colony, commercial and colonial groups.121 Most importantly, 
perhaps, the German Hong Kong model more easily addressed the thorny issues 
associated with race and racial alterity that confronted both Sinophiles and Sinophobes 
alike. This was especially important in terms of how best and to what extent Germans 
should engage with the Chinese, as both parties recognized that, with China and the 
Chinese population as large as it was, creating a large-scale settlement colony was not 
feasible; the Chinese would have to play a leading role in the day-to-day life of any 
German colonial venture. 
Although sinomaniacs found little appeal in the fact that a “German Hong Kong” 
required imperialist control, this model recognized China’s enduring cultural and 
political power, leaving room for the possibility that the local populace might be able to 
take greater responsibility for running the leasehold over time.  Additionally, an 
international center might also open up more Europeans to the admirable characteristics 
of China, softening fear of the “Yellow Peril.”122  It was this broad-based appeal that 
seized the attention of a German government increasingly interested in imperialism, as 
this model allowed it to pursue its own foreign and domestic policy, while also appealing 
to the broadest spectrum of the population to this colonial project.  As Admiral Eduard 
von Knorr, Chief of the Naval High Command (Oberkommando der Marine) from 1894 
to 1899, commented, “everything depends on our creation of a German Hong Kong.”123 
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It was the German navy-more specifically, a new generation of officers in its 
upper echelons-that provided the final piece in the transformation of a domestic political 
issue into state policy.  This group began its rise to prominence in 1894, with its 
influence secured by the appointment of Tirpitz as the new Secretary of State of the 
Reichsmarineamt in 1897.  Tirpitz firmly believed in the necessity of a large and 
powerful fleet as an expression of national power, as a strong navy would allow 
Germany to “protect the homeland against possible rivals…[and] also directly support 
the activities around the world which were so crucial in establishing the nation’s 
international position.”124  In order to secure its interests at home and abroad, Tirpitz 
believed Germany needed a fleet that could Great Britain’s, the world’s largest and 
greatest power.125 Tirpitz viewed the projection of national power in the global level as a 
combination of a strong military, powerful political influence, and a clear presence in the 
international market economy. Having a dominant naval force would not only protect 
Germany from its enemies, but also secure all three of these important criteria for world 
power. 
Tirpitz’s desire to develop German naval power and establish Germany as a 
Weltmacht fit well with the goals of the major advocates of a colony in China, namely 
commercial, missionary, and colonial groups. By accelerating Germany’s engagement in 
China, Tirpitz could secure each of the critical elements of global power projection, as 
China was a region of the world where the powers of Europe were still jockeying for 
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control. Whereas Europe had already largely carved up Africa and the pursuit of 
influence in Latin America required a more nuanced approach due to the efforts of the 
United States to resist European intrusion into its own backyard, the battle for China, 
East Asia, and the Pacific had yet to truly begin. That each of Tirpitz’s objectives fit well 
with those of other domestic groups interested in a colony in China only furthered the 
navy’s role in spearheading the drive for an imperial presence in the 1890s.  
Although the Reichsmarineamt had reduced the East Asia Squadron to two 
gunboats and an occasional ship on a training mission due to the need to protect 
Germany’s colonial presence in Africa, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in August 
1894 led to a revival of interest in a greater naval presence in China. As a result, the 
Kaiser, afraid that the other states of Europe would take advantage of the crisis to seize 
additional territory in China and that Germany might somehow miss out on the 
opportunity for an imperial land-grab, authorized the creation of a squadron of cruisers 
under the command of Rear Admiral Paul Hoffman. This new naval unit-the 
Ostasiatische Kreuzerdivision-comprised the recently-commissioned light cruiser Irene 
and three older and smaller cruisers, the Arcona, Marie, and Alexandrine. Its principal 
orders were to protect German trade from attack by Chinese raiders as well as German 
missionaries and other nationals from crimes committed against them by Chinese 
subjects. Additionally, the division received authorization to engage in commerce 
raiding against ships belonging to Germany’s rivals in the region-principally Britain and 
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Russia, but also, increasingly, Japan-in the event of war. Finally, Wilhelm tasked 
Hoffman with seeking out potential sites for a permanent German naval base.126  
Hoffman tried his best to follow through on these directives but found that the 
three small cruisers under his command were inadequate for the tasks at hand, leading 
him to request newer ships to replace them. Knorr, acceded to Hoffman’s request, 
replacing the Alexandrine and Marie with the heavy cruiser Kaiser and the light cruiser 
Prinzess Wilhelm. Another cruiser, Cormoran also began to conduct operations in the 
Pacific at this time, although it acted under orders independent from those of the East 
Asia Division.127 
The re-outfitting of the Ostasiatische Kreuzerdivision made it easier for Hoffman 
to discharge his duties as commander, although the division still suffered from the same 
problems that had plagued German naval vessels when Diederichs and Luise made their 
tour in the 1880s, namely the lack of a suitable place for ships to coal, refuel, train, and 
conduct repairs. This problem became even more acute during the Sino-Japanese War, 
as German ships were denied access to the facilities at Shanghai and Nagasaki, 
significantly hindering the cruiser division’s ability to act quickly and decisively in a 
crisis. In Hoffman’s estimation, Germany needed to “seek the acquisition of a point of 
the Chinese coast…as a base of our interests in China.”128 
Hoffman was not alone in his belief about the importance of a permanent 
presence in China, as his assessment about Germany’s naval presence in East Asia 
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received considerable support at the highest levels of the imperial government. In 1894, 
Wilhelm II advocated the seizure of Formosa in order to protect German trade with 
China that now totaled over 400 million marks annually.129  Further backing on this 
point came from Chancellor Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst who asserted that 
acquiring territory in China would “fulfill the needs of our fleet and of commerce for 
bases which we have demanded for decades.”130 Even the State Secretary of the Foreign 
Office, Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein- despite his preference that Germany avoid 
imperial entanglements-agreed that Germany would suffer national humiliation if it 
failed to acquire any land from a partition of China.131  Additionally, German 
representatives on the ground in China, such as von Heyking, actively campaigned for 
stronger naval action in China: “We cannot wait [to acquire a base], because our 
warships cannot swim about here forever like homeless waifs, and we run the risk of 
losing prestige [in Europe] because we have expressed wishes without pushing them 
through.”132 Consequently, Hoffman received orders to investigate potential locations for 
a base in China, a mission that the head of the East Asia Cruiser Division took very 
seriously. Despite the strong advocacy from such high-ranking individuals, however, the 
government still hesitated to take decisive action. 
Nevertheless, this lack of action did not deter Tirpitz. As early as 1895-while 
Chief of the Naval Staff-Tirpitz made strong overtures for the establishment of a base in 
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China. While Tirpitz’s frustrations with the German government’s unwillingness to 
adopt many of his recommendations (including his plans for building a powerful and 
modern fleet) led to his resignation from his post in autumn 1895, the push from within 
the navy for a base in China continued. With the help of his Chief of Staff, Otto von 
Diederichs, Eduard von Knorr prepared an Immediatvortrag in which he made an 
impassioned and thorough plea for the immediate creation of a base in East Asia. In 
crafting his argument Knorr cited military and strategic needs as well as economic ones. 
Modern warships needed constant maintenance at bases, and, coupled with the fact that 
the Far East was fast becoming a hotbed of economic activity, the lack of a permanent 
presence in East Asia at a time when the other world powers were consolidating their 
holdings seriously hindered the effectiveness of Germany’s power projection. In this 
report to the Kaiser, Knorr also highlighted the importance of a potential base being 
easily defensible with good access by land and sea. This would not only make it easy to 
provision naval vessels, but also foster the further development of German economic 
interests. Most importantly, by choosing a location centrally located between Shanghai 
in the North and Hong Kong in the South, Germany could build a port that would 
become a prominent location in China and a central axis of power in the Far East. 
Of the potential sites available, Knorr found four that could possibly meet 
Germany’s needs: the islands of Chusan and Amoy, Samsah Bay (in the province of 
Fujian), and Kiaochow Bay, centered on the fishing village of Qingdao. While 
Kiaochow Bay was at the bottom of Knorr’s rankings, Diederichs noted the Bay’s 
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inclusion.133 Based on his own personal review of Knorr’s memorandum and his prior 
experience in the Far East, Diederichs concluded that a base located at Qingdao was 
Germany’s best option.134 
Upon succeeding Hoffman as the commander of the Ostasiengeschwader in late 
1895, Tirpitz continued his predecessor’s work, investigating the viability of four 
additional locations in the Far East-including Kiaochow Bay-as possible bases for 
German activity. When he was recalled to Berlin in 1896 to become State Secretary for 
the Imperial Navy, he delegated the completion of this task to Diederichs, who readily 
plunged himself into determining the best fit for a German base that would fulfill all the 
needs of the navy and the German Empire. Like Hoffman and Tirpitz, Diederichs firmly 
believed that Germany needed to acquire a permanent presence in China. Indeed, while 
many high-ranking officials agreed on the necessity of a port in East Asia, there existed 
little consensus on its location. Whereas Diederichs preferred Kiaochow, Knorr and 
Gustav Freiherr von Senden-Bibran, the Chief of the Naval Marine Cabinet, favored 
Chusan. Admirals Friedrich von Hollman, the State Secretary of the Imperial Navy, and 
Hoffman advocated for Amoy (long a center of German activity in the Far East), while 
Wilhelm II actively campaigned for the seizure of Weihaiwei (Weihai), a port opposite 
Qingdao on the Shantung peninsula.135 
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Despite the initial disagreement among members of the naval administration, 
other members of the German China interest group pressed for the selection of 
Kiaochow Bay as the site of a German base. In addition to needing to protect the 
overwhelming number of German missionaries based in Shantung and surrounding 
regions, the most important justification for choosing this location was that the area 
surrounding the bay fit all the necessary criteria for creating a “German Hong Kong.”  
As Ferdinand von Richthofen-who, at this time, was participating in a lecture tour of 
Germany extoling the value of a Germany colony in China-had pointed out in his 
writings on China, this region was rich in undeveloped mineral wealth, especially the 
coal necessary for refueling German warships, as well as land that could support a 
variety of agricultural produce.  The landscape of the surrounding territory was highly 
suitable for the construction of railroads and, according to von Richthofen, a port on 
Kiaochow Bay would also be “the best terminus for a wider rail network which would 
cover all of northern China.”136  Furthermore, Shantung was located far enough north 
that a port there would be outside the influence of other major trade ports such as Hong 
Kong, Macao, Formosa, and Shanghai, and so a future port there would fill a valuable 
role.   
Following his 1896 appointment as Tirpitz’s successor in East Asia, Diederichs 
undertook a comprehensive review of relevant files related to the Squadron and 
Germany’s presence in the Far East. Between his examination of these files, briefings 
with his superiors, and his own personal experiences in East Asia, Diederichs concluded 
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that China’s currently weakened state presented a golden opportunity for Germany to 
expand its presence in China and acquire its own naval base in the Middle Kingdom. 
Achieving such a goal was even more pressing now than at any other time, largely due to 
the explosion of imperial expansion into China. British Hong Kong was becoming a 
major trading center and axis of power in the Far East, anchoring Britain’s presence 
elsewhere in China, particularly in Shanghai and along the Yangtze River. France had 
firmly established itself in the region around Canton as well as in Indochina, while 
Russia and Japan continued to seek a dominant position in Manchuria, as they continued 
to make inroads into Central Asia and Korea, respectively. If Germany waited much 
longer to act, then soon enough there would be no place for Germany to establish itself 
as a global power in China by having a base of operations to protect its interests.137   
In September 1896, Tirpitz prepared a follow-up report to Knorr’s 
Immediatvortrag, in which he recommended that the German government should pick 
Kiaochow Bay as the site of Germany’s first Asian colony.  While Tirpitz found that 
securing and developing either Chusan or Samsah Bay presented too many diplomatic 
and economic difficulties, Amoy still offered excellent potential. Nevertheless, despite 
his favorable evaluation of Amoy, Tirpitz spoke most highly of Kiaochow Bay. Many of 
the arguments Tirpitz made were clearly based on the arguments expounded by von 
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Richthofen.  The German Admiral extolled the economic advantages of the bay, 
stressing that Kiaochow was “the only natural, good harbor in the whole of China 
northwards from Shanghai to Newchang,” and that it could become the chief trade outlet 
for both Shantung and all of northern China.  Furthermore, he observed, “developing the 
bay would ease communications with the western part of Shantung where German 
missionaries are active.”  Finally, Tirpitz included a sizeable description of the maritime 
and military capabilities of the bay, the ease in which it could be expanded into a harbor, 
and the advantages for defense this location offered.138   
In recalling this quest for a naval base and port in China in his memoirs, Tirpitz 
expressed that from very early on he recognized the importance of following the British 
example in China for both military and economic reasons: “If German trade was ever to 
cease being a go-between for English and Chinese products, and to begin putting 
German wares on the Asiatic market, it needed its own Hong-Kong [sic] just as our 
squadron did.” In evaluating potential sites, he quickly realized-based on the reports of 
von Richthofen and numerous businessmen, merchants, engineers, and others on the 
ground in China-that “there was only one place for the German who had once more 
arrived too late…the unset pearl Tsingtau.”139 Soon after Tirpitz’s report reached Berlin, 
a consensus among religious, commercial, academic, and military interests rapidly 
developed that Kiaochow Bay was the perfect choice for a new German colony. 
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Nevertheless, despite Tirpitz’s glowing recommendation in September, the 
German quest for a base in China stumbled the following December, due to a follow-up 
report from Tirpitz.  Not only did he reverse course by advising the government to 
consider a different site instead of Kiaochow, but he also questioned the very value of a 
base in East Asia.  Tirpitz justified his reversal by revealing a troubling development 
from China that, according to the North China Daily News (an English-language 
newspaper published in Shanghai), the Chinese government had agreed to lease 
Kiaochow Bay to Russia.  While he doubted the accuracy of the story, Tirpitz warned 
that “a smaller naval power such as Germany” might not be able to defend a base against 
a Chinese or European attack.140  Consequently, the head of the Reichsmarineamt feared 
that pushing too hard to acquire Kiaochow could lead to a potential conflict with Russia 
in the Far East. Tensions between the two powers were still high following Germany’s 
intervention in the negotiations to end the Sino-Japanese War, and, in Tirpitz’s opinion, 
further disagreements with Russia in this region might seriously imperil Germany’s 
position in Europe and the world.141 Consequently, it would take the efforts of men on 
the ground in China-particularly Diederichs-to rescue the plan to acquire Tsingtau.  
Despite Tirpitz’s gloomy report, Diederichs continued to advocate strongly for a German 
port in Asia, which, most importantly, he believed should be located on Kiaochow Bay.  
Between December 1896 and August 1897, Diederichs undertook an extended tour of 
                                                 
140 Tirpitz to Knorr, 6 December 1896, BA-MA, RM 38/28. 
141 Gotschall, By Order of the Kaiser, pp. 144-146. 
 91 
the East Asian region, in which he assessed both the state of the East Asia Squadron and 
potential locations for a harbor and base. 
As the debate about a base in East Asia continued to heat up, members of the 
Imperial Naval Ministry recognized that no true advancement in Germany’s naval 
presence in the region could take place unless it could build a larger and more powerful 
naval force that could rival Great Britain’s. While the center of Germany’s rivalry with 
Great Britain played out most noticeably in concerns over the control of the North Sea, 
Berlin and London faced a similar competition in China.  Just as in the North Sea and 
the rest of Europe, Germany had now begun to challenge British hegemony, although it 
had to do so in a world in which England was already the dominant power.  It was this 
notion of a competition with Britain that contributed to the powerful appeal of the 
“German Hong Kong” argument for gaining territory in China.  The creation of a multi-
faceted, rich, powerful, and culturally significant international port along the model of 
one the crown jewels the British Empire, proved too alluring to be ignored.  Given 
Tirpitz’s recent experiences in the Far East, the rivalry that existed here certainly carried 
over into the European context, pushing the navy to consider stronger action at home and 
abroad. 
In order to achieve this goal, however, the navy needed a large influx of 
government funding, which the Reichstag was unwilling to give; in fact, it was the 
cutting of naval funding in 1896 that had resulted in the resignation of Hollman as head 
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of the Imperial Navy and the Tirpitz’s subsequent appointment.142 Although recalled 
from East Asia in early 1897, Tirpitz did not return to Berlin until 6 June, at which time 
the new Staatssekretär plunged into his responsibilities. On 15 June, Tirpitz presented a 
proposal to the Kaiser that outlined the makeup and purpose of the new German fleet he 
envisioned.  His memorandum identified England as Germany’s chief enemy and 
located the principal area of conflict as the North Sea, where Germany could challenge 
the British with the greatest chance of success; Germany lacked numerous bases around 
the world, so it was impractical to make the battle with England into a global one.  
Instead, Tirpitz promoted the creation of two squadrons of eight battleships each, plus a 
fleet flagship and two reserves.  The construction would be completed within seven 
years, with funding by the Reichstag fixed at 58 million marks per year, the same as the 
most recent budget.  Wilhelm enthusiastically supported Tirpitz’s, and so the State 
Secretary plunged headlong into drafting the First Naval Bill.143 
Given the recent defeat of Hollmann’s proposal for increased funding for the 
navy, Tirpitz understood he needed to secure widespread support from key swing votes 
if he wanted to ensure passage of his naval bill.  Tirpitz’s earlier experiences abroad had 
convinced him that “the relationship between a strong navy and the expansion of 
German colonial power provided one of the most persuasive arguments for enlarging the 
fleet,” a point that he pressed hard in selling his proposed bill.144  In order to win the 
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support of liberals (who generally represented commercial interests), Tirpitz emphasized 
the connection between a fleet and economic power and trade influence.  Perhaps the 
most important and influential group that Tirpitz needed to persuade, however, was the 
Catholic Center Party, the largest single voting bloc in the Reichstag. 
Comprised mainly of Catholics and South Germans, the Center Party (die 
Zentrumspartei) was not decidedly opposed to the notion of naval expansion, although 
aggressive foreign policy was never an issue that the party heavily supported.  However, 
the growing presence of Catholic missions abroad was an issue of great concern to the 
Center, particularly the role that the government played in ensuring the protection of 
missionary rights overseas.  This was of particular importance in China, where the SVD, 
the leading Catholic missionary group in China, led by Bishop Anzer, had a significant 
presence since 1880.  Despite Anzer’s early prominence in Shantung and position as a 
leading advocate for German interests in China, the German government was slow to 
protect religious groups in the Far East. It was not until 1886-and then only after 
considerable pressure from the Center Party-that Bismarck showed a willingness to 
make the German government the protector of German Catholics in China, and it would 
be another two years before this became official government policy. In 1890 Kaiser 
Wilhelm finally assumed personal responsibility for the protection of German 
missionaries in China after a series of complex negotiations with Peking and Rome.145  
Although this was a major success for the Catholics, the fact that Germany had a limited 
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military presence in the Far East was a cause for concern.  Bishop Anzer played a crucial 
role in this regard, as, in the words of a Foreign Office spokesman, he called 
“vociferously for a more powerful German presence in China” in order to protect the 
missionaries from attacks and abuses of rights by the natives.146   
Although Tirpitz seemed to show little interest in missionary work-he was never 
keen on intervening on behalf of Anzer and his followers while stationed in Asia-he 
recognized that his interests clearly intersected with those of the Center Party.  
Consequently, in October 1897, he approached party leaders-including the head of the 
die Zentrum, Ernst Lieber-with a proposal: if the party supported the passage of his naval 
bill, he would push for an increased naval presence in China with the protection of 
German missionaries as one of the chief reasons for doing so.  The Center Party readily 
agreed to this proposal, promising to deliver the necessary votes at the appropriate 
time.147  
In addition to the convergence of political interests that resulted in the seizure of 
Kiaochow Bay, Catholic missionaries also played a crucial role in its selection as the 
location of a German base in China.  While the primary reason that led the German 
government to take control of Tsingtau and its environs was its suitability for 
establishing a German Hong Kong, Kiaochow Bay was also located in the region where 
the SVD had its headquarters. Bishop Anzer’s continued advocacy for a stronger 
German presence in China as well as his interest in protecting his missionaries strongly 
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influenced Ambassador Schenk zu Schweinsberg to recommend the establishment of a 
colony and base on Kiaochow Bay in 1894.148  Furthermore, due to the strong presence 
of German missionaries in Shantung, choosing Qingdao as the center of a new German 
colony would ensure a strong relationship with the local population and provide a basic 
infrastructure for the development and administration of the new colony.  As the enclave 
around the bay was also somewhat removed from Peking, the influence of both the 
Chinese capital and other European powers was greatly diminished, providing better 
conditions for placing a German mark on China’s development.149   
Just as Tirpitz and the Center Party reached their political agreement in Berlin, 
on 21 August, Otto von Diederichs completed his tour and review of Germany’s position 
in East Asia, preparing a forty-page report on his findings, entitled “A Military and 
Political Report on the Situation in China.” Placed in a sealed pouch to be carried to 
Hong Kong, the report was then transported to Berlin in a safe on a liner operated by 
Norddeutscher Lloyd. In his report, Diederichs immediately responded to the concerns 
raised in Tirpitz’s December 1896 memorandum about the strategic importance of an 
East Asian port.  Diederichs asserted that “German interests here are indeed sufficient to 
justify corresponding [naval] strength,” adding, “we must energetically pursue the 
development of this power.”  Diederichs further recommended to his superiors that the 
only way Germany could maintain its diplomatic and economic presence in China was 
through the creation of a German naval base there.  If Germany wanted to be considered 
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a Weltmacht, he argued, Berlin needed to act quickly before the major imperial 
powers—specifically Britain—destroyed China, severely damaging Germany’s presence 
and prestige both in China and as a global power.   
Having addressed the matter of whether Germany should have a base in China, 
Diederichs then turned to the question of the best location, arguing that the most logical 
location for a port was Kiaochow Bay, with the tiny fishing village of Qingdao at its 
center.  As the bay’s strategic value was unquestioned, Diederichs used other arguments 
to justify his support for Kiaochow.  First, citing economic advantages, he asserted that 
the creation of a railroad network between a port city on the bay and the Peking-Hankow 
(Hankou) line would allow Germany to derive great wealth from the rich Shantung 
coalfields.  Furthermore, as German commercial interests had been slowly expanding 
northward from Shanghai since the 1880s, he warned that “Germany’s economic 
interests in China might fail to expand hereafter unless Kiao-chou [sic] was developed as 
the center of future financial activities.”  Determined to leave no question about 
Kiaochow’s suitability, Diederichs also pointed to religious interests, as Germany’s 
increased official presence in Shantung would afford greater protection for German 
missionaries in the region.  With these arguments in mind, Diederichs concluded, “it is 
my firm belief that Kiao-chou provides the greatest fulfillment of our needs as a German 
base.”150 Adding further credence to the viability of Diederich’s recommendation was 
another report (also prepared in August) from Georg Franzius, a senior naval engineer 
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and director of the Imperial shipyard at Kiel, whom Knorr had dispatched to China in 
December 1896 to conduct full surveys of the four sites that the Navy had identified for 
a potential German base. In considering the suitability of each location, Franzius found 
that, “Kiao-chou Bay far exceeded the other sites in every respect.”151 
In concluding his report, Diederichs conceded that seizing Kiaochow Bay might 
provoke a diplomatic crisis and opposition from one or more of the other powers in 
China, particularly Russia or Great Britain. Nevertheless, the commander of the East 
Asia Squadron also believed that France, Britain, Russia, Japan, and the United States 
were too preoccupied with other concerns to oppose such action. Here, Diederichs 
argued, Germany could take advantage of its traditional policy of avoiding considerable 
imperialistic action to produce a muted response from its rivals. Indeed, the only major 
roadblock that Diederichs envisioned was that Germany would need suitable cause to 
justify its aggression, most likely a violent attack on the part of the Chinese government 
or its subjects against German nationals or a German-sponsored project.152  
When Diederichs’ report reached the German Naval High Command in Berlin on 
25 October, it made an immediate impression upon Hans von Koester, acting as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Navy in place of Knorr, who had fallen ill.  
Koester immediately sent copies of Diderichs’ report to Tirpitz and the new Foreign 
Minister, Bernhard von Bülow; Wilhelm II received a copy at a private audience with 
Koester on 1 November.  Although von Bülow and Tirpitz still had their doubts, 
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Diederichs’ impassioned argument convinced the Kaiser to act. The navy would seize 
Kiaochow Bay and Qingdao at the first opportunity.153   
On 6 November, a few days after Koester’s briefing with the Kaiser, news of the 
murder of two German missionaries in Shantung on 1 November reached Diederichs, 
Wilhelm, von Bülow, and Tirpitz. Events proceeded rapidly as word of the attack spread.  
Remaining true to his agreement with Ernst Lieber and the Catholic Center Party, Tirpitz 
pushed for decisive military action in response to the violence. On 14 November, 
Tirpitz, supported by the Kaiser and the Foreign Office, ordered Diederichs to sail into 
Kiaochow Bay and seize Qingdao, providing Heyking with the leverage necessary to 
negotiate a settlement with China that resulted in the cession of the fishing village and its 
environs to Germany.   
Initially, Tirpitz was afraid that the aggressive seizure of territory in China might 
backfire, as any naval misadventure might cost him the support for the naval bill 
(submitted to the Reichstag just a few weeks earlier, on 19 October) he had so carefully 
cultivated.  Nevertheless, quite the opposite occurred.  When Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst 
opened debate on the naval bill on 6 December, his reference to Kiaochow was met with 
thunderous applause, none more loudly than from the Center.154   
Although the debate lasted several weeks, Tirpitz retained the crucial support of 
the liberals and the Catholics, who provided the decisive votes in the passage of the 
Naval Bill on 26 March 1898, just as Lieber had promised.  Wilhelm signed the Naval 
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Bill into law on 10 April, two days after the Reichstag ratified its treaty with Chinese 
government (signed 6 March 1898) granting Germany a 99-year lease of the Bay and a 
wide swath of territory surrounding it.  On 27 April, Wilhelm issued an Imperial Decree 
that placed Kiaochow Bay and Qingdao under official German protection.  Now known 
as the Kiaochow Leasehold, the Kaiser put the new territory under the direct control of 
the Imperial Navy, with Kapitän zur See Hans Karl Rosendahl assuming the position of 
the Leasehold’s first governor. Tirpitz finally had his new navy, and Germany a place to 
establish the “German Hong Kong” so many had ardently desired. 
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CHAPTER III  
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A GERMAN HONG KONG 
 Having finally obtained the territory for which the German Chinese interest 
group had advocated for so long, the time had now arrived to establish a permanent 
presence on the Chinese coast that would meet the many and multifaceted visions for 
Tsingtau that had coalesced broadly around creating a German Hong Kong. Although 
the interested parties agreed on this plan as a general model for the new German colony, 
what this meant and how it should be implemented varied greatly. Consequently, while 
the Leasehold government supported the German Hong Kong vision, it never articulated 
clearly how this concept fit into its plans for the growth and development of the German 
colony and how this could be best accomplished.  
In the first years of the colony, then, the colonial administration’s priority was 
developing a system of governance and infrastructure that would allow it to handle the 
various problems and concerns of the colonial community and foster the city’s 
development. This chapter examines these early years of the colony in which the 
Germans living and working in the leasehold laid he administrative foundations for the 
leasehold government and began to articulate a vision of empire that helped transform 
Tsingtau from a tiny fishing village into one of the largest and most prominent cities in 
China on the eve of World War I. During this phase in the colony’s history, the official 
policy regarding Tsingtau was unclear and ill-defined. Save for the broad notion that 
Tsingtau needed to become a German Hong Kong, the various factions in the colony 
fought to bring the specific contours of their respective visions to bear.  
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Although the naval government shared sinophobic sentiments in recognizing the 
importance of establishing a clear demarcation of German power through the 
enforcement of colonial policies and social hierarchy, strong liberal tendencies 
ultimately tempered these impulses as the Navy began to articulate its vision more 
clearly. In order for Tsingtau to be the German Hong Kong that government officials 
desired, the native population need to be willing partners in Tsingtau’s development and 
success. As a result, the naval government showed a willingness to engage with the 
Chinese and meet some of their immediate needs in the early years of the colony, with 
its ultimate goal being the creation of an educated and well-trained interlocutor class that 
could act as a liaison between the colonial government and Chinese leaders at the 
provincial and federal levels. While the commercial community certainly wished for 
Tsingtau to become a profitable and desirable entrepôt on the Chinese coast, it 
nevertheless worried that the Navy would be too heavy-handed in pursuing its strongly 
liberal plans in its pursuit to make the colony a projection of Germanness overseas. 
Instead, businessmen, merchants, and traders-often supported by members of the Foreign 
Office in China as well as Berlin-saw Tsingtau becoming a German Hong Kong through 
its development as an engine of economic growth and power, with little contribution or 
involvement on the part of the Chinese. While these plans were not opposed to each 
other, tensions between them certainly existed, often leading to clashes and protests as 
each party sought to protect and advance their respective imperial visions.  
Indeed, the intra-elite battles between military leaders, diplomats, missionary 
groups, and middle-class businessmen and traders on the ground in Tsingtau-all of which 
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had similar objectives, but also competing interests in the German colony-made it 
difficult to establish a concrete set of goals for Tsingtau and a plan for how best to 
accomplish them. In the early years of the colony, the more racist and sinophobic 
elements in the leasehold began to win out initially in shaping colonial policy, forcing 
those who desired a more ordered and liberal imperial rule to embrace harsher racial 
policies designed to entrench Germany’s dominance and authority in the region, 
recalling the manner in which Germans engaged with the native Ovaherro in German 
Southwest Africa. Nevertheless, by 1905 the early tensions over the future of the colony 
were resolving in favor of those who wanted to build a sustainable and self-contained 
community that would connect easily, efficiently, and profitably to China, the Far East, 
Germany, and the world. 
On 15 January 1898, the German and Chinese governments agreed to the basic 
tenants of an “Atonement Treaty” that resolved the conflict that erupted between the two 
states following the murder of two German missionaries on 1 November 1897. Although 
both governments agreed to these general terms in January, they would not sign the final 
version of the treaty until 6 March 1898.155 According to the terms of this treaty, 
Germany acquired the sole right to exercise sovereignty over an area that became known 
as the “Kiautschou Leasehold” for ninety-nine years. The leasehold was a 553 square 
kilometer area-based around the fishing village of Qingdao-that encompassed several 
larger towns and 275 smaller villages. The treaty also established a fifty-kilometer buffer 
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zone that China had sovereignty over, but where Germany also retained special rights, 
particularly in terms of troop movement and deployment. Furthermore, China agreed “to 
abstain from taking any measures, or issuing any ordinances therein, without the 
previous consent of the German Government.” In securing this buffer zone, Germany 
gained an additional level of territorial protection without having to increase 
dramatically the amount of land that it had to govern directly.  
The treaty also granted the Germans a series of economic privileges regarding 
the regulation of trade, commerce, and transport through the Leasehold and Shantung 
more broadly. China granted Germany a concession to build three railroad lines in the 
province and the right to establish and operate coal mines within 10 miles of the railroad 
beds on either side. The agreed-upon routes not only passed through every major 
coalfield that Ferdinand von Richthofen had identified during his extensive travels in 
Shantung, but also ensured that Tsingtau and the Leasehold would be the nexus of 
economic activity in Shantung. Furthermore, Germany also received the right to extend 
this network of railroads to the border of the province, once it had completed 
construction of the rail line from Tsingtau to the provincial capital of Tsinan. This 
stipulation became an important step in connecting the German colony to the world 
beyond China as Tsingtau began to emerge as a prominent trade destination on the 
Chinese coast.156 
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The final section of the treaty enshrined additional rights in Shantung that 
established the province as a virtual German sphere of influence. In this portion the 
Chinese government “binds itself in all case where foreign assistance, in persons, capital, 
or material, may be needed for any purpose whatever within the province of Shantung, 
to offer the said work or supplying of materials in the first instance” to Germany. In 
securing the terms outlined above, Germany had acquired all that the various parties 
interested in territory in China had desired: an area of land on the Chinese coast that 
could be developed into a prosperous port and center of power, as well as series of 
concessions that “opened the way to economic and political domination over an 
important Chinese province which formed to colony’s hinterland.”157  
Despite the delay between agreement of the terms of the treaty and its signing, 
the German government wasted no time in laying the groundwork for its new overseas 
possession. One of the first matters of concern for the new territory was establishing a 
structure of administrative control and authority.  Although normally such responsibility 
would fall to the Colonial Office, Admiral Tirpitz lobbied strenuously that control of 
Germany’s East Asian colony should remain in the hands of the Imperial Navy, arguing 
If the matter [Tsingtau] was going to prosper, it had to be left in the hands of one 
department. The navy had immediate military interests there such as a base 
demands…As we [the navy] have assumed responsibility for this Eastern Asiatic 
Base, it is my opinion that we are better suited to push on its economic 
development.158 
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Despite objections from the Foreign Office, Kaiser Wilhelm found Tirpitz’s argument 
persuasive and, with the promulgation of the German Imperial Ordinance of 27 January 
1898, the Reichsmarine was given full responsibility for the governance of Germany’s 
newest territory.159 As Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy, Tirpitz now controlled 
the naval station that Otto von Diederichs had established upon the seizure of Qingdao 
the previous November, as well as serving as the direct representative of the Leasehold’s 
interests to the Emperor and the Reichstag. Conversely, Tirpitz also represented the will 
of the Kaiser and the Chancellor to the inhabitants of the Leasehold, countersigning and 
enacting all legislation that affected the East Asian colony.160  
Tirpitz’s authority over the Leasehold was further solidified with the passage of 
an act on 1 March 1898 that granted the head of the Reichsmarineamt the powers of a 
commanding admiral, which normally the Staatssekretär lacked. This new 
authority made Tirpitz as the commander of all naval units at sea and ashore, directly 
subordinate to Kaiser Wilhelm. In essence, Tirpitz now possessed the main powers of 
both the First Lord of the Admiralty and the First Sea Lord in the British Navy.161 As a 
                                                 
159 In general, the Reichstag was responsible for decisions related to the governance of Germany’s 
colonies, including all colonial activities. Nevertheless, the Imperial German Constitution was unique in 
that the Emperor could act in concert with the Chancellor-appointed to the post by the Emperor and 
responsible only to him-to bypass and supersede the Reichstag’s authority. This was mainly achieved 
through imperial decrees and ordinances from the Emperor, which required only the counter-signature of 
the Chancellor to take effect. In the case of the administration of Tsingtau, Wilhelm II believed strongly 
enough in Tirpitz’s arguments for the Navy to govern the colony that he was willing to override any 
potential opposition in the Reichstag to bring this about. For more on the intricacies and peculiarities of 
the Imperial Constitution, see Matthew S. Seligmann and Roderick R. McLean, Germany from Reich to 
Republic, 1871-1918: Politics, Hierarchy, and Elites (London: Macmillan, Basingstoke, and London, 
2000). 
160 Friedrich W. Mohr, Handbuch für das Schutzgebiet Kiautschou (Leipzig: Köhler, 1911), p. 6. 
161 Holger H. Herwig, 'Luxury Fleet', The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (London: The Ashfield Press, 
1980), pp. 22-23. 
 106 
result, Tirpitz established a new department in the Reichsmarineamt – the Central 
Administration of the “Kiautschou Protectorate” – which would handle the duties of the 
Emperor in military matters and those of the Reichskanzler regarding civilian affairs.162 
With the above structure enshrined in law, Tirpitz became fully responsible for the day-
to-day administration, planning, and supervision of Germany’s newest colony. While he 
was certainly remained accountable to the Chancellor, the Emperor, and the Reichstag, 
Tirpitz took on a virtually autonomous role in Berlin regarding Tsingtau.  
On the ground in China, the new Leasehold government evolved from the 
structure established by the occupation forces in 1897. As the Senior Office Present and 
the commander of the East Asia Cruiser Squadron, Diederichs assumed control of the 
occupying forces until 11 February 1898, when naval infantry and artillery arrived to 
fortify Germany’s presence. From that point until 16 April 1898 (when the newly 
appointed Governor arrived), Korvettenkapitän Oskar von Truppel took control of the 
occupation forces and temporary administration of the Leasehold, a position independent 
from Diederichs’ command of the Cruiser Squadron. With the signing of the treaty with 
China in March 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II, acting upon Tirpitz’s recommendation, 
appointed Kapitän zur See Hans Karl Rosendahl the first Governor of the Kaiserliches 
Gouvernement Kiautschou. Assuming the office following his arrival in Tsingtau in 
April, Rosendahl was now directly responsible to Tirpitz in the governance of 
Germany’s newest imperial territory. During the first year of the colony, Rosendahl’s 
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overall authority was somewhat limited, as any of his policy decisions first had to be 
approved by the naval leadership in Berlin before they could be published and enforced. 
Beginning in 1899, however, in an effort to streamline and simplify matters related to 
the governance of the colony, prior approval was deemed necessary only for “the most 
important and far-reaching regulations.” Indeed, over the course of the colony’s 
existence, naval authorities in Berlin never overruled or overturned a policy or law that 
the governor of the colony had enacted, even if Berlin would occasionally force the 
governor to adopt policies with which he personally disagreed.163 
The goals that the Reichsmarineamt pursued for Tsingtau, then, developed out of 
the same concerns that had originally motivated the push for a German presence in 
China in the first place. Tsingtau had to be a model colony that reflected the best of 
German administration in every area, from the justice system to education, infrastructure 
to cultural and social development, matching-and surpassing-Germany’s chief rival, 
Great Britain, in the realm of colonial endeavors.164 Most importantly, the Leasehold 
needed to become the premiere trading entrepôt in East Asia that would enhance German 
trade and prestige both at home and abroad, becoming the focal point of activity in the 
Far East for the Great Powers of the world. As a result, then, the Navy could achieve a 
twin objective in raising public awareness of and support for German imperialism and 
the Reichsmarine, particularly among the liberal commercial interest groups.165 
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Nevertheless, these objectives lacked any full expression as Germans-both in Berlin and 
also “on the ground” in the Leasehold-did not have any clear common idea of what, 
exactly, they were trying to accomplish in building a German Hong Kong and how they 
were going to do it. 
 While the naval administration certainly agreed with the Foreign Ministry that 
Tsingtau should serve as a premiere coaling, repair, and shipbuilding station for the 
Imperial Navy, the Reichsmarineamt remained uncertain as to how it should best 
accomplish this goal. One of the early guiding principles that the Navy embraced was 
that a harbor in China would be of little value if it were not also a flourishing center of 
trade, a point that Eduard von Knorr pressed home in his 1895 Immediatvortrag arguing, 
“everything depends on creating a German Hong Kong.”166 Tirpitz agreed with Knorr in 
this regard, as he too believed that Tsingtau would never flourish as just a naval base, 
but rather had to become something greater: a major center of trade, culture, and 
imperial power, an axis of German power much like what the British were building in 
Hong Kong.167 In achieving this goal, the colony would showcase the navy’s skill in 
organization and management, disarming Tirpitz’s rivals in the Foreign Ministry, and 
also justifying further support for the further build-up of the navy. Armed with this 
powerful image of what Tsingtau could become, Tirpitz succeeded in his vigorous 
campaign to keep the administration of Tsingtau and the Leasehold in the hands of the 
Imperial Navy.  
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Tirpitz’s desire to ensure the successful development of Tsingtau into a major 
axis of power in East Asia was profound and earnest, often echoing the same concerns 
for the colony in private as those he expressed in official statements. That Tirpitz 
remained head of the navy through the entire life of the colony afforded him a guiding 
hand in maintaining the stability and continuity of his development plans, a vision that 
permeated down to the local level: in a 1900 memo to the Naval Office, then-Governor 
Paul Jaeschke (1899-1901) commented that “the existence of the colony has no 
justification if It does not become the home base for large German companies trading in 
the interior.”168 Consequently, the first years of the colony were dedicated to establishing 
a system that would allow the different visions of a German Hong Kong to coalesce into 
a successful, and profitable, reality: establishing an administrative structure capable of 
handling the various problems that might arise in establishing the new colony, 
developing trade and increasing profits through construction of roads and railroads, 
opening coal mines, improving and enlarging the harbor, and building a naval shipyard, 
all of which were designed with the intent of supporting both German and foreign trade 
interests. In accordance with this plan, the German government designated Tsingtau a 
“Free Port” like Hong Kong (a status that ended in 1905), and customs duties were only 
charged only on goods whose final destination was not Tsingtau.169 
 Even though Germany’s new territory in China was technically a leasehold 
according to the March 1898 treaty with China, “the Germans never considered its status 
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to be different from that of the other German colonies.”170 On 27 April 1898, Germany 
officially declared Kiaochow a German “protectorate” (Schutzgebiet), the standard term 
for a colony in the German legal system.171 As George Steinmetz notes, “although this 
aligned Kiaochow with the general legal framework in force in all of the overseas 
colonies, those laws said nothing about the specific regulations, decrees, and policies 
that would be implemented in any given colony.” Thus, while the Navy was bound 
generally by German colonial law, it retained a relatively free hand in how it could go 
about running Tsingtau and the Leasehold. While German colonial officials operated the 
Leasehold quite differently from Germany’s other overseas territories, the legal status of 
the colony was not one of the factors that differentiated it. Rather, the fact that Kiaochow 
was “located in China, whose place in German geopolitical calculations began to change 
in the years leading up to World War I” played a critical role in distinguishing the 
Leseahold from the other German colonies. In nearly all other respects, however, “the 
Germans defined Kiaochow as a colony, just like the colonies in Africa and the 
Pacific.”172 
This understanding of Kiaochow’s status fully permeated the Navy’s approach to 
the colony. In establishing the governmental structure of Tsingtau, naval administrators 
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worked carefully to ensure that both the central Chinese government in Peking and the 
provincial authorities in Tsinan had no role in the governing of the Leasehold. 
Nevertheless, German leaders also recognized that they would need to work with their 
Chinese counterparts at times to ensure that laws, decrees, and measures were being 
properly followed and that policies remained consistent inside and outside of the colony. 
In embracing the German Hong Kong vision for Tsingtau, the navy endeavored to 
ensure that there would be no hint of Chinese authority that might negatively impact 
German control of the Leasehold. 
 As such, the chief administrator of the new German colony was the governor of 
the Kiaochow Leasehold, based in Tsingtau. As noted above, the governor was a naval 
staff officer who, in essence, had complete and total authority over the Leasehold. This 
officer was responsible for all military and civilian affairs, ruling over a population of 
Chinese and foreign nationals from a variety of different homelands including Germany, 
Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, the United States, and Japan. All of these civilians, 
whether Chinese, German, or foreign, were under the full and complete organizational 
and legal authority of Germany.  
 The governor’s military power stemmed from his rank as an officer and the fact 
that he was also the commanding officer of the newly established German naval base at 
Tsingtau.173 The governor’s jurisdiction over the civilian population lay vested in his 
ability to issue local ordinances that took effect immediately upon their promulgation. In 
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establishing the role and power of the governor, the navy sought to grant the governor 
“as great a degree of autonomy as possible in relation to the homeland authorities.”174 By 
doing so, the governor would have the ability to take actions that “take local conditions 
into consideration and permit him to act vigorously and without delay in meeting the 
demands of a fast-growing and quickly evolving community.”175 Although the 
Reichskanzler retained the authority to overrule or revoke any of the colonial ordinances, 
this occurred very rarely in practice. As the head of the Imperial Navy and thus the 
superior officer to the governor, Tirpitz had total control over and responsibility for 
Tsingtau and the surrounding environs that comprised the Leasehold. Although Tirpitz 
remained personally (and publicly) interested and vested in the success of Tsingtau, he 
rarely felt the need to intervene or interfere in the running of the colony, largely due to 
the fact that he attempted to select officers who shared his vision for Tsingtau (and the 
navy’s role in securing this) to serve as governor.176 Should a governor fail to follow 
through on that important point, however, Tirpitz did not hesitate to replace him, such as 
in 1911 when Tirpitz removed Oskar von Truppel as governor of the colony for 
continually resisting policies that he (Truppel) felt forced to adopt.177 
 The power of the governor was limited to the territorial boundaries of the 
leasehold. Consequently, while the governor might have need to consult and-on 
occasion-work with the Chinese provincial authorities in Tsinan to ensure good 
                                                 
174 Denkschrift, 1898-1899, Staatsarchiv-Bremen, 3-R.1.g.5. 
175 Otto von Diederichs, as quoted in Norem, p. 105. 
176 Tirpitz, My Memories, vol. 1, pp. 100-107. 
177 Steinmetz, Devil’s Handwriting, p. 437. As will be seen later in this chapter, a similar fate befell the 
first governor of Tsingtau, Hans Carl Rosendahl, when it became clear to Tirpitz that Rosendahl was not 
sufficiently or properly pursuing his objectives for the colony. 
 113 
governance, it was not his responsibility to do so on a regular basis. Rather, according to 
an agreement between the Foreign Office and the Imperial Navy in 1898, “political and 
commercial affairs that affect German endeavors outside of Kiaochow, such as railroads 
and mines, will remain within the purview of the Auswärtiges Amt.”178 Nevertheless, in 
these early years of the colony, the principles of this agreement were rarely enforced, 
and the governor of Tsingtau also served as the main German official who handled all 
matters related to German activities and endeavors in Shantung and, on occasion, in the 
Chinese interior in general.  
 Immediately below the governor in the Tsingtau’s hierarchy were a chief of staff 
and a civilian commissioner.179 The chief of staff oversaw the military side of the 
Leasehold administration, which accounted for approximately 2500 German soldiers in 
the colony’s early years. Most of these troops were members of Tsingtau’s new garrison, 
the III. Seebattalion (Naval Infantry Battalion), which comprised 1132 men and 22 
officers, and the Kiaochow Naval Artillery Detachment (272 men and seven officers). In 
addition to these main forces, the chief of staff also oversaw several elements of the East 
Asia Expeditionary Detachment, the naval dockyards, and any of the crews belonging to 
the East Asia Station or vessels that might be passing through the port. Finally, an 
additional fifty or so senior naval officers and NCOs affiliated with the colonial 
government (but not members of either the III. Seebattalion or artillery detachment) 
came under the jurisdiction of the governor’s chief of staff; these individuals could bring 
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their families to live with them, and, by 1914, 300 military families resided in the 
colony.180 The military headquarters in Tsingtau served as the base for the majority of 
the German colonial troops, although some detachments were also stationed along the 
Leasehold’s borders and at more important and sensitive areas of Germany’s new 
territory. 
Furthermore, to help maintain peace and order within the leasehold territory 
outside the city limits (as well as cut the overall operating costs for the military in the 
colony), the naval administration created a company of 100 cavalry and infantry units 
drawn from the local Chinese population.181 The decision to recruit this “Chinese 
Brigade” stemmed from the success that locally recruited Chinese troops had while 
serving under Charles George Gordon during the Taiping Rebellion.182  Under Gordon’s 
command, his Chinese soldiers showed considerable ability and potential for 
understanding and implementing modern warfare tactics and strategy. If, then, a well-
paid group of Chinese soldiers could fight under a German commander, the naval 
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administration reasoned, then the difficulties of policing internally the local population 
and defending the German colony from outside threats could be made that much easier. 
Recruiting a Chinese regiment to help maintain the security of the leasehold reflects the 
ambivalent role of the Chinese in the colony and German attitudes toward them. Due to 
the prevalence of Sinophobia at this time and the worry of uprisings by anti-foreign 
groups, the Foreign Office and its diplomats in China (not to mention the German 
commercial community, whose interests often aligned with the Foreign Office) preferred 
Germany not utilize such a military force.183 Despite these sentiments, the generally 
more sinophilic naval leadership in Berlin and China argued that the realities of 
governing the colony efficiently, coupled with the military potential the Chinese had 
already showed for effective military service under a European officer, easily justified 
this policy. Doing so, then, allowed the Chinese to take on a key position in the 
leasehold, which would, over time, become one of many ways in which the local 
population came to play a leading role in the growth and day-to-day life of Tsingtau. 
 While the governor’s chief of staff handled control over the military forces 
stationed in Tsingtau and the Leasehold, a civilian commissioner was responsible for the 
management of the civilian population and represented the needs and desires of this 
segment of the population on the governor’s council. The civilian administration was 
divided into separate branches responsible for Westerners (including Japanese nationals) 
and Chinese, as well as along geographic lines, with individual offices overseeing urban 
and rural zones. The urban district encompassed Tsingtau and its immediate 
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surroundings, while the rural zone comprised the rest of the land in the leasehold. 
Nevertheless, as the majority of non-native Chinese civilians worked and lived within 
the bounds of Tsingtau, the regional separation only impacted the governance of the 
Chinese on any notable level.184  
The civilian commissioner directly oversaw the foreign population, working 
directly with a variety of bureaus and agencies under his authority to ensure efficient and 
effective governance of the day-to-day affairs of the colony. As it was often the case that 
German colonists did not have the opportunity to participate actively in the running of 
the colony-a point of contention raised by various colonial groups and organizations 
back in Germany-the naval administration made it a point of emphasis to encourage 
civilian engagement in the colony’s governance.185 To this end, the navy established, 
“organs of self-government [in Tsingtau] that will use the skills of the civilian 
population, and especially the economically important members of the leasehold in 
service of the colonial government.” In 1899, Governor Jaeschke issued a decree 
organizing a Government Council of western citizens that would advise him and his 
advisors on colonial matters. Comprised of three members, one chosen by the governor 
after consultation with his civilian council, one elected by the business community, and 
the final member was chosen by landowners in the colony who paid at least 105 marks 
in land taxes.186 Chinese landowners and businessmen were permitted to vote for this 
final member as well, in the hopes of securing “the fullest possible participation of the 
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Chinese through their ‘natural’ leaders.”187 Even though the committee functioned in 
mostly an advisory capacity, it played an important role in bringing the interests of 
landowners and businessmen to the governor’s attention in these early years, bringing 
together the disparate visions of empire into a more unified whole. After 1902, a Chinese 
Committee was formed to better represent the interests of Chinese merchants and 
landowners, as the imperial government recognized the import role these members of the 
colonial community provided in ensuring the smooth functioning of the Leasehold.188 
Existing from 1902 to 1910, the Chinese Committee was comprised of twelve 
members chosen by Chinese merchants from the three main provincial guilds active in 
the Leasehold: the Jiran Guild (merchants from Shantung and Tianjin), the Sanjiang 
Guild (the lower Yangtze region), and the Guangdong Guild (Canton).189 Additionally, 
three of these members had to be compradors of German firms based in Tsingtau.190 In 
general, the Chinese representatives to the Committee voted as a block, whether backing 
a candidate in a election or in choosing to support or reject a government proposal. 
Intense debate and discussion was quite common amongst the Chinese representatives, 
but the guilds always made sure to present a united front when it came to final votes, 
something that often frustrated the colonial administration.191 In 1909, when the unified 
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voice of the Chinese Committee torpedoed a new policy that would grant German 
merchants additional space on the transport liners of the German Far Eastern Shipping 
Conference travelling from Tsingtau to Europe, the outcry from the commercial 
community compelled the colonial government to curtail the power of the Chinese 
guilds. Although the outraged merchants and traders preferred that the Chinese 
Committee be stripped of all its power, the naval administration recognized that it was 
important to take into account the legitimate interests and wishes of Chinese merchants.  
As the Chinese Committee comprised members from a wide variety of 
backgrounds, fighting between representatives and the Leasehold’s leadership was not 
uncommon. Furthermore, government officials often grew concerned with the conscious 
attempts on the part of Chinese Committee members to take on (unofficially) the 
functions and duties of the provincial government.192 Recognizing the power that the 
Chinese were able to wield over government policies, leaders in Tsingtau decided that it 
would be better to work with the Chinese rather than curtail their voice completely. 193 
Consequently, in 1910 the Chinese Committee was reformed and replaced by the 
Chinese Advisory Committee. The most important change in the establishment of this 
organization was that the governor himself selected four representatives. Although 
Chinese merchants lost the ability to select their own leaders, this loss was balanced out 
by the fact that these four individuals became members of the governor’s advisory 
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committee, which had previously been comprised solely of Europeans.194 As a 
government-appointed organ, Chinese Advisory Committee was overall more open to 
supporting the colonial administration’s goals than the original Chinese Committee.  
As the members of the Advisory Committee were more trade-oriented and much 
better trained and educated, they were much more aligned with and supportive of naval 
government’s plans for the commercial development of Tsingtau and its overall vision 
for the creation of a German Hong Kong. Such support was further strengthened by the 
flood of liberal, educated, and highly-placed Chinese officials that poured into Tsingtau 
as exiles following the 1911 republican revolution.195 In addition to providing insight on 
plans and policy, the Advisory Committee also helped resolve disputes between German 
and Chinese merchants, something that was accomplished with greater efficiency and 
less hostility than had been the case under the Chinese Committee, resulting in smoother 
relations between the native and foreign populations. 
The Chinese community in Tsingtau and the Leasehold fell under the jurisdiction 
of a commissioner for Chinese affairs, who served under the civilian commissioner in 
the colonial administration.196 Assisting the commissioner were two German officials 
who served as the heads of Bezirksämten (district offices) that were responsible for 
overseeing the urban and rural districts, respectively. Although this administrative 
structure was employed in Germany’s other colonies (particularly in Africa), the duties 
and responsibilities of these officials were modified in the Chinese context to more 
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closely mirror the role of the district magistrate (chih-hsien) that played such a key role 
in China’s governance of its provinces. These magistrates served as both administrative 
and judicial authorities, and, much like their Chinese counterparts, were charged with 
full responsibility for the security and welfare of the individuals in their respective 
districts. In addition to wielding an authority similar to their Chinese equivalent, the 
bezirksamtmänner were also charged with enforcing a legal system that “came as close 
as possible to Chinese practices,” and were encouraged to “learn Chinese law by 
listening to village elders and other knowledgeable persons and local leaders.”197  
 Much like a chih-hsien¸ the German magistrate in charge of the rural district had 
only one main duty: to ensure the effective maintenance of local law and order.  In the 
early years of the colony, this remained the only goal for the naval administration in 
overseeing the area of the Leasehold outside Tsingtau, something that changed in later 
years following the Boxer Rebellion (the initial phases of which began in areas of 
Shantung that included the rural regions of the Leasehold) and as business and 
commercial interests began to grow and expand. Following the example of the Chinese 
district magistrates, the German commissioner worked with local Chinese elites and 
lower-level provincial leaders in pursuit of his objectives, making use of troops and 
police when necessary. In managing the urban Chinese, the head of the Bezirksamt 
performed functions similar to his counterpart overseeing the non-native population, 
working with semi-administrative offices, the police force, and members of the Office of 
Surveying and Land-Use to ensure smooth and efficient administration. Although no 
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specific provisions existed for making members of the urban Chinese community a part 
of their local government, the navy “sought the advice and cooperation of the most 
distinguished members of the local population, whenever possible.”198 
 Overall, this system of management of the Chinese population of the leasehold 
worked well for the naval administration. Thousands and thousands of Chinese flocked 
to Tsingtau in these early years, resulting in a dramatic rise in the population of the new 
city.199 Moving into the colony from other parts of Shantung as well all across China, 
these migrants were attracted by the overall smooth operation of the colony and the 
vibrant economic activity stemming from an influx of investment in the Leasehold. 
Although it is difficult to pinpoint an exact number of émigrés that arrived in Tsingtau at 
this time, the numbers provided by the 1899-1900 Denkschrift for the colony reflects 
that an increase of approximately 4,000 urban Chinese in Tsingtau’s second year. At the 
same time, the rural Chinese population in the leasehold held firm at roughly 80,000, a 
strong reflection that the rural Bezirksamt was just as effective as its urban 
counterpart.200 
 Overall, the Chinese appeared to handle the transition to German rule with 
relatively little trouble. Although uprisings and protests did occur, reports from the naval 
administration make no mention of any serious opposition from the native population to 
German control. The decision to work with and within traditional forms of Chinese 
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government certainly played an important role in limiting difficulties, although this did 
not mean the Germans were opposed to using force when necessary. In February 1899, 
for example, a conflict arose concerning the theft of government survey equipment. The 
rural magistrate identified twelve villages that might have been responsible and ordered 
their leaders to surrender the thieves or be subject to harsh fines and penalties. As the 
villages either could not or would not turn over the guilty parties, Governor Jaeschke 
sent a detachment from the III. Seebattalion to seize cattle as recompense for the lost 
equipment. As a result, members of the villages rose up in protest, provoking an armed 
confrontation that left two Chinese dead.201 Uprisings such as this were not uncommon 
in the rural zone, and some level of tension between Germans and Chinese persisted 
through the life of the Leasehold, although to a much lesser degree over time. 
 From the very start of the colony, the Imperial Navy prioritized the goals they 
established for Tsingtau, particularly the city’s economic development and its growth as 
a port and trade center. To this end, Tsingtau’s governor and its naval administration 
were evaluated by their abilities to secure these objectives, despite their overarching-and 
critical-military duty to protect Germany’s interests in China and East Asia. Indeed, it 
was the inability of Tsingtau’s first governor, Hans Rosendahl, to meet the non-military 
demands of his assignment that resulted in his transfer a mere six months after his April 
1898 arrival in Tsingtau. In governing the colony, Rosendahl chose to pursue a policy 
that focused clearly on the colony’s military role as naval base and rather than its civil 
one as a commercial port and center of trade. In reporting the reasoning for this decision 
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to Wilhelm II, Tirpitz explained Rosendahl “failed to set his sights on the important goal 
of the economic development of Kiaochow or to contribute to the advancement and 
achievement of this goal” despite the fact that he had told Rosendahl repeatedly that 
“ensuring this development was his primary duty and that he had been given as free a 
hand as possible to carry out this mission.” Although Rosendahl had proven himself 
highly competent in discharging his military duties in establishing the Leasehold’s 
garrison and the battalion, his decision to focus on these objectives, Tirpitz reported, 
“turned him even more from his higher task of developing the colony.”202  
As a result, Rosendahl was replaced by Paul Jaeschke, who, like Tirpitz, had a 
long history with the Imperial Navy in East Asia and had been an early advocate in the 
Navy for the seizure of German territory in China, even participating in the 1895 
expedition to identify potential suitable sites for a German sphere of influence.203 
Jaeschke’s views on his responsibilities as governor were much more in alignment with 
Tirpitz’s expectations and, under his governorship, Tsingtau’s development began to 
take off. The outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion-and Jaeschke’s untimely death in this 
armed conflict-blunted these efforts for a brief time, but his successor, Oskar von 
Truppel, who remained governor of Tsingtau for a full decade, oversaw a true 
flourishing of the colony during his tenure. 
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 As high as the expectations were for the officers in charge of the colony, the 
sailors and soldiers that served under them were evaluated just as highly for the 
effectiveness in bringing about the navy’s vision for Tsingtau. In addition to their 
primary task of protecting the colony and German interests in China more broadly, the 
troops were also responsible for surveying, construction, road building and repairs, and 
health-related tasks.  Although Jaeschke clearly recognized the value that the soldiers 
provided in developing Tsingtau, he complained to Tirpitz in 1900 that “their 
nonmilitary duties are becoming a source of trouble, as they obstruct their training and 
limits their effectiveness in defending German interests.”204 In responding to this report, 
however, Tirpitz was unconcerned about this diversion from military preparedness. The 
head of the Reichsmarineamt asserted, “it is the recurring experience of all states that at 
the start of colonial endeavors one relies on troops to do the required labor. 
[Furthermore,] the common work of officials, colonists, and troops leads to a strong 
bond between them that is critical in order for the colony to survive and prosper.”205 
 Tirpitz believed wholeheartedly in the plan to turn Tsingtau into a German Hong 
Kong, supporting and pushing this objective in both official/public statements as well as 
his private correspondence. Additionally, as Tirpitz was a particularly savvy politician, 
he recognized the political value of pursuing this vision of empire for Tsingtau, 
particularly if the navy could merge its specific vision with those of other prominent 
interest groups in China and East Asia, much as he was able to do in the drive to acquire 
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territory in China in the first place.206 To this end, Tirpitz made certain to keep the 
Reichstag fully appraised about the Navy’s policy vis-à-vis Tsingtau, providing constant 
updates about plans for the development of Tsingtau and their successful execution. Just 
as Tirpitz used an alliance of interests to garner the critical support he needed for the 
Navy Bill, Tirpitz used the successes in the growth and development of the Leasehold to 
demonstrate that the Reichsmarine was the best manager of overseas colonial interests 
(within both Germany and Europe), and win public support for the navy. In doing so, 
Tirpitz could easily argue for additional increases to the navy’s annual budget that could 
be used in the development of Tsingtau as well as the navy in general, key needs in 
Germany’s attempt to prove itself a worthy rival to Britain.   
 In order to generate maximum exposure and support for Tsingtau during the 
annual budget appropriation debates, Tirpitz had the Reichsmarineamt prepare an annual 
publication on the colony, Denkschrift betreffend die Entwicklung des Kiautschou-
Gebiets (Memorandum Concerning the Development of the Kiautschou Leasehold). 
These memoranda provided detailed and thorough accounts of the colony’s growth and 
developments, devoting especial attention to successes attained during the previous year. 
The booklets (usually 35-40 pages in length) provided considerable support for the 
claims contained therein, including charts, maps, tables, and photographs. Filled with 
copious details about the development of the Leasehold over the year they covered, these 
reports showcased the high level of competency in colonial administration the Navy 
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sought to cultivate, making them some of the best and most valuable sources of 
information on Tsingtau even now.  
As a result of these efforts, the Leasehold (not to mention the Navy in general) 
received considerable funds from the Reichstag in comparison to Germany’s other 
colonies.207 In the crucial first decade of the colony, in which the colonial government 
laid much of the foundation for Tsingtau’s growth and development, the annual budget 
for the Leasehold totaled 102,337,442 Marks. In just the first two years of the colony 
(1898-1900) the German government appropriated 23,280,000 marks to Tsingtau, an 
average of nearly 8 million marks per year. The annual amount appropriated to Tsingtau 
continued to increase each year until 1906-1907, when opposition to colonies in the 
Reichstag reached its peak.208 Indeed, aside from the expenditures to suppress the 1904-
1906 revolts in Africa, more funding went to Kiaochow between 1898 and 1907 than 
any other German colony, despite the larger size and longer history of Germany’s 
territories in Africa.  
The willingness to commit so much funding to Tsingtau largely stemmed from 
Tirpitz’s personal advocacy in the Reichstag, convincing many of the politicians there 
that the colony was extremely well managed and developed. Indeed, even as opposition 
of the Reichstag to German colonies reached its peak, Tsingtau remained extremely 
popular. While many of the Kolonialamt’s most virulent critics attacked Germany’s 
other colonies for the poor management, lack of development, and overall waste of 
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funds, they heaped acclaim on the effective running of Tsingtau. In 1905, for example, 
as the Reichstag engaged in heated debates about funding for the colonies, the vote on 
the Leasehold’s budget elicited only praiseworthy speeches about Tsingtau that members 
widely cheered. One of the most significant of these speeches was the one that Richard 
Eickhoff, the deputy of the Progressive Party (which usually staunchly condemned 
Germany’s colonies), delivered on behalf of the party’s leader Eugen Richter. Widely 
applauded on both sides of the parliament, Eickhoff noted the “gratifying development” 
of the Leasehold and commented, “certainly over the years we have committed a large 
amount of money for Kiaochow, but the Navy used it in a rational way.”209 As John 
Shrecker notes, “the adjective ‘rational’ was probably the highest compliment a 
Progressive could pay to any expenditure.”210 
 As the naval administration shared the sentiment that achieving broad economic 
goals would make Tsingtau into a viable colony and a one of the most desirable ports in 
East Asia, supporters of this policy argued that these objectives needed to remain a 
cornerstone of the Navy’s plan for the Leasehold. Longtime members of the Leasehold’s 
government such as Otto Hövermann believed that “the state must not only prepare those 
installations which serve immediate needs but also such undertakings, which will be 
useful in later years.” If followed through on properly, “these ventures will serve as 
examples to the outsiders [i.e. Chinese businessmen], who will then bring relations with 
the creators of these examples in order to obtain and equally high cultural level” that was 
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central to making the colony manageable and profitable.211 Consequently, it was up to 
the state to see to it that development of this infrastructure would continue to bolster 
Tsingtau’s long-term economic successes and viability.  
As Tsingtau remained split between German/Western (including Japanese) and 
Chinese commercial communities, colonial policy had to give some attention to native 
businessmen as well. This need was particularly acute since there was never a desire to 
turn Tsingtau into a settler colony, meaning that colonial leaders needed to attract 
Chinese inhabitants, businesses, workers, and personnel to form an integral part of daily 
life in the colony. As Hövermann expressed above, Tsingtau needed the Chinese to act 
as “intermediaries” or willing partners in the economic growth of the Leasehold, and so 
the naval administration had to keep opportunities open to all investors. This vision of an 
educated and well-trained interlocutor class that could act as a go-between for the 
colonial government with Chinese leadership at the provincial and federal levels became 
a keystone of the navy’s idea of what it meant to create a German Hong Kong. 
 While the naval government even in this early period exhibited a willingness to 
engage with the native population and meet some of their immediate needs, its civic 
planning reflected a more “traditional” sense of colonial rule. As Germans moved in to 
the colony following its annexation, the Chinese were “driven out of old Tsintau [sic],” 
the village [Qingdao] razed, and a new city built to take its place.212 The guiding 
principle of Tsingtau’s urban plan was the strict separation of Europeans and Chinese in 
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order to produce “a clear demarcation of our territory from China,” and so that the 
Germans might “avoid being in direct touch with China.”213  
Although the Navy’s city planners certainly recognized the necessity and 
importance of the Chinese to Tsingtau’s livelihood, they also feared and looked down 
upon the Chinese due to the overarching prevalence of the racially-charged sinophobic 
views at this time. The European district, known as “Upper Tsingtau,” then, was filled 
was large villas, open space, scenic parks, and wide curving roads that all bore German 
names.214 Large numbers of trees, bushes, and flowers were planted, most of which were 
imported from Germany and were used to form a belt of greenery to surround the 
European zone. Only Chinese servants were allowed to live in this district, and then only 
in small “coolie houses” separate from the main villas on any particular estate. The other 
buildings in the European district-houses, hotels, official buildings, shops, etc.-retained a 
very distinct German or European style, many of which evoked the traditional 
appearance of Bavarian buildings.215 Once this area was fully realized, visitors to the city 
almost felt as if they were not in China at all, but rather back home in Germany. Once 
such individual, Georg Schweitzer commented, “when I arrived in Tsingtau 
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and…looked around…I was overcome with the feeling: you’re in a completely German 
territory here. This feeling accompanied me everywhere during my stay.”216 
 In addition to this separation spatially, the Chinese were also subject to a 
different legal system and other regulations as well. Europeans and Chinese used 
separate hospitals, schools, prisons, burial grounds, and even chambers of commerce in 
these early years, and were forbidden to join elite social clubs, such as the Tsingtau-
Klub.217 While the Chinese were allowed to use the same beaches as the Europeans, they 
were restricted to using separate changing houses and bathrooms. Furthermore, natives 
were required to be in the homes by nine o’clock in the evening, unless they had a 
specific reason to be out after dark and had to carry a lantern with them if doing so.218 
Further regulations were promulgated by “Chinese Ordinances” that were used to help 
keep the local population under control and in check whenever necessary. In the second 
decade of the colony, as Tsingtau began to prosper and more and more Chinese elites 
found themselves drawn to the city, civic leaders softened their approach towards the 
native population, particularly those who worked their way up into positions of 
prominence. Chinese and German members of the colonial community interacted freely 
in organizations such as the Confucius Society and colonial leaders exerted pressure on 
more sinophobic organizations, such as the Tsingtau-Klub, to allow the Chinese 
members access.219 
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 Another important part of the colonial government’s policy in the Leasehold at 
this time was the aggressive and harsh campaign to extend and establish German control 
in the region outside the city and the 50-kilometer buffer zone. While this was justified 
through the need to protect missionaries and defend the colony from violent anti-
Western religious organizations (such as the Order of the Sacred Fist, which was largely 
responsible for the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and based in southern 
Shantung), Germany used any opportunity it could find to develop its military 
dominance.220 In his memoirs, Tirpitz describes how “the risings in China compelled us 
to carry out the so-called Boxer protection, the walling-in of the town area to an extent 
of 5 kilometers from water to water. Thus we avoided being in direct touch with China 
and prevented these disturbances from affecting us, to the great satisfaction of the rich 
Chinese who flocked to Tsingtao.”221 Military campaigns were violent and expressed an 
“aggressive disdain for the Chinese, especially for Chinese literati, antiforeigner secret 
societies, and symbols of Chinese tradition and religion.”222 Temples were routinely 
sacked, villages were destroyed, and often hostages were taken, ransomed for food and 
supplies. All of this was part of a plan, as the Ostasiatischer Lloyd described, to show 
Chinese officials that “the German government in Kiaochow cannot be toyed with.”223  
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Much of this response stemmed from the powerful strains of Sinophobia that 
permeated Germany and Europe in this period. Such disdain for the Chinese reached its 
height during the Boxer Rebellion, when Wilhelm II, in his infamous “Hunnenrede,” 
encouraged the East Asian Expeditions Corps to “emulate King Etzel’s Huns of a 
thousand years ago,” so that “no Chinese will ever again dare to look disapprovingly at a 
German.”224 Troops were stationed in towns outside the Leasehold’s borders after 1900 
under the pretext of preserving law and order, even though this meant, “contradicting all 
of the contractual agreements that had been previously forced on China.”225 
 In time, many of the regulations aggressively directed against the Chinese in 
Tsingtau came to be tempered or altogether changed, and the aggressive military actions 
launched from the colony’s capital largely came to an end by 1905. Nevertheless, in the 
early years of Tsingtau, the naval administration’s view of a German Hong Kong had to 
strike a balance between its desire for a more ordered and liberal imperial rule with more 
common colonial practices that reflected the strong sense of Sinophobia that was 
prevalent and quite commonplace at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 Despite the fact that the merchant community in China shared the broad interests 
of the naval administration in terms of its economic goals-businessmen and traders had 
long called for a German trading enterpôt like Hong Kong-its own vision of empire did 
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not directly mesh with that of the Imperial Navy. Whereas the navy considered it its duty 
to share German capital, culture, and competence freely, merchants were much more 
interested in their bottom line: securing wealth and profit through the exploitation of 
favorable trade agreements, cheap and replaceable labor, and easily acquirable land for 
growth and development. Thus, their ideas of empire were much more in line with those 
of the Foreign Ministry, which stubbornly insisted on ensuring that all the stipulations 
and concessions wrested from the Chinese government should be rigidly enforced. The 
division of power between the Imperial Navy and the Foreign Office, particularly the 
fact that administration of the colony was in a naval governor’s hands, infuriated 
German merchants in China. A naval commander as governor, they argued, stood in 
direct opposition to their trading interests, as they viewed the colony as their own 
personal and exclusive territory like other treaty ports such as Hong Kong or 
Shanghai.226 These merchants dreamt of acquiring vast riches overnight since they had 
already laid the groundwork for their companies many years before and now had finally 
secured favorable treaties to guarantee their rights. Thus, they tended to draw upon other 
colonial models, such as Africa, and did not wish to see their dreams whisked away by a 
series of orders from a simple naval bureaucrat. 
 Chief among the initial complaints and opposition of merchants and investors 
was the colonial government’s plan to give both Chinese and Europeans an equal chance 
to purchase land in Tsingtau and the Leasehold. Although natives were prohibited from 
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residing in the European sector (unless employed as servants), they were able to buy 
land, develop it, and then sell it back to a European buyer at fair market value.227 Though 
a plan such as this was certainly what German land speculators envisioned for 
themselves, they were incensed that a wealthy Chinese individual might turn the tables 
on them.228 German businessmen launched a wave of protest over Governor Rosendahl’s 
actions, campaigning vigorously in both the German and German Asian press (primarily 
the Ostasiatischer Lloyd, based in Shanghai) to have these measures repealed and 
Rosendahl recalled for his failure to understand what was in Germany’s best interests 
vis-à-vis colonial policy.229 
 Although Rosendahl came under heavy fire for his land distribution policy, he 
was ultimately able to weather this storm. Between the land ordinances and strong 
policies regarding the limited legal status and overall rights of the Chinese, German 
merchants and businessman saw elements of their vision for Tsingtau being channeled 
constructively. Such restrictions on the status of the Chinese left the commercial 
community with enough space to exploit the native population, much in the same way 
the colonial settlers had done in Africa, allowing Tsingtau to become their own personal 
hunting grounds like Hong Kong or Shanghai.230 That the Navy’s plans for the economic 
development for the colony aligned with those of the commercial community in the 
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long-term also provided Rosendahl with some leeway to square the interests of the two 
sides. Nevertheless, Rosendahl was never able to win over commercial leaders in the 
colony fully, as they believed he remained insensitive to the needs of trading companies 
and investors. The commercial community cared little for the Navy’s insistence that the 
Leasehold needed to be operated differently from the other treaty ports and that, as a 
result different policies and plans needed to be put into practice.231 Rosendahl further 
eroded the confidence that merchants and businessmen had in him as someone who 
would advocate for and protect their interests by expressing vocal and public support for 
the scholarly German official Wilhelm Schrameier.232 A philologist and interpreter at the 
German consulate in Shanghai, the Foreign Office sent him to Tsingtau following the 
German occupation of the Leasehold, playing an active role in the organization of the 
Leasehold administration, particularly the land system, and was later appointed the first 
Chinesenkommisar responsible for overseeing the Chinese Bureau in the Leasehold. The 
German commercial community, however, saw Schrameier as responsible for many of 
the policies-such as the equal chance for Chinese and Europeans to purchase land-that 
pre-empted their profit-making plans from the outset. As a result, a wave of negative 
stories and editorials about the governor flooded German newspapers (something that 
Tirpitz actively disliked when it was focused on the Imperial Navy), causing Tirpitz to 
recall Rosendahl from his post after only eight months in office.233 
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 Just as it would be too simplistic to label the colonial government’s vision for 
Tsingtau as purely sinophilic, middle class businessmen and investors in the colony were 
not just sinophobic in their outlook regarding the local population and its role in creating 
a German Hong Kong; the civic plan for Tsingtau is an excellent example of this. Like 
most treaty ports, Tsingtau was to have an exclusively European district (discussed 
above), as well as regions of the city where only Chinese would live, Taidongzhen234 
and Taixizhen. These two zones were built with the needs of merchants, businessmen, 
and traders in mind, as they were filled with rows of “cheap coolie houses” for the large 
number of workers that the major firms in the city would require.”235  
Though quite satisfied with having their labor needs met in this way, the middle 
class also backed the creation of a mixed “middle district” between the purely European 
and Chinese zones, known as Tapautau, or Chinesen-Stadt, which would represent a 
middle ground between the two groups.236 Due the powerful strain of racially-charged 
Sinophobia at this time, civic planners initially conceived Tapautau as a one of the 
segregated districts of the colonial city that was typical of other European-controlled 
territories on the coast of China such as Tientsin’s “walled city” or the Daowai district in 
Harbin where wealthier Chinese merchants could live and trade.237 Where Tapautau 
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differed from Tientsin or Harbin even in these initial stages is that did not emerge out of 
original indigenous settlements that were later incorporated into the city but was rather 
an intended part of the plan for Tsingtau from the start.  Furthermore, unlike Daowai-
which remained solely under Chinese administration even under Russian rule-Tapautau 
remained under the control and supervision of the colonial government.238  
Nevertheless, this initial plan to make Tapautau into a fully-formed “Chinese 
town” within Tsingtau but completely separated from the European district never came 
to fruition. Between shortages of good land for houses and businesses in Tsingtau and 
the notable shift towards Sinophobia in the early years of the colony, the meticulously 
planned division between the European and Chinese towns (represented physically by 
the “green belt” designed for “Upper Tsingtau”) rapidly crumbled.239 “Moreover,” as 
Philip Demgenski argues, “different groups of European business people that were by 
now [i.e. 1900] living in Qingdao pursued different aims vis-à-vis the local population, 
competing with each other over business opportunities and resources.”240 Consequently, 
then, the plan for Tapautau changed quickly, resulting in the creation of a city district 
with a wholly new identity that had yet to be seen in any other Chinese colonial city. 
With this shift in plans for the Chinesen-Stadt, this district now became an 
ethnically “mixed zone of commercial, industrial, and residential activity in which both 
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Europeans and Chinese could live, work, shop, and own property.”241 In addition to the 
well-to-do Chinese that lived and worked here, some German merchants chose to set up 
shops here, and mid-level German bureaucrats in the colony, as well as managers and 
white-collar employees of the German merchant firms, lived there as well. While 
Tapautau was still landscaped and laid out with an eye towards aesthetics, buildings 
were clustered together more densely, and the architecture was much simpler and more 
diverse. European-style houses and business were mixed with a Chinese architectural 
style typical of the lower Yangtze region and Canton-a nod to the fact that many of the 
residents were businessmen from middle and Southern China.242 The architectural style 
of these early buildings also paved the way for the type of building that would become 
emblematic not only of Tapautau but also, later, for Tsingtau itself: the Liyuan houses. 
Though similar in design to houses that could be found throughout northern China, these 
courtyard-style houses were heavily influenced by German building regulations and 
partly designed by German architects.243 Furthermore, residents could even find large 
European-style department stores in Tapautau, such as the Tsingtau branch of 
Ruifuxiang, which sold a range of goods from cloth to luxury items such as silk, satin, 
tea, and furs, as well as items that were popular and trending in Europe. As a result, 
Tapautau assumed an ambiguous identity that was never fully part of the European 
district, but also never fully segregated from it. Although Tapautau “had been planned as 
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a segregated ‘Chinese town’ and also governed accordingly…it quickly transformed into 
an ethnically and spatially mixed area” that represented a hybridization of German and 
Chinese identity.244 
While cultural distinctions and divides remained in this zone-the civil ordinances 
were still in effect, for example-laxer racial restrictions and greater opportunity for inter-
mingling certainly reflects a willingness on the part of German businessmen to work 
with the Chinese. Photographs taken during the colonial period show people in Tapautau 
wearing a mixture of European and Chinese clothing, and European businesses and 
residences were often neighbors with their Chinese counterparts.245 This cultural 
hybridization was even extended to the street names in this district, as they had Chinese 
names (usually taken from towns in Shantung) with the German word strasse appended 
to it, such as the main avenue, Kiautschoustrasse. Furthermore, Chinese financiers were 
eventually allowed to invest in German companies and businesses, although they were 
not permitted to sit on their boards of directors.246 The existence of a district like 
Tapautau, and the merchant community’s support for its creation and willingness to live 
and work with the Chinese reflects an understanding that, in order for Tsingtau to be the 
German Hong Kong that German investors desired, the boundaries between Europeans 
and Chinese needed to be blended, even if only in a limited fashion.  
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 While German merchants continued to resist the strongly liberal plans of the 
colonial government, their somewhat sinophilic tendencies often left room for 
compromise that allowed the Navy’s plans for the colony to continue apace. This is not 
to say that the conflict between commercial and naval leaders was nothing more than a 
game of protest and appeasement, but rather that the sides were able to find common 
ground and harmonize the differences in their visions for making Tsingtau into a viable, 
desirable, and powerful center of power in East Asia. Wilhelm Schrameier perhaps best 
expressed this in his 1910 study of German influence in China:  
 The thought of taking advantage of the decay of China is contrary to anything 
Germany  desires…Germany knows…nothing but her trade interests. Germany is a 
trading power   and has to guard her trade and industrial interests in China [and 
East Asia], and to  develop them further. What we need for this trade is a prosperous, 
rich China; a country  which finds increased prosperity in steady 
development…Germany will, and must, be  anxious to help the Chinese government by 
all possible means in its attempts at reform.247 
 
Though a broad desire of protecting trade and industrial rights was certainly prevalent 
among leaders in the commercial community, German politicians and diplomats often 
tied this economic vision of empire to their own desires for Germany to be regarded as a 
major global empire and a power to be reckoned with both in East Asia and on the world 
stage. In summing up merchant interests in China to the Kaiser in 1907 in order garner 
his support for privatizing the naval yard and related shipbuilding shops, Arthur Graf 
von Rex, the German Envoy to Peking, 1906-1911, argued that 
the Imperial government had always wanted to turn Tsingtau into an example of 
German Kultur in China, and that German-Chinese undertakings would be a 
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good basis for such cooperation of the two peoples. The British had lifted the 
Japanese to the same level, [and] we should do this for the Chinese. Whoever 
fulfilled the new cry: China for the Chinese would realize the greatest benefits. 
 
Wilhelm eagerly agreed with Rex’s plan and line of argument, filling his personal copy 
of this dispatches with notes of “yes!!!”, “agreed”, and “correct” in the margins.248 With 
ideas such as those expressed by Schrameier and Rex gaining the Emperor’s support, all 
that remained was implementing these plans successfully. 
 Although the period prior to 1905 did reflect a hybridized view-point of the 
Chinese and what it mean to make Tsingtau into a German Hong Kong, much of this 
early phase was colored by an overwhelming Sinophobia that stunted the colony’s 
growth. By 1905, however, economic pressures, changing geo-strategic considerations, 
and a resurgence of deeply resonant sinophilic ideas that China possessed an admirably 
ancient culture that could serve as the foundation for its modernization all led to a 
dramatic shift in colonial policy, as new institutions began to overlay the overall existing 
colonial structure. Sinologists who had trained as translators, studying in China and 
maintaining close contact with local Chinese, began disseminating China-friendly 
sentiments, encouraging their superiors to “create the dynamics that altered the formulas 
of colonial governance.”249 As a result, “there emerged a serious program intended to 
‘influence the spirit and character’ of the Chinese in the colony.”250 Sinophobic views 
gave way to a greater sense of Sinophilia, allowing for a reorientation in colonial policy. 
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As a result, those who believed in following the model of British Hong Kong-that 
cultural development and influence was the best means of making Tsingtau successful-
gained greater influence in Kiaochow’s politics. The time for creating a fully realized 
German Hong Kong was now at hand, where Germany would “show China the paths 
that will lead contemporary Chinese cultural to the superior Christian-Germanic 
culture.”251  
 After 1905, economic considerations and interests came to have a much greater 
influence in the colony, as German capitalists became much more vocal in their criticism 
of the colony as being too militaristic, calling for its further liberalization, in order to 
realize the profits that they, their superiors, and the German government itself, had 
hoped for.252 While this did not necessarily mean more liberal native policies-the 
Ostasiatischer Lloyd and Detusch-Asiatische Warte, both the voices of German 
businessmen, frequently criticized the open and fair treatment of the Chinese-the 
pressure from middle-class businessmen to realize Tsingtau’s full economic potential 
exerted a powerful, if less direct influence over colonial policy. Destroying villages and 
towns and driving the Chinese away, German commercial leaders argued, would 
accomplish little, and turn the Germans into “the most hated foreign devils.”253 Realizing 
that losing the Chinese labor force and Chinese-owned businesses needed to support the 
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colony and its growth would be an economic disaster, colonial leaders now understood 
they needed to find ways to make the Chinese a more active part of the colony. 
 Between shifting power dynamics in East Asia and a growing feeling of isolation 
in Europe, the idea of turning China into an ally gained greater appeal to leaders in 
Germany after 1905. If China could be uplifted like Japan, the more liberal and 
sinophilic elements in Tsingtau argued, Germany could counterbalance Japan’s rising 
influence in East Asia, as well as place greater pressure on Britain to defend its own 
interests. Doing so meant working more closely with the Chinese, as well as promoting a 
new hybrid interlocutor class in the colony capable of defending and promoting German 
interests in Peking and the rest of China. In this way, then, the desire of Sinophiles for 
the colonial government to embrace a policy of Bilduungsauftrag (cultural imperialism) 
meshed perfectly with Berlin’s new geopolitical strategy. Consequently, the colonial 
government moved away from a policy of segregation and militarism towards one of 
inclusion and exchange that emphasized more direct cultural assimilation and active 
civilizing projects, most notably through education and infrastructure development 
projects. The important strategic considerations of using Tsingtau as a means of 
leveraging better relations with China influenced native policy by urging leaders in the 
Foreign Office and in the Imperial Navy to censure Governor Truppel when he resisted 
reforms or attempts to include the Chinese more in the daily life of the colony, as well as 
to give greater weight and influence to a different group of Germans in the Leasehold: 
the middle-managers of empire, including academics, missionaries, translators, consuls, 
businessmen, and lower-level civil servants in Tsingtau who fully embraced a vision of a 
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German Hong Kong in which Germany’s rule in Tsingtau represented “a balancing of 
the differing [Chinese and German] ways of thought.”254 
 The earliest signs of this change in policy began with an exchange of official 
visits between Truppel and the governor of Shantung, Zhou Fu (1902-1904), in 1902 and 
1903. This simple interaction between the two governors had an immensely positive 
effect as Richard Wilhelm, the leader of the Protestant Weimar Mission in Shantung, 
remarked that this “put an end to the antagonist atmosphere by showing more could be 
achieved on both sides by mutual trust and goodwill,” resulting in “bringing the two 
cultures into contact.”255 Soon after these initial visits, Truppel and the colonial 
government finalized an agreement with Zhou Fu’s successor, Hu Tingqian, to withdraw 
all German troops in Shantung back into the Leasehold proper. This November 1904 
agreement to roll back the German military presence in China marked the beginning of 
Germany’s shift in colonial policy towards “cultivating cultural-political relationships, 
especially with the educated Chinese upper strata.”256 Although this change in policy did 
not occur officially until 1904-1905, the seeds for this type of collaboration were sown 
in 1902 with the formation of the Chinese Committee in Tsingtau, which, as noted 
above, formed a powerful and influential voice in the running of Tsingtau and many of 
the new development projects and policies that the leasehold administration pursued. 
Despite some dissension and protest from more conservative elements in the 
colony, the response to changes such as these were overwhelmingly positive. In 1904, 
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the local director of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in Tsingtau offered public praise to 
Governor Truppel for making the Chinese “what they should be, that is, citizens 
[Bürger] of our colony.”257 While the bank director’s words are perhaps an overly-
hopeful exaggeration, it is clear that Tsingtau was moving towards greater legal and 
cultural equality, and that the Chinese were becoming a more integral part of the colony. 
Such a move in this direction represented a critically important development upon the 
British model of rule in India and East Asia, as colonial leaders began to recognize that 
they could no longer remain completely “aloof and distant [from the native population], 
maintaining their separation by refusing to engage in proper conversation or 
treating…[the Chinese] as static objects.” While Germans in Tsingtau had started out as 
strangers in their new territory, they were now beginning to assimilate themselves with 
the indigenous population, while also allowing the Chinese to do the same with the non-
native one.258 
Although the competing visions of empire espoused by the naval administration, 
the Foreign Office, and the commercial community began to come into greater harmony 
after 1905, they remained in tension with each other over the degree to which Tsingtau 
was to be an economic engine or a projection of Germanness (Deutschtum) abroad. The 
lack of definition of what “German Hong Kong” meant still overshadowed Tsingtau’s 
progress, even as it grew from a tiny colonial outpost into a prominent colonial city on 
the Chinese coast, a well-connected and modern trading entrepôt in East Asia. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BRINGING TSINGTAU TO THE WORLD, AND THE WORLD TO TSINGTAU 
The seizure of Tsingtau and the area surrounding Kiaochow Bay provided 
Germany with the opportunity to seize what many leaders in Germany had long 
considered Germany’s rightful place in China and the Far East.259 Following the German 
takeover, the colonial administration began to shape a general administrative concept for 
the colony that would provide for its steady growth and development. As the central 
facet of the naval administration’s vision for Tsingtau was making it into a model colony 
and a focus for commercial growth (a German Hong Kong), an important element in this 
plan was the effective and efficient administration of the Leasehold. As Tsingtau began 
to take off after 1900, the administrative structure the navy had established proved 
capable of coping with the problems a governing the increasingly larger colonial 
community.  With such an effective governing structure in place, and a general vision 
for what Tsingtau should become-an international hub of trade and culture-to guide it, 
the colonial government’s next task was to develop a core infrastructure that would 
allow for Tsingtau’s rapid and sustained development. 
As the previous chapters have shown, the vision of Tsingtau becoming a German 
Hong Kong, while prevalent from the earliest years of German interest in China, 
remained varied and not very well defined, particularly among the various leadership 
groups in the colony, such as the Navy, members of the Foreign Office, and the 
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commercial community. Although this lack of a unified vision for the colony did, at 
times, lead to conflicts over Tsingtau’s continued development (most notably the role 
that Chinese were to play in the colony), these tensions did not stunt the colony’s 
growth, despite sometimes pulling plans for the colony in multiple directions at once. To 
begin to even approach the creation of a German Hong Kong (in whatever form it might 
yet take), however, the Germans sent to Tsingtau had to determine how to make the new 
city of Tsingtau an international hub of activity. Central to this plan, then, would be to 
ensure that the necessary infrastructure existed that would connect Tsingtau and the 
Leasehold to the rest of China and the world beyond effectively and efficiently. Over the 
life of the colony, then, leaders in Tsingtau oversaw the construction of a network of 
routes that would allow Tsingtau to be easily accessible via land, sea, and, eventually air. 
This chapter, then, examines the naval government’s attempts to work with, alongside, 
and through commercial, diplomatic, cultural, and political leaders to develop a working, 
multifaceted infrastructure of good roads, a vast and comprehensive railroad network, 
and a large modern harbor and naval facilities that would make Tsingtau into a central 
hub of activity in the Far East and a showcase for German power, prestige, and colonial 
rule. 
As discussed in chapter II, Tirpitz’s views on how to run the Leasehold 
permeated throughout the colonial government. Otto Hövermann perhaps best expressed 
Tirpitz’s vision for the development of Tsingtau when he wrote, 
The power to achieve the far-reaching goals for which Kiautschou was occupied 
can only be found with the state…The state must ensure its own participation in 
the process of colonization. The state must establish itself in the colony for the 
initiation of trade-relations and participate in the financial ventures which come 
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from the Fatherland. The state must not only prepare those installations which 
serve immediate needs, but also such ventures that will be important in the 
future. These ventures will serve as examples to outsiders [i.e. non-state actors, 
particularly the native population], who will then begin to interact with the 
creators of these examples in order to achieve an equally high level of 
achievement.260 
 
Although Hövermann’s description of the Reichmarineamt’s colonial policy was not 
published until 1914, the idea that the state rather than individuals or private businesses 
(who would readily exploit the opportunity for their own gain) needed to assume 
responsibility for the development of infrastructure to ensure the smooth operation of a 
colony and to benefit those who lived, worked, and visited the city was one that had 
existed since the earliest days of Tsingtau. In the evening edition of the Hamburger 
Korrespondent published on 25 June 1898, the naval administration earned “high praise 
for its long-range planning and firm implementation of its policies. In the future, the 
results [of such forward-thinking] will become even more apparent, both in the finances 
of the state and the well-being of future settlers, visitors, and residents.”261  
In order to turn its vision into concrete results, the naval administration had to 
complete a considerable amount of preliminary groundwork. First and foremost was 
conducting a survey of the land in Tsingtau and the Leasehold. Not only would a 
thorough examination of the Leasehold’s geography aid German officials in determining 
what land was most suitable for the construction of farms, housing, transportation, water 
supplies, and industry, but this study would also help set accurate borders and allow for 
the development of a well-thought-out plan for the colony. The first survey teams 
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arrived in April 1898, and immediately set out on their task, working diligently to 
determine Tsingtau’s exact geographic location, install accurate means of calculating 
time, and, finally, construct a meteorological station. They also conducted topological 
surveys, measured and documented the islands dotting Kiaochow Bay, and calculated 
the tides and high-water marks. This was the primary task for much of the first year of 
the colony, and the first annual Denkschrift for Tsingtau contained an important 
supplement filled with much of the data that the surveyors collected.262  Governor 
Rosendahl pushed strongly for the quick completion of the surveys so that development 
planning for the colony and the all-important land sales could begin.263 
On 2 September 1898, the colonial administration published the Land-Use 
Ordinance, which contained detailed descriptions of the plans for Tsingtau and the 
Leasehold and maps laying out the new city. Roads, railways, the harbor, military 
installations, and even parks appeared on these plans, with special attention paid to the 
locations of the railway station and harbor, and the development of the areas surrounding 
them. Recognizing the pragmatic need for the construction of a city in which Europeans 
and Chinese would need to live separately but also have space to work with and interact 
with each other, the city was divided into three parts: a place where wealthy Europeans 
could live and work, the “mixed” section of the city where the more well-to-do Chinese 
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could conduct business with Europeans, and, finally, two purely Chinese sections for 
laborers, farmers, and local businesses.264 
In addition to maps of the new roads planned for the city, the Land-Use 
Ordinance also contained important provisions related to their design and construction. 
The naval administration established strict regulations regarding the gradient, width, and 
angle of entrance of private driveways, and the streets themselves were designed to be 
wide and curving, so as to reduce the amount of dust created by prevailing winds.265 
Furthermore, the colonial government made copious use of dynamite to carve out 
smooth graded roads from the granite hills upon which Tsingtau lay, covering the new 
streets with crushed stones that could be watered down and smoothed out by steam 
rollers. Storm drains and sewers were also a central feature of the general road plan as an 
additional measure to prevent the erosion of road surfaces and the surrounding land.266 
In general, the roads were designed to meet the needs of both private and public 
construction, as the use of land warranted. This posed a considerable challenge in the 
early years of the colony due to the extremely high volume of land sales and building 
construction, although the Leasehold government strove to respond to all requests as 
expeditiously as possible.267 By 1903, demand for new roads began to slow, finally 
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providing colonial leaders with the opportunity to complete the initial network of roads 
laid out in the Land-Use Ordinance.268 
As far as naming Tsingtau’s streets, civic planners utilized a distinct pattern. In 
the European section of the city, roads were named after German rulers and other well-
known-or at least well-placed-Germans. In the mixed-population district of Tapautau, 
the east-west streets bore the names of Chinese provinces (Shantung, Shansi, Kiangsu, 
etc.), while the north-south roads took their names from Chinese cities (Peking, 
Shanghai, Nanking, etc.). In a nod to the “mixed nature” of the district, each of the 
streets had the German word Straße added as an enclitic (e.g. Shantungstraße). In 
Taidongzhen and Taixizhen, the streets followed more traditional Chinese naming 
conventions, such as “Golden Dragon” and “Silver Wing.” As the city grew and districts 
were added or expanded, the naval administration continued to utilize these naming 
patterns, providing continuity to the layout of the rapidly growing city.269 
While aesthetics was an important factor in the design of the streets, pragmatic 
considerations were also a primary concern for city planners. In addition to being able to 
accommodate wagons, the roads within Tsingtau were especially wide to accommodate 
the Chinese “wheelbarrow.” A cart with a single wheel fastened just under its center of 
gravity, this vehicle for transporting goods allowed an individual to push a heavily-laden 
cart with considerable ease. While the cart’s design reduced the strain placed on the 
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individual moving it, the cart’s narrow wheel of the cart did substantial damage to the 
road beneath it. To accommodate the cart while also mitigating the wear and tear on the 
roads, civic engineers in Tsingtau added a 30-centimeter-wide “cart lane” on either side 
of the road made from granite slabs, passing through all major intersections. 
Furthermore, as the heavy loads on the wheelbarrows often resulted a wide berth, the 
roads were three meters wide in each direction.270 
During the dry season, laborers watered down the roads with sea-water in order 
to “counter dust as well as provide a more permanent and pleasing appearance.” To 
prevent the opposite problem of the roads being washed away during the heavy rains of 
the monsoon season, the leasehold government built a system of storm drains and storm 
sewers, as well as constructing a hard road surface made of crushed granite, seated in 
place by steamrollers operated by a two-man team of Chinese laborers. 271 In places 
where the road gradient was steeper, engineers used cobblestones instead to prevent the 
roads from washing out. Having taken he threat of downpours and constant heavy rain 
into consideration, city planners also covered sidewalks with granite or concrete slabs, 
separating them from the roads with curbstones. These curbstones also served as gutters 
to help direct the flow of water away from the roads and into the catch basins that led to 
the storm drains. 272 The catch basins helped sift sand and dirt from the water that 
entered the storm sewers, keeping the whole system clean and rainwater flowing freely. 
The European section and Tapautau each had their own storm drainage networks, which 
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the colonial government renovated and expanded as the city grew and new roads needed 
construction. In the exclusively Chinese areas of the city, storm drainage networks 
initially existed only in the eastern outskirts. In 1907, however, the naval administration 
built a mixed storm and sewage system in the predominately Chinese Harbor District, a 
cheaper and equally safe alternative to the separate drainage systems found in the 
European areas. 273 Between 1899 and 1909 (where specific data is available), the 
Leasehold government constructed over 20,000 meters of storm sewers in Tsingtau, with 
connections to 463 houses.274 
 The drainage systems filled a critically important role in the city’s infrastructure 
that supported its rapid growth and development. Since the storm and sewer systems 
carried rainwater away immediately, the city roads rarely flooded or turned into mud 
pits, as commonly occurred in the rest of the Leasehold and Shantung. Traffic could thus 
continue to flow freely once the rain ceased, and pedestrians could move about the city 
without fear that carts, wagons and, in later years, motor vehicles, might soak them as 
they passed by, a benefit that made an exceedingly positive impression on visitors and 
tourists. 275 In July and August 1903, Governor Truppel hosted a delegation of German 
investors and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Commerce. In reporting back on 
the results of this visit, Truppel noted that several members of the delegation reacted 
quite favorably to the streets’ appearance: “walking around on the wide avenues of 
Tsingtao, one cannot help but imagine that he is walking down the modern streets of a 
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European city.” Another one of the delegates expressed his great pleasure to Truppel, 
telling the governor, “I greatly feared [after the rains of the last few days] that I might 
need to replace my boots. I am glad to say I did not!”276 Furthermore, the storm drains 
limited erosion in and around the city-an important consideration for an otherwise dusty 
and sandy region. Regular flushing with sea water mitigated the build-up of silt and sand 
in the storm sewers, keeping the drainage system working at or near full capacity year-
round. 
 While the leasehold government remained proactive in constructing roads to 
meet the demands of its German populace, doing so was often easier said than done. 
Complaints about the roads-or lack thereof-ran rampant at times. In 1910, for example, 
the Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten lampooned Leasehold officials over the long delays 
in the completion of Kieler Strasse, one of the main avenues in Tsingtau’s European 
district. Having already been under construction for eight years, the newspaper reported, 
somewhat sarcastically, that the construction contract had been awarded to a prominent 
Chinese family living in Tapautau, the Man-man-ti (“Slows”), who were expected to 
complete the road project when the 99-year lease on Leasehold was set to expire.277 
Additionally, in 1911, residents of Tsingtau repeated criticized the unfinished condition 
of roads throughout the city, including one that had been under continuous repair for 
over three and a half years.278 
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 Financing for the construction of the roads came from the Roads division of the 
Construction Department in Tsingtau, using the profits from land and property auctions. 
The maintenance of the roads was paid for through taxes on connections to the city’s 
water system.279 The Construction Department was only responsible for roads within 
Tsingtau as well as the main roads that ran from the city into the rest of the leasehold. 
The building and preservation of roads in the rural districts of the Leasehold came under 
the aegis of the individual Chinese villages that the roads passed through. The 
Bezirksamtmänner took on the responsibility of identifying which villages were needed 
to supply funds for road materials as well as laborers for construction. In general, 
villages provided any strong and able-bodied men that could be spared from their daily 
labor. Although these workers were required to give up their time in serving the 
community in this way, the local commissions offered little in the way of compensation, 
aside from a midday meal and a nominal sum at the end of each day’s work.280 
Consequently, the majority of road construction and repair took place during the winter 
months when this “volunteer” labor could be spared from working in the fields with 
minimal disruption to their means of living. One of the last roads built in this manner 
connected Tsingtau to the Mecklenburg-Haus, a beautiful convalescent home nestled on 
the northern side of the Mount Lao, or Laoshan. Originally, it could take upwards of a 
full day to navigate the paths, footbridges, and narrow mountain trails to reach this 
mountainside retreat and the nearby Taoist Monastery (Waldfrieden or Weizhaun). With 
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the completion of this road in early 1914, however, an automobile could make the 
journey in a little under one hour, further bolstering the burgeoning tourist industry that 
was becoming a hallmark of the colonial city.281 In addition to the village-built roads, the 
Schantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft, the German railway company established in the 
Leasehold, also took on the responsibility of building a series of extra-city provincial 
roads that linked Tsingtau with major towns and cities in the Leasehold and the province 
beyond. These roads served as the main conduit of people and products to the railroads, 
which was not only one of the main supports for Tsingtau’s growing trade economy, but 
also one of the main conduits for connecting the city to destinations in China, Asia, and 
beyond. While only a handful of these roads were fully completed and useable by the 
end of the German occupation, these roads succeeded in connecting Tsingtau to its 
surrounding hinterlands and the cities beyond Kiaochow and Shantung.  
 While roads were the lifeblood of a burgeoning Tsingtau, the railway, harbor, 
and seaways beyond were the life-lines that made Tsingtau into a rapidly-growing city 
and potential rival to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and the other major ports in East Asia. By 
designing all aspects of rail and sea trade for the maximum benefit of the colony’s 
residents and investors, the colonial administration hoped to support and spur the growth 
of agriculture and trade in Tsingtau, the leasehold, and Shantung. In doing so, Tsingtau 
would be transformed into the premiere destination port in North China and, ultimately, 
all East Asia. 
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 As the leasehold agreement provided for a variety of special rights for German 
business and investors in the colony, the prospect of generating considerable profit in 
major industries such as banking, shipping, coal, and steel were relatively safe. 
Consequently, the Imperial Government took special interest in the rapid construction of 
a railroad that would connect Tsingtau-and the Leasehold-to the rest of China, East Asia, 
and beyond. If, as leaders in Tsingtau and Berlin hoped, Tsingtau was to become a 
successful major trading colony, it needed to develop a strong railroad network that 
would support the other major industries and foster the growth and development of the 
coal mining industry as well. As the mining and railway industries were two of the 
central economic interests of that encouraged German expansion in Shantung, German 
investors anticipated high profits. Additionally, the railroad was also critically important 
to those groups and individuals-particularly in the Imperial Navy and the Foreign Office-
who saw Tsingtau as crucial to Germany’s global security posture. An efficient railroad 
system would allow for the rapid transport of troops and supplies, as well as additional 
support for a sizeable naval presence on the Chinese coast. For this reason, protecting 
and guaranteeing the safe construction of the railway and the mining industries was a 
central concern of the leasehold government and the state offices in Berlin overseeing 
Germany’s new colony in China.  
 The railroad and mining concessions offered a host of potential opportunities for 
German economic interests. Various syndicates formed seeking large and profitable 
government contracts for the construction of the railroad and the operation of the mines. 
Chief among these was the Shantung Syndicate, which counted the large China-based 
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German trading houses such as Carlowitz and Company, as well as companies involved 
in heavy industry such as Siemens and Krupps among its members, the Magnate 
Syndicate, comprised of Prussian landowners, and the German Industry Syndicate for 
the Settlement of Kiautschou and the Hinterland (Deutsche Industrie-Syndikat zur 
Erschließung Kiautschous und des Hinterlandes), in which the Augsburg-Nürnberg 
Maschinenfabrik and other industrial enterprises were involved.282 With all of these 
potential investment groups pursuing government contracts, the primary concern for the 
Auswärtiges Amt, under whose jurisdiction the railway and mining industries fell, was to 
bring an end to the competition between individual German companies, and instead form 
a consortium of capital-rich investors that would maximize corporate involvement in the 
leasehold’s industries.283 On May 24, the various syndicates applied jointly for the rail 
and mining concessions as a single corporate entity, the Schantung Eisenbahn 
Gesellschaft (SEG).  
Formally incorporated in Berlin on 14 June 1899 with a capital investment of 34 
million gold Reichsmarks guaranteed by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the SEG 
successfully bid on and received an exclusive railroad and mining contract from the 
imperial government on 1 June.284 In order to spur Tsingtau’s rapid development, the 
Leasehold needed an immediate connection via rail to Tsinan, the economic center and 
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capital of Shantung. Located on the Grand Canal, one of China’s major transportation 
arteries linking Peking and Hangchow (Hangzhou), the quick and efficient transportation 
of goods and people to Tsinan was vitally importance to Tsingtau and the Leasehold. 
Consequently, the primary objective of the government contract awarded to the SEG was 
to construct a new railroad from Tsingtau to Tsinan within five years. A subsidiary 
provision of this agreement also tasked the SEG with building a branch line from 
Tsingtau to Linyi, the largest city in southern Shantung.285 Upon the successful 
fulfillment of this initial project, the German government promised additional contracts 
that would provide for the expansion of the railroad to other cities such as Port Arthur, 
Shanghai, and Peking, as well as connections to other major railways such as the 
recently-completed Trans-Siberian railway.286  
Although an independent business entity, the SEG had considerable ties to the 
imperial government and the other government-sponsored corporation in the colony, the 
Schantung-Bergbaugesellschaft (SBG), which received a contract to develop the mining 
concessions in Shantung on the same day as the SEG received its one for the railroad.287 
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The Reich-as well as the colonial government-had considerable sway with both Boards 
of Directors, and never hesitated to make its desires known. Furthermore, any dividends 
over 5 percent were taxed at varying percentages, meaning that the more successful SEG 
was in generating profits, the more those profits had to be shared with the leasehold 
government. Despite such taxes limiting the company’s profit margins, however, the 
imperial government was content to leave construction decisions and day-to-day 
operations largely in the hands of the SEG’s managers and directors.288 
 German industry also benefited greatly from the creation of the SEG and its close 
ties with the imperial government. German firms crafted all the manufactured equipment 
necessary for the railroad, from rails and ties to locomotives, cars, and colliers, in 
Germany and prominent German shipping companies-including Hamburg-Amerika Linie 
and Nordduetscher Lloyd- transported these materials to China, exporting twenty-five 
thousand tons of goods.289 By the summer of 1899, these material and transport contracts 
totaled over 20 million Reichsmarks, a major economic boon for the German companies 
and the state’s economy.290 Once these goods arrived in China, they passed into the 
control of Heinrich Hildebrand, a Prussian railway executive and municipal engineer 
who had been in China since the early 1890s as a representative of German interests and 
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an adviser on Chinese railroad projects and was now responsible for overseeing the 
construction of the Tsingtau-Tsinan railway.291 Although the right-of-way for the 
railroad was wide enough to accommodate a double track, the SEG completed only a 
single track by the time Germany had to cede the Leasehold at the end of World War I. 
The project was indeed an ambitious undertaking, but all parties concerned were 
confident of its success and the myriad benefits it would bring to Germany’s new 
colonial project. 
Following the establishment of the SEG and the SBG, work on the railroad began 
immediately, following the general route mapped by Ferdinand von Richthofen in the 
1860s and modified by the contemporary survey that SEG engineers conducted upon 
receipt of the company’s government contract.292 Earthwork began in Tsingtau on 23 
September 1899 with a groundbreaking ceremony over which Crown-Prince Heinrich, 
the Commander of the East Asia Squadron, presided. While German engineers oversaw 
all aspects of the construction, Chinese subcontractors carried out most of the actual 
work. In some cases, these contractors received payment for the completion of a specific 
task, such as backfilling, the transportation of materials, or moving a fixed amount of 
earth, while in other circumstances they were responsible for supplying a fixed number 
of Chinese workers to carry out hard labor tasks while under the supervision of German 
contractors or railroad officials, such as the construction of bridges, laying of rails, or 
smoothing of grades. These local workers were generally peasants that lived in villages 
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along the railroad’s route, providing a steady stream of easily accessible labor.293 As the 
conditions for the workers were relatively good and the pay reasonable, local workers 
came to appreciate the opportunities that working on the railroad offered and often 
quickly volunteered for whatever jobs the contractors came to recruit.294 In addition to 
local labor, contractors also employed workers from northern China who had already 
had previous experience building the railroads there. At the height of the railroad’s 
construction, somewhere between 20,000 and 25,000 Chinese workers provided their 
manpower for the railway line.295 Furthermore, due to the fact that many in the local 
population looked favorably upon the potential options for employment that the railroad 
offer, the SEG founded a small school in 1899 that provided the necessary education 
“create…the personnel for stationmasters, conductors, fireman, engineers, and 
watchmen, etc.”296 While the SEG initially preferred to hire Germans (and other 
Europeans) to handle much of the operation and maintenance of the railroad upon its 
construction, due in no small part to the prevalence of Sinophobia within the commercial 
community at this time, the extremely high wages that foreigners commanded in China 
compelled SEG officials to turn to the local population to fill many of its low and mid-
level positions, particularly in the areas outside Tsingtau.297 
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Aside from river crossings whose seasonal variances the SEG engineers would 
have to plan for, construction of the route was manageable with few natural obstacles or 
difficult grades to contend with. Perhaps the most difficult problems facing the SEG 
were negotiating the time and distance required for such a project and the negative 
reactions from the local populace directly affected by the railway’s presence, particularly 
in terms of buying land and maintaining the security of the railroad as its work 
proceeded further into Shantung’s interior. Chinese peasants were often unwilling to sell 
their land, and the process could be slowed significantly due to the difficulty involved in 
determining who, exactly, owned the property the SEG wished to purchase. Security of 
the railroad was critical as the SEG’s activities left the SEG extremely vulnerable to 
attacks and disturbances. Unrest from the Chinese was not only costly to the company in 
terms of property damage, but also due to long construction delays that inevitably 
resulted. Nevertheless, despite such concerns the SEG did little to encourage its 
engineers to work with the native population and to treat them fairly, particularly in the 
sectors just outside protectorate’s borders.298 In an early report on the progress of the 
railway’s construction, Governor Jaeschke reported to the Reichsmarineamt that “the 
Chinese population outside the Leasehold is being systematically excited against 
foreigners. This is largely due to the actions of engineers along the route of the new 
railroad.”299 As a result, local officials and members of the native educated elite began to 
campaign vigorously against the presence of foreigners in Shantung and China in 
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general. The unrest that the railroad encountered, then, “grew out of local grievances but 
gained momentum because the local authorities reflected the anti-foreign sentiments 
them in ascendency among their superiors.”300 
 Further trouble erupted over the refusal of the SEG and the SBG to compromise 
with or seek assistance from provincial and local leaders regarding these disturbances. 
Although Part II, Article III of the Leasehold Agreement stipulated that special 
arrangements should be made concerning the regulation of railroad construction and 
mining, the German consortia showed no interest in negotiating such contracts, despite 
repeated demands from the governor of Shantung, Zhang Yongmei (1897-1899).301 The 
SEG and SBG feared that further regulations would limit the influence of their 
respective companies, reducing the administrative power they wielded and the profits 
they might earn. Any problems or difficulties that might arise, they argued, would be 
solved better on a case-by-case basis rather than with any sort of broad-based 
agreement.302 This approach, which meant completing the railways and mining projects 
without consulting or cooperating with the Chinese, became a major factor in the 
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vehement resistance to the railroad by the Chinese population and segments of the 
provincial administration in 1899 and 1900.303  
As a part of their resistance to the railroad’s construction, leaders in Shantung 
sought to delay the construction of the railroad and mines. By passing a series of 
“Regulations” in March 1900, the Governor of Shantung tried to implement a treaty 
governing the construction of railroads and mines that would force German companies 
to comply with certain procedures in their building projects. These regulations were the 
first attempts to recover lost rights in the railway and mining industries and thus regain 
control over the economic development of Shantung, a central facet of Chinese policy 
towards the German-occupied territory. In addition to the conservative Anti-Foreigner 
movement brewing at the time, a broad regional political movement arose focused on 
ending German special rights in Shantung and the Leasehold, as well as the restoration 
of Chinese sovereignty. This movement employed several varied tactics to accomplish 
this goal: presenting German companies such as the SEG and SBG with administrative 
difficulties that ate away at their profits, granting Chinese mines and mining companies 
massive state subsidies, and aiding in the purchase of stock in German companies in 
order to gain greater influence over them. This economic resistance, coupled with local 
protests and resistance to German authority, as well as competition with Chinese 
companies, both in the railroad and above all in mining, succeeded in forcing the 
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German government to slow construction of the railroad and mines, two elements 
essential to bringing the Navy’s vision for Tsingtau to bear. 
 The first major disturbances to strike the railroad occurred in June 1899 at Kaomi 
(Gaomi), one of Shantung’s regional capitals. Here, the local Chinese tore out the 
surveyors’ rods that marked the railroads’ route, chiefly because they did not understand 
the purpose of the rods and feared that they would lose the land on which the rods had 
been placed. 304 On 21 June, Hildebrand requested Jaeschke send military assistance on 
the pretext that the railroad’s work at Kaomi could not progress unless Germany 
occupied the district capital.305 Although Tirpitz opposed military interventions that 
might force the Chinese to escalate the situation, Jaeschke promptly responded to 
Hildebrand’s request, dispatching a marine and mounted artillery force to Kaomi. His 
primary reason for doing so was the critical importance of maintaining the railroad’s 
construction schedule and, therefore, “diplomatic treatment of the situation would take 
far too long to resolve.” Additionally, Jaeschke believed that it was strategically 
necessary to strengthen Germany’s military power in the fifty-kilometer buffer zone, 
arguing that pursuing a purely diplomatic solution might provide the provincial officials 
“with a pretext for sending large numbers of troops into the zone, which would be 
inconvenient for us.”306 The expedition at Kaomi lasted only two weeks, but in this time, 
the troops occupied the district capital and suppressed the unrest harshly and quickly, 
preventing it from spreading further along the railroad’s route. The troops did so by 
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fighting two decisive battles against the local militia, including one at the village of 
Titung, where the first riots occurred. On 5 July, the leader in Kaomi signed a peace 
agreement and the troops returned to Tsingtau.307 
As experiences like the Kaomi riots suggested that conflicts with the Chinese 
could become long-standing, Ambassador Clemens von Ketteler and Governor 
Jaeschke-on instructions from von Bülow and Tirpitz in Berlin-advised the SEG and 
SBG to negotiate on an agreement with the governor of Shantung.308  Considering that 
the German government refused to carry out any permanent military action in Shantung 
at this time, Ketteler and Jaeschke particularly desired such a peaceful outcome.309 
Indeed, this push to reach some sort of arrangement with the provincial government was 
one of the few points on which the Ambassador and Governor agreed regarding the 
administration of the Leasehold in these early years. Nevertheless, despite this 
concordance of views, the two sides differed greatly on the means to achieve it. In 
confronting their difficulties with the Chinese, many of the railroad personnel chose to 
follow the more aggressively anti-Chinese policy of the Chinese Legation rather than 
that of the Governor of Tsingtau and the colonial administration. As crises with the local 
population worsened, members of the Foreign Ministry in China-led by Ketteler-advised 
the SEG that 
it would be useful to use liberal measures for compensation for the sale of their 
[the Chinese] land. At the same time, buying the good will of the elite, timely 
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gifts of money to local officials, and the general involvement of local leaders in 
the success of the company is of primary importance. This will be least 
troublesome in breaking any remaining resistance…and thus secure unimpeded 
continuation of construction.310 
 
Although recognizing that this advice reflected a possible solution to the SEG’s 
problems, Governor Jaeschke could not have disagreed more with the Foreign Ministry. 
While he certainly believed such “gifts” could secure some measure of goodwill from 
local and regional officials, the amount of money spent in this way would have little 
effect in the end, as these bribes would have to continue to go up the chain of command. 
Furthermore, if these schemes were somehow exposed, not only would the resulting 
scandal likely lead to the resignation of the individuals who accepted the bribes, but it 
would also provide fertile grounds for the Chinese press to attack the SEG and turn the 
local population further against the colony and Germany’s presence in Shantung. 
Finally, Jaeschke objected to bribery because such actions would destroy the notion that 
German law was above reproach and that such corrupt practices were a crime that came 
with real consequences. Without the proper rule of German law, the Governor argued, it 
would be impossible to set the proper example for Germans and Chinese alike, and 
ensure the good relations with the Chinese that the naval administration viewed as 
critical to Tsingtau’s success going forward.311 Although the legation in Peking 
disagreed with Jaeschke’s policy on interacting and working with native officials and 
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leaders, the leadership in Tsingtau embraced the colonial governor’s policy, as it 
provided a strong basis for solid long-term relationships with the Chinese.312 
Conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the colonial government continued to 
rage, as the German Legation jealously defended its position as the official 
representative of the Kaiser and his Imperial Government in China and thus the proper 
authority to mediate disputes with the provincial government in Shantung.313 Despite 
this careful guarding of power, however, Ambassador Ketteler and his ministers found 
themselves unable to control the relationship between the SEG and the local Chinese 
population, particularly as the railroad company moved further into Shantung’s interior. 
As a result of the ongoing conflicts over the railway construction in the region around 
Kaomi, Yuan Shikai, newly appointed as Governor of Shantung in late 1899, issued a 
decree in February 1900 that prohibited the SEG from continuing their work without a 
special agreement because, as Yuan claimed, “at present there is no treaty between 
Germany and China which regulates the matter.” 314 Consequently, “the resumption of 
work further north [of Kaomi] depends on the negotiations [with Yuan] in Tsinan.”315 In 
calling for negotiations to take place at the provincial capital, Governor Yuan intended 
to deal with the larger problems that the German companies in Shantung-primarily the 
SEG and SBG-caused as a result of their uncontrollable behavior. In preparation for this 
meeting, Yuan drafted three sets of protocols designed to regulate the railway, the mines, 
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and, most importantly, address the relationship between the Leasehold and Shantung, 
with the expressed goal of establishing a Chinese representative in Tsingtau to safeguard 
Peking’s interests within the German colony and limit the Leasehold’s overall 
independence.316  
At the same time, Yuan sought to establish a Provincial Foreign Office in Tsinan 
that was directly responsible for handling matters with the Germans. Yuan’s plan for 
creating such an office was likely based on a similar one in Manchuria (with the same 
name) that the provincial governor there established to handle problems with Russia and 
the railroad it was building.317 Although the office in Shantung was to become the 
second of its kind in China, the success of this institution in Tsinan resulted in the office 
becoming a staple of provincial administrations throughout the Qing Empire. 
Negotiations between the Germans and Chinese began in February 1900, when 
Shantung Railway Commissioner Heinrich Hildebrand-under advisement from Jaeschke 
to do so in order to end the unrest in the province and resume construction on the 
railway-went to Tsinan to meet with Governor Yuan. The SEG’s Board of Directors in 
Berlin were dismayed when they received word that Hildebrand was opening talks with 
Yuan, complaining to Chancellor von Bülow, “we never expected Hildebrand would 
enter negotiations after we explicitly instructed him not to do so. We only sent him to 
Tsinan to secure the speediest end of the unrest.”318 The SEG added further, “It is 
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damaging to our interests [that] negotiations began in Tsinan before the unrest was 
ended.”319 Although incensed by these actions, the SEG’s directors ultimately authorized 
them when it quickly became clear that this was the only option that would ensure the 
resumption of work and the board learned that Hildebrand and Yuan were already deep 
into discussions. In addition to Hildebrand and Yuan, other participants in the 
conference included General Lieutenant Yin Chang, whom the central government in 
Peking sent to represent the Qing government’s interests, and Captain Freiherr Treutsch 
von Buttlar, whom Governor Jaeschke dispatched to represent the colonial government 
and serve as Hildebrand’s Military Attaché. 
Although both sides met with a considerable amount of equanimity, several 
difficulties arose during the negotiations. As early as the first round of talks, Yuan 
“definitively declared that uninterrupted progress on the railway’s construction as well 
as effective protection of the railways by the authorities of the Province of Shantung 
would only be possible after the Chinese government and the railroad company [SEG] 
reached a fully-settled agreement."320 Nevertheless, after lengthy negotiations on certain 
individual provisions, the SEG and the provincial government concluded two private-
law agreements on 21 March 1900: the Mining Regulations and the Railway 
Regulations.321 Both settlements established various responsibilities on the part of 
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German companies-notably the SEG and SBG, but also any new companies that might 
be established in the future-regarding the construction and operation of railroads and 
mines. Of particular importance were the regulations governing the purchase of land and 
the settlement of conflicts between Germans and members of the local populace directly 
affected by any new construction. In return, the Governor of Shantung agreed to ensure 
the protection of any German facilities built to support the railroad and mining industries 
outside the fifty kilometer "neutral zone" surrounding the Kiaochow Leasehold.  
While Yuan succeeded in achieving these important concessions, Hildebrand 
rejected the provincial governor’s demands that he have a say in determining the route of 
any railroads or where mines might be established, as well as Yuan’s request that the 
provincial government be permitted to tax a company’s profits. Although Hildebrand 
succeeded in resisting these restrictions, he nevertheless had to accept certain other 
limits placed on the authority of German firms, such as the requirement for Germans to 
apply for a passport from Chinese authorities to travel in Shantung’s interior, or that the 
companies would need to discuss the effects of new projects on farming and the local 
populace with community leaders and local officials.322 
Overall, though, the Germans were satisfied by the terms of the two agreements. 
In their estimation, they achieved peace and security for the new railway in exchange for 
relatively minimal concessions. While the Chinese had secured a small amount of 
control over the railroad, the SEG and SBG’s original plans were not affected 
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considerably. Yuan, for his part, was quite pleased with the results. By the fact that 
Germany had agreed to sign to regulations, the provincial governor had secured an 
acknowledgment that the railroad was nominally under Chinese jurisdiction, and the 
powers granted to the province in the regulations served to emphasize the fact that, 
outside the Leasehold itself at least, the railroad fell under Chinese control. Furthermore, 
the regulations provided a stepping-off point for further agreements related to when and 
how the Chinese government might ultimately take full control over the railway in the 
future. The general treaties also reiterated that, in the near future, the railroad would be 
controlled by a joint Sino-German company in which Chinese businessman would 
participate in the management of the SEG and SBG, although the line would remain 
under full German management for the time being. 
The completion of the railway and mining regulations was a great personal 
success for Governor Yuan and the basis of his rise to prominence as one of the most 
important political figures in North China during the Late Qing Dynasty and the Early 
Republic.323 These agreements represented a major step forward in China’s foreign 
policy as well, as they provided a template for how the Qing Dynasty might deal with 
the economic advance of European powers. Furthermore, the regulations succeeded in 
preventing further violent conflicts related to railway construction and mining after 
1900, even though such peace came at the price of having to use Chinese troops against 
their own people to suppress any protests. Nevertheless, Yuan proved that he was not 
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just a simple tool in the hands of foreign imperialists. On the pretext of maintaining 
peace and stability in Shantung, Yuan Shikai and his successors began to implement a 
policy of demanding broad and widespread government support for domestic industry 
and commercial enterprises that could compete with German companies. Such a policy 
began a process of economic resistance against foreign commercial dominance that, over 
time, chipped away at many of the special rights that had been granted to Germany and 
other European powers in Shantung and elsewhere in China, while also laying the 
groundwork for China to play a larger role in the Leasehold and Tsingtau. 
Yuan’s new policy succeeded largely due to a greater willingness on the part of 
the SEG and the German government to negotiate with the Chinese about the railroad, a 
change of heart justified by the provincial governor’s skillful diplomatic maneuvering 
and the respect German leaders felt for him. The SEG also softened its stance because 
further delays would result in even more severe financial losses than the company had 
already endured.324 The company and its shareholders could expect no returns on their 
investments unless and until the railroad was completed and fully operational. 
Furthermore, it became crucial to meet the construction schedule for the necessary 
bridges and dams on the route to Kaomi before the spring floods made such work 
impossible. As the value of the SEG’s property continued to increase (reaching 4.5 
million marks by the start of 1900), the SEG stressed that “the most important thing is 
the immediate resumption of work.”325 The Naval administration also showed a desire to 
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work with the Chinese because it had grown uneasy about sending German troops into 
the interior of Shantung to quell unrest there. Between the rampant violence resulting 
from the rising Anti-Foreigner Movement and the presence of Yuan’s troops in 
Shantung, Jaeschke shared Tirpitz’s fear of war. In discussing the matter with the Naval 
Secretary, Jaeschke reported, “the possible result of German military measures is now 
less clear than in the first Kaomi expedition.”326 Jaeschke clarified his convictions in a 
later letter when he noted, “one cannot do anything with the one or two hundred men we 
can now spare for such purposes against the modern troops which Yuan Shikai has 
brought to the province.”327 
Nevertheless, the SEG’s troubles were only further exacerbated by the eruption 
of the Boxer Rebellion. Although the disturbances that ultimately resulted in the siege of 
the legations in Peking originated in the southern part of Shantung, the impact of the 
events that took place in the neighboring provinces was relatively minimal within 
Shantung in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. This was largely due to the fact 
that Yuan Shikai opposed the conservative militarism that he Boxers represented. 328 
Nevertheless, although Shantung avoided major destruction, the unrest that did occur 
had a significant impact on German endeavors in the province and its position there. As 
a result of the Boxer uprisings, Governor Jaeschke ordered all Chinese troops out of the 
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Leasehold the and the fifty-kilometer buffer zone and replace them with German soldiers 
in order to protect the railroad and German interests. As the Boxer crisis began to reach 
its critical phase in June and July 1900 (with the murder of Ketteler that led to the siege 
of the legations in Peking), Shantung remained relatively calm. When the diplomats in 
Peking began requesting support at the end of May, Ketteler asked Berlin to send a 
detachment of marines from the III. Seebataillon, a request that von Bülow readily 
agreed to, noting that the Germans has already “successfully restored order to what 
concerns us the most, the province of Shantung,” and could therefore be readily spared 
for use further north.329 On 29 May, 51 marines left Tsingtau and arrived in Peking with 
the other German reinforcements at the beginning of June, remaining there for the 
duration of the siege of legations.330 
As Yuan did his utmost to keep order in Shantung, relatively little trouble 
erupted until the last week of June, when Chinese rebels threatened and assaulted 
missionaries in various parts of the province. At Weihsien (Weixian, now known as 
Weifang), both the American Presbyterian mission and the German mining activities 
there came under attack, and the railroad encountered renewed violence at Kaomi. 
Consequently, construction of the railroad ground to a halt, and employees of both the 
SEG and SBG, both Chinese and German, were victims of physical assaults. A local 
armed band even attacked Heinrich Hildebrand himself, as he was in Kaomi at the time 
that the riots began again.331 
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Germany’s initial response to this renewed violence was to send aid to the 
endangered Westerners. On 26 June a small volunteer force of naval and civilian 
residents of Tsingtau went to Weihsien to recuse the missionaries and mining engineers 
under attack. Two days later, Jaeschke dispatched one of the locally recruited Chinese 
companies to the city, followed by troops from the III. Seebataillon on the next day. 
Fearing that the presence of German troops deeper in Shantung’s interior might 
exacerbate the unrest that was bubbling over, Governor Yuan asked Jaeschke to delay 
the advance of these troops, promising that he would defend all foreigners and their 
property with his own forces. Yuan also encouraged Jaeschke to order the SEG and SBG 
suspend all operations outside the Leasehold and evacuate their personnel to Tsingtau so 
as to guarantee their safety. 332 Trusting that Yuan would fulfill his promise, Jaeschke 
ordered his troops to remain at the town of Chiaochou for the time being and also gave 
instructions to the SEG and SBG to suspend their operations and have their employees 
head to the Leasehold and Tsingtau.333 The missionaries and engineers had already 
begun returning to Tsingtau en masse, with the first groups reaching the safety of 
German protection by 2 July.334 Once the SEG and SBG’s workers were out of danger, 
Yuan began to carry out the guarantee he made to Jaeschke, sending Chinese troops to 
guard the abandoned installations and construction sites. In the area around Kaomi, 
Yuan’s provincial troops began to arrest the local groups that had been fomenting unrest, 
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executing their main leader and exiling some more minor ones.335 Although the 
disturbances continued in this region, these troops brought greater peace and security 
than had existed at the end of May. 
Despite the success that the provincial troops had in suppressing the violence in 
Shantung, the third suspension of railroad operations in a year convinced Hildebrand and 
the directors of the SEG that work on the railroad would never be completed 
uninterrupted unless German troops provided their protection. Both Hildebrand on the 
ground in Tsingtau and the SEG directors in Berlin thus demanded the Imperial Navy 
and Foreign Office provide this assistance.336 Both parties emphasized that unless the 
work resumed soon, the SEG would consider executing the escape clause in its 
concession that granted it the right to postpose the completion of the railroad in the event 
of unforeseen circumstances. This course of action represented a powerful means for the 
SEG to force the Imperial Navy-which was reluctant to use German troops in Shantung’s 
interior-to provide this assistance, as Tirpitz strongly believed that Tsingtau could not 
realize its potential as a German Hong Kong without the completion of the railroad. Due 
to these concerns, as well as those for the security of the neutral zone immediately 
outside the leasehold, in early July Jaeschke agreed to use naval troops to protect the 
construction work in the area between the Leasehold and Chiaochou, where the German 
troops had remained stationed. Consequently, the troops based at Chiaochou began 
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patrolling the region and on 10 July construction of the railroad resumed in the area 
surrounding Kaomi.337 
Although Tirpitz preferred that the Navy not use military force to support the 
SEG in Shantung’s interior, he did not give Jaeschke specific orders that he could not do 
so. Furthermore, Tirpitz personally wrote the SEG’s board of directors in Berlin to 
inform them that the Reichsmarine would do everything in its power to ensure that the 
railroad’s construction could proceed uninterrupted.338 While the security concerns that 
the Boxer Rebellion raised was an important reason why Tirpitz chose to pursue an 
actively militant course of action in Shantung, an even more critical consideration was 
that the navy came under increasing pressure in the summer of 1900 to take an even 
more aggressive stance. Following the murder of Ketteler and the intervention of the 
Eight-Nation Alliance in Peking, many leading officials in Germany-including Kaiser 
Wilhelm-called for Germany to send a punitive expedition to China as well. Those that 
supported this plan believed that Shantung was the perfect place for Germany to seek 
revenge for the events in Peking, as Germany could combine its punitive actions to seize 
firmer control over Shantung and expand Germany’s interests in the region.339 Although 
Wilhelm, the Army, and a majority of the members of the Reichstag supported this plan, 
Tirpitz did not share this fervent desire. Indeed, Tirpitz was “one of the few German 
military leaders who questioned the whole idea of sending a large expeditionary force to 
China and, after it arrived, worked to keep the influence of it and its commander [Field 
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Marshal Alfred von Waldersee] on Shantung to a minimum. Though Tirpitz was willing 
to undertake military action to protect the railroad and pacify the neutral zone, he was 
opposed to any broader adventures in the province and tried, on the whole with success, 
to thwart them.”340 In opposing these calls for aggressive military action, Tirpitz argued 
that, if the Leasehold became an official theatre of war,  
one could expect a complete paralysis of the flowering commerce of the colony 
for whose growth the government and private persons have for years sacrificed 
much. Until now, in agreement with the Foreign Office, I have done all in my 
power to indicate to…business and commercial interests that everything would 
be done to avoid having the current crises in China result in deleterious 
influences on the peaceful economic development of the colony, that was, after 
all, the real reason for its acquisition…[If Kiaochow was declared to be at war] 
the economic stagnation would not only last during the military operations but 
also for a long time afterwards, and that other competing commercial centers on 
the China coast would make use of the situation.341 
 
Ultimately, Tirpitz’s arguments won over von Bülow and, with the Chancellor’s 
support,342 the calls from military, colonial, and commercial interest groups for German 
expansion deeper into Shantung came to naught. While many of the troops from the 
German forces still landed at Tsingtau, they did not contribute to any of the navy’s 
actions in the Leasehold and Shantung as they made their way to Peking.  
As the conflict with the Boxers and their supporters moved away from Shantung 
and then were finally resolved by the intervention of the Eight-Nation Alliance, the 
Leasehold and provincial governments reached a point of mutual understanding and 
cooperation, at least within the borders established by the 1898 treaty granting the 
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Kiaochow Concession. On 7 October Governor Jaeschke informed Yuan Shikai that the 
railroad construction in Kaomi would resume at once under the protection of German 
troops and that the fifty-kilometer buffer zone would now come under the control of the 
German military. Consequently, Jaeschke requested Yuan remove the provincial forces 
from the area by 12 October as their presence was no longer necessary. With China’s 
power incredibly weakened by the failure of the Boxer Rebellion, Yuan had little choice 
but to comply and so, on 10 October, Chinese troops left Kaomi and the buffer zone.343 
In the middle of October, a strong naval force arrived at Kaomi and engaged in a 
pacification campaign to ensure the safety of the railroad and the SEG’s personnel. 
Following the end of this military action, the German forces continued to occupy 
Chiaochou and Kaomi, using them as bases of operation for protecting the buffer zone 
and the railroad. Construction continued apace, then, although the SEG still encountered 
opposition, protests, and trouble with and from the Chinese as its operations moved to 
the north and west towards its initial terminus at Tsinan. To ensure the continued 
protection of the railroad and to prevent another major uprising, the Imperial Navy and 
the SEG reached an agreement in which the SEG promised to construct all the larger 
stations on the Tsingtau-Tsinan route in such a manner as to ensure that they could be 
used to house troops and be easily defended from attack.344 
Even after the end of the Boxer Rebellion and the negotiation of the Regulations, 
however, the SEG still encountered numerous problems. Chinese companies contracted 
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to provide laborers from outside Shantung, for example, never delivered on their 
promises, resulting in critical labor shortages.345 In addition, the laborers employed by 
the SEG often came into conflict with local rural populations, causing slow-downs and 
delays. Compounding these difficulties was the widespread corruption that resulted from 
the allocation of orders to Chinese companies; abuses that were heavily criticized by 
German authorities in both Tsingtau and Berlin.346 Nevertheless, at the end of 1900, the 
SEG moved its headquarters from Berlin to Tsingtau. In part, this move was an attempt 
to sway public opinion back in the SEG’s favor, as it projected a desire on the part of the 
company to be more involved in daily operations in China. This change was also 
required by the terms of the Kiautschou Concession Treaty, which stipulated that any 
joint German-Chinese business ventures must be located in China and close to Chinese 
control. Despite this shift in physical location, however, the SEG’s board of directors 
remained based in Berlin, exercising control of the company from there. 347 Furthermore, 
the provincial government in Tsinan did not accept the standing option for Chinese 
investors to purchase shares in the SEG until Governor Zhou Fu did so in 1902, finally 
making the SEG a fully-fledged joint German-Chinese business venture.348 
 Despite these difficulties, construction of the railroad moved ahead at a steady 
pace, due in no small part to the protection offered by German soldiers in the Neutral 
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Zone and by Chinese police forces outside it.349 The SEG completed the first major 
section of the railroad line-connecting Tsingtau and Kiautschou City (a county-level city 
just outside the Leasehold)-in April 1901, and major traffic along the route between 
Tsinan and Tsingtau began on 1 June 1904 to much fanfare. Despite the initial starts and 
fits the project encountered, the SEG met one of the most important provisions of its 
railroad concession: completion of the main railway within five years. With this line 
completed, the SEG then proceeded to build a trunk line to Boshan/Poshan to support the 
growth and development of the coal fields. In all, the construction costs for the railroad 
amounted to roughly 52 million Reichsmarks, coming in just under the original budget 
of 54 million.350 Over the life of its control over the railroad, the SEG repaid more than 
half of the construction costs to the German government in the form of raw goods and 
delivery orders.351 
 The railway established its main repair and supply facilities in the small village 
of Ssufang, on the northern extremes of Tsingtau’s city limits. It was here that Chinese 
workers began training not only in the assembly of locomotives and train cars, but also 
in the nuances of steam engines so that they could repair and maintain the intricate 
machines up and down the Tsingtau-Tsinan line. That so many local Chinese were 
involved in the daily upkeep of the trains was no coincidence. From the very start, the 
SEG and the Leasehold government intended to have as few Europeans as possible 
servicing the railroad, preferring instead to rely upon German-trained local Chinese. Not 
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only would this keep operating costs down (as noted above, European skilled labor in 
China commanded high wages), but this plan also provided another means of creating a 
specialized interlocutor class of native Chinese that understood Germany’s plans for the 
colony and China and would, as a result, support German interests. From the inception 
of the railroad until its completion in 1904, around fifty to sixty Germans were 
responsible for the railroad’s upkeep, but that number decreased to fifteen to twenty 
once the line was fully established.352 Furthermore, all the personal on the trains, as well 
as in the stations, were Chinese. The only notable exception to this were the main 
stations located in Tsingtau, Weihsien, Chou-ts’un (Zibo), and Tsinan, as the employees 
at these stations had to manage both regional and local train traffic, something the SEG 
preferred to leave in the hands of Germans.353 
 The SEG and Leasehold government both agreed that employing local Chinese 
laborers instead of Germans and Europeans was a wise move that offered mutual 
benefits. In training the native population how to maintain and run the railroad, the SEG 
provided hands-on experience in learning how to build and manage a modern 
transportation system, something that China sorely needed at the time, particularly if 
Germany and the other European powers wanted to move goods and people around the 
Far East quickly and efficiently. Furthermore, by utilizing the Chinese as station 
managers, conductors, porters, and ticket collectors, among other customer-service roles, 
the SEG and colonial administrators could make the railroad appear to be a less 
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“foreign” and intrusive entity, a matter of special importance given the protests and 
unrest the SEG faced during construction of the railroad and the Boxer Rebellion. That 
the Chinese were also able to find acceptance from colonial leaders as capable and 
effective craftsman, administrators, and middle managers in a large and profitable 
company-earning a good wage in the process-further bolstered the railroad’s reputation, 
making it a desirable place to gain employment as well as generating considerable 
profits for the railroad. The Chinese employees, as a result, became willing interlocutors 
between foreign investors and their fellow Chinese consumers, supporting the Leasehold 
government and the SEG and its subsidiaries and advancing their interests wherever and 
whenever possible.354  
 The passenger side of the Tsingtau-Tsinan railroad’s business developed quite 
rapidly, providing a major transportation boon and bringing in considerable profits.355 
Where the journey between the two cites had previously taken ten to twelve days, a train 
needed only about twelve hours to traverse the entire line and its fifty-six stations. On 
the other side of the SEG’s business-the transport of cargo freight- the rail line initially 
fell short of expectations. Although the company generated profits each year between 
1904 and 1908, the increase over the previous year was relatively modest, usually 
around 2.5-3.25%. This was due in part to the fact that the German coal mines did not 
produce as much raw material as investors had initially anticipated. As such, mine 
exports did not match the large transport volumes that the SEG’s shareholders had hoped 
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for. Although the board of directors could not be blamed for this shortfall, they also did 
not help their company’s cause by setting high freight transport rates.356 Consequently, 
Chinese merchants and traders continued to prefer older, more traditional transport 
routes, such as the Grand Canal to South China or the Xiaoqing River to North China.357 
This early preference for more traditional modes of transport proved to the SEG and 
officials in Berlin and Tsingtau just how competitive and resilient these other routes 
could be due to their cost-effectiveness.  
Nevertheless, despite the early struggles that the SEG encountered on the freight 
side of its business, by 1908 the company began to see strong growth there as well, 
largely due to a dramatic increase in the ability of the SBG to extract the type of coal 
required to power the steam engines of German manufacturing and ships. This rise in the 
amount of available coal from the mines at Boshan placed even greater demand on quick 
and efficient transport, exactly as the founders of the SEG had envisioned. Although the 
return on investment remained modest throughout the life of the company and colony, 
particularly given the financial risk involved, the railroad turned a consistent profit, 
particularly after the 1908 spike, when dividend profits rose to 5% in addition to a 
preferred dividend (“Superdividende”) of 2.5%.358 Financial gains aside, the Tsingtau-
Tsinan railroad succeeded most admirably in its other main goal of becoming a vital 
lifeline for Tsingtau, the Leasehold, and the hinterland beyond. By 1910, the SEG 
completed a connection to the Trans-Siberian Railroad, making it possible to travel from 
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Berlin to Tsingtau in roughly three weeks. The economic impact of the railroad on trade 
and tourism as well as in extending Belin’s global reach will be returned to in the 
following chapters, but the mere fact of its completion and presence was-along with 
roads and the harbor (discussed below)-a critical factor in securing the various visions 
for Tsingtau as a significant commercial center and trading entrepôt.  
The roads within the Leasehold and in the hinterland beyond filled a critical role 
in funneling goods and people to the railway, which, in turn, acted as one of the main 
supports for Tsingtau’s trade, locally, provincially, nationally, and, in time, 
internationally. The final and most important element in transforming the tiny fishing 
village into a prominent focal point in East Asia, however, was the harbor, where 
commodities and individuals could be transferred from rail to ship and ship to rail to 
continue their journey to destinations worldwide. Much as was the case with the railroad, 
Tirpitz and the Reichsmarineamt saw the development of the harbor not just as a central 
element in German global security and power projection, but also as a means of 
stimulating and developing agriculture and trade both in the Leasehold and Shantung. 
Consequently, in designing the new harbor, the navy ensured every element of it 
maximized its benefits to those who made used. The harbor, then, served as the linchpin 
for the integrated development of the Leasehold and, as a result, construction on it began 
almost immediately upon the establishment of the colonial government in 1898.  
The navy assumed sole responsibility for building and operating the port 
facilities in Tsingtau. Although originally planned to be located on the northern edge of 
the Tsingtau Peninsula, at Governor Truppel’s urging, the Imperial Navy built the main 
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port installation, the Großhafen (Great Harbor), on the southern side of the peninsula, 
where the original fishing village stood, allowing the harbor to occupy the northwestern 
portion of Tsingtau proper. Together with the trading firm Carlowitz and Company and 
Alfred Gädertz, the head engineer for the SEG, von Truppel drew up plans for a state of 
the art harbor complex that would see to all the needs of the Navy, shipping and 
passenger services, and the railroad. Their plan envisioned all harbor works centered 
around the existing land bridge that jutted out from the peninsula, with the shipyards, 
dock, and industrial buildings located on the northern side of the peninsula, close enough 
for speed and convenience but without obstructing the flow of daily harbor activities. 359  
While Reichsmarineamt received von Truppel’s design with some enthusiasm, Tirpitz, 
Georg Franzius, and Richard Gromsch, the Harbor Inspector and Head of Construction 
in the Leasehold, ultimately rejected it, primarily due to concerns about the effect heavy 
summer rains might have on harbor traffic. As storms usually rolled in from the south 
and southwest, ships docked on the southern side of the peninsula would find themselves 
completely unprotected from heavy winds; sea swells, high waves, and swirling tides 
could pose dangerous threats. On the northern side, however, the hills of the city and the 
newly constructed embankments would provide excellent wind-breaks that would 
protect ships. Difficulties in constructing a sea-wall and dykes also raised concerns, 
particularly in terms of their respective costs; although the naval administration was 
willing to spare no cost in constructing the centerpiece of the colony, its budget did have 
its limits. Tirpitz also raised objections from a city planning perspective, as he believed 
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that the natural division of Europeans and Chinese would be better served by placing 
harbor facilities that the Chinse would staffed on the northern side of the peninsula, 
where the native population lived and worked; the harbor installations that Germans and 
Europeans would utilize most should then be much more conveniently located on the 
southerly side of the hills.360 
 Despite Tirpitz’s recommendations, delays in communication led the colonial 
administration to adopt the Truppel-Carlowitz-Gädertz plan, which was already readily 
available, particularly since Truppel had held initial charge over the Leasehold in 
between its seizure and the appointment of Rosendahl as the first governor of Tsingtau. 
Lacking any specific direction from Berlin, Rosendahl had begun construction on the 
harbor according to the original plans, and, by the time the objections of Tirpitz, et al. 
reached Tsingtau, Rosendahl had already completed the land surveys, analyzed soil 
samples, and driven the test pilings for the foundations of the major harbor structures.361 
When Jaeschke replaced Rosendahl as governor in early 1899, the final plans for the 
harbor arrived and were grafted onto the original design from which Rosendahl had 
already begun working. 
 The surveying of the harbor and the ground soundings proved to be quite difficult 
for the technicians and laborers of the Harbor Construction Department, particularly 
when summer storms interrupted their efforts. Nevertheless, these tasks were of primary 
importance in order to ensure a solid foundation for the dyke that would enclose the 
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entire harbor, as well as begin the process of pile driving necessary for bearing the hefty 
loads of the quays and harbor buildings. The harbor administration also needed to 
construct a small harbor to provide a location for loading and unloading the barges and 
light haulers that brought materials to and from the ships that anchored in the bay. After 
some initial difficulties, however, construction was ready to begin: the Reichsmarineamt 
and colonial government completed each of the surveys, fully agreed upon a plan of 
development, and made all the other necessary preparations.  
With material and technical support from the SEG, colonial officials oversaw the 
construction of a narrow-gauge steam railway from the harbor to two rock quarries that 
would provide all the required building materials for the dykes as well as crushed rock 
for grading the building sites along the harbor’s shoreline. The first order of business 
was to create a rocky reef on the northwestern side of the harbor as a part of the dyke. 
These granite outcroppings would be connected via vibrated concrete, rather than the cut 
stone and concrete that formed the rest of the dyke; using concrete for the dyke ensured 
the strength and stability of the seawall. While the Chinese laborers recruited to work on 
this project were new to this method of construction, they quickly mastered the process.  
The versatility offered by the concrete dyke provided a wind break for ships during 
storms from the north and west, alleviating one of the strongest concerns Tirpitz and 
naval engineers raised when considering the plan for the harbor.362 Once the quarried 
rock and stone arrived at the harbor, junks carried it to the construction site and workers 
unloaded it by hand. Although the process was slow and tedious, Rosendahl (and later 
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Jaeschke) preferred this course of action to building the dyke forward from the land.  
Construction of the reef was cheaper than hauling the materials an additional fifteen 
kilometers by a section of railway that had yet to be constructed due to difficulties the 
colonial government encountered in securing the necessary building concessions. 
Furthermore, the Harbor Construction Department had yet to settle firmly on where, 
exactly, the outer dyke would connect to the reef, and the governor preferred protecting 
the exposed side of the harbor first before establishing the dyke’s final northern 
boundary.363 
 The Reichsmarine had little trouble securing investors and hiring contractors to 
oversee the various facets of the harbor’s construction. The Hamburg-based construction 
firm, F. H. Schmidt of Altona, readily agreed to a contract for the construction of the 
dyke, which allowed this phase of the building program to proceed on schedule. The 
leasehold government provided the necessary materials and reimbursed F. H. Schmidt 
for the cost of hiring Chinese laborers, while the contracting company paid the colonial 
administration five percent of its budget for the use of machinery and a further ten 
percent for the administration and oversight of the project.364  The Imperial Navy, 
contracted the Hannover-based company, C. Vering, one of the largest civil engineering 
firms in the German Empire, to construct the three large piers planned for the great 
harbor. Carl Hubert Vering, the company’s founder and chief executive, was an engineer 
from Bremen who began his career in the railroad industry before switching to harbor 




works. In 1879 he assisted in the construction of the naval facilities at Wilhelmshaven, 
and from 1883-89 he built the three deep harbor basins for ocean-going ships in 
Hamburg. After the completion of the Hamburg project, Vering participated in the 
building of the Kiel Canal connecting the North and Baltic Seas. Although the imperial 
government initially balked at the amount of funds that Vering sought for the 
construction of the piers, after a series of long negotiations the imperial government 
agreed to pay C. Vering 9.3 million marks for the job, signing the final contract in 
Hamburg on 25 March 1901.365 A number of private investors and firms based in 
Germany showed strong interest in securing a government contract for the construction 
and management of the harbor itself, something that the Reichsmarineamt found highly 
desirable, particularly since the list of potential investors included many of the 
wealthiest-and most financially stable-trading houses in China.  Despite this enthusiasm, 
however, many of these firms expressed a desire to wait until Tsingtau was designated a 
free port before making any firm investments in the harbor.366 By the time Jaeschke 
became the new provincial governor in February 1899, commercial firms in China 
further delayed providing any financial resources for the harbor, citing a desire to wait 
for construction on the Shantung Railway to begin.367 Nevertheless, with the promise of 
private funds soon to be forthcoming, Tirpitz agreed to proceed with the construction of 
the harbor.   
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 Despite such a robust and promising start to the development of the harbor’s 
critical infrastructural, the construction project quickly ran into difficulties. The site for 
the harbor was not nearly as deep as the engineering surveys had indicated, resulting in a 
costly need for underwater rock blasting and dredging of silt. As a result, many of the 
potential private investors withdrew their support, forcing the Imperial Navy to turn 
elsewhere for capital investment or risk abandoning the project completely. With the 
construction of a state-of-the-art harbor critical to securing the navy’s imperial vision for 
Tsingtau, failure to follow through on this project was not an option; though less 
desirable, the Reichsmarineamt turned to the Reichstag’s Naval Appropriations Board 
for the necessary funds.368 In the end this proved to be a wise move, given that the costs 
of the construction turned out to be much higher than Harbor Construction Department 
initially estimated. The small harbor, built to handle smaller vessels as well as support 
the activities of the Great Harbor, cost nearly 200,000 Marks, a marked increase from 
the initial budget of the 37,000. With the additional preparatory work that needed to be 
done, Rosendahl estimated that the Navy would need 40 to 50 million Marks to complete 
the large harbor.  
 Due to the massive nature of the harbor’s construction and cost, the Navy was 
eager to chronicle its extraordinary efforts in the engineering, dredging, and building 
taking place in the waters surrounding Tsingtau. Every annual Denkschrift on Tsingtau 
drew attention to the progress of the harbor’s construction, containing detailed 
descriptions of new advances in building, how much earth was moved, what 
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construction the navy and its engineers completed, and any especially difficult troubles 
they had overcome.369 Upon its completion, the Großhafen consisted of a semi-circular 
dam three miles long with a 330-yard opening into Kiautschou Bay. The area within the 
dam comprised roughly 725 acres, dredged to a depth of 31 feet, and able to 
accommodate the largest commercial and military ships sailing the high seas. Located at 
the end of the dam were private and government wharves, occupying an area 220 yards 
wide. Projecting into the harbor from the shoreline were the three large piers, one of 
which was reserved specifically for petroleum; there were also several lesser piers and 
docking locations for much smaller, usually private craft. Taken together, the large 
general-use piers provided nearly a mile of modern, state-of-the-art docking facilities. 
Railroad connections ran along the entire length of both piers, allowing for the direct 
loading and unloading of goods between railroad cars and ships. C. Vering connected the 
petroleum pier directly to railroad storage tanks whose construction the navy subsidized 
through contracts with the Asiatic Petroleum Company and U.S. Standard Oil. The 
Harbor Construction Department also built warehouses both on the piers as well as on 
the shoreline where the navy had filled in the land. The dam and the first main pier (Pier 
I) opened for use in March 1904, nearly the same time as the completion of the railroad 
connection to Tsinan. C. Vering completed Pier II in 1907, and the petroleum facilities 
the following year. 
                                                 
369 Copies of the Denkschrift covering the period of construction (1899-1908) can be found at the 
Staatsarchiv-Bremen, 3-R.1.g.no. 5; the specific reports on the building of the harbor appear under 
“Building Activities.” 
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Due south of the Großhafen was the Small Harbor (Kleinhafen). Containing 
roughly the same facilities as its larger counterpart, the navy constructed the Small 
Harbor with the intent of supporting smaller sailing vessels such as barges, tugs, and 
junks. This installation was the first of the two harbors completed, as its original purpose 
was to provide a point of landing for barges while the Großhafen was under construction 
and ships were unable to load and unload directly at a pier. The smaller harbor’s dyke 
enclosed a dredged-out area of 328,000 square feet (approximately 7.5 acres), and a 
single pier 116 yards long projected into the space of the Kleinhafen.370 Much as in the 
case of the Great Harbor, the navy established warehouses along the shoreline, and the 
railroad connected to the pier and other points along the harbor to provide a speedy and 
efficient means of transporting goods. In addition to the two harbors, the navy also 
constructed a variety of buildings to aid navigation into and out of the port, including a 
large lighthouse on Chaolian Island (Chalein Tao) and a smaller one at the entrance of 
the port. In addition to the lighthouses, a variety of pilotage equipment, buoys, and 
harbor lights helped ships reach the harbor and port safely, even at nighttime and in 
difficult conditions such as fog, rain, and snow. As fog could become a considerable 
problem, the Navy provided foghorns, fog pistols, and bell buoys to help guide ships into 
the harbor.371  
                                                 
370 In 1930, an octagonal pavilion, Huilan Ge (The Tower of Billowing Back and Forth), was constructed 
at the end of this pier, today known as Zhan Qiao. The pier and its pavilion quickly became an iconic 
representation of the city and was adopted as the logo of the locally-produced Tsingtao Beer, whose 
brewery officially opened under German control in 1904.  
371 This description of the port-both the small harbor in this paragraph and the Great Harbor in the 
preceding-and its particulars is drawn from Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism, pp. 220-221, 
China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc. of the Prots 
Open to Foreign Commerce in China…1902-1911, Volume I (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1913) pp.245-
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The navy was extremely proud of its efforts and the finished product that 
comprised the port facilities of Tsingtau; the additional time and cost was clearly 
worthwhile in the minds of the naval administration. Visitors to Tsingtau regarded the 
port as among the finest anywhere in the world, and the harbor certainly ranked as one of 
the most convenient and efficient in the Far East. In the 1906 Denkschrift, the Navy 
boasted,  
Tsingtau now has the safest and easiest facilities for loading and unloading in 
East Asia. Even in the older harbors, such as Hong Kong and Shanghai, the 
loading and unloading of large steamships must be done with the aid of barges. 
At Tsingtau, this can be done directly into the railway. The harbor itself is 
excellent and well-marked, and it is safe the entire year in all weather.372  
 
As with many of the other civic developments in Tsingtau, Germany’s imperial rivals 
were duly impressed by the Navy’s accomplishment. On the eve of World War I, 
William Blane, a noted British specialist on East Asia and avowed critic of Germany’s 
“Prussian Aggression in Shandong” found it hard to deny that that Tsingtau’s harbor was 
“the finest in China, not even Dairen excepted.”373 
                                                 
246, and China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1907 (Shanghai: Kelly 
and Walsh, 1908), pp. 123-124. 
372 Denkschrift 1905-1906, Staatsarchiv-Bremen, 3-R.1.g.no. 5. 
373 William Blane, “Tsingtau,” Transcriptions of the Japan Society, London, 13:2-17 (1915), p. 10, 6. 
Dairen, modern-day Dalian, was another name for Port Arthur, the Russian-and later Japanese-controlled 
port city on the Liaotung/Liaodong peninsula in Manchuria. Of especial note and importance is that Port 
Arthur, lying directly across the Bohai Straits from Shantung, was one of Tsingtau’s major competitors for 
dominance as a port city in northwestern China. For other examples of non-German admiration for the 
port of Tsingtau, see, Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of China, July-September 1905, F.O. 
405/156 in Ian Nish, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs-Reports and Papers from the Foreign 
Office Confidential Print (hereinafter cited as BDFA), Part I, From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the 
First World War, Series E, Asia, Volume 13, China Miscellaneous, 1894-1910, (Frederick, MD.: 
University Publications of America, 1989), p. 562; Tennan Tahara, Kōshūwan 起亚湾 (Kiautschou Bay) 
(Dairen: Manshū Nichinichi Shinbunsha, 1914), pp. 312ff. 
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Although the Imperial Navy always desired to see Tsingtau turned into a 
premiere commercial center-as evidenced by its support for capital ventures and the 
development of trade-its initial focus and justification for building such a state-of-the-art 
port was to provide its East Asia Squadron with a premiere coaling and fueling station. 
These early plans for the port are a striking reminder that a certain tension often existed 
not only between the different strains of the German Hong Kong vision that various 
leadership groups in Tsingtau expressed, but also within these respective potential plans 
for Tsingtau’s development, due in no small part to the fact that the notion of what it 
meant to create a German Hong Kong remained broad and ill-defined. However, 
extraordinary technological developments during the ten years it took to construct the 
harbor led a critical change in the long-term plans that the Reichsmarineamt had for 
Tsingtau. By 1908, the powerful dreadnoughts with their long-range guns and sheer 
dominance of other ships of the line made defense of the port considerably more 
difficult. While this development did not completely alter the Navy’s desire of making 
Tsingtau into a premiere port destination in East Asia (if not the world), it did mean that 
one possible for vision for Tsingtau, that it could become a new Kiel or Plymouth 
seemed much less likely. This reality pushed turning Tsingtau into a German Hong 
Kong (or, in the European context, a Bristol or Hamburg) increasingly to the forefront, 
leading to embracing the creation of a thoroughly modern mercantile, cultural entrepôt 
on display for the Chinese and other imperial powers to see and emulate. While the 
naval base remained an important aspect of Tsingtau’s attraction, over time it become 
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only one of several important axes for the German colony, displaced by the value offered 
by the harbor’s commercial facilities.374  
One of the key technological advantages that Tsingtau’s harbor possessed was 
the development of a coal bunkering system for refueling ships directly at the piers 
rather than using Chinese laborers and barges. With the twin goals of making Tsingtau 
into a naval station and trading hub, coal was one of the first-and perhaps most 
important-goods to be shipped to Tsingtau. While the establishment of the SBG was still 
in process of being established (and thus unable to produce local coal for ships), the 
German government signed a two-year contract with the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal 
Syndicate to supply the port with all the high-quality coal that it might need.375 In return 
for this service, and in order to provide the most efficient means of stocking Tsingtau’s 
coal reserves, the coal syndicate requested the establishment of a coal dump near the 
harbor on the city’s northern peninsula. The colonial government agreed to this request, 
building two loading-unloading bridges, one running towards the Great Harbor and the 
other towards the Small Harbor. A few months after beginning work on this coal dump, 
however, the city administration abandoned the project, as the Syndicate found the 
location to be less desirable than it initially thought.376 Instead of the originally agreed-
upon coaling facility, then, the colonial government constructed a modern coal wharf 
south-west of the harbor’s shipyard and dry-dock, which would allow ships to bunker 
                                                 
374 For an example in this shift in orientation, cf. Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten, 21 December 1904 
(Tsingtau as a Naval Station) and Hamburger Nachrichten, 14 November 1907, which stated, “the critical 
military significance as a naval station can no longer be ascribed to Tsingtau. Our colony today is much 
more significant as a trade entrepôt like Hong Kong.”  
375 von Haenisch, Jebsen & Co., pp. 54-55. 
376 Rosendahl to RMA, 9 March 1899, BA-MA, RM 3/6740. 
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very quickly.377 The shipyard and the dry-dock also provided top-notch amenities for 
ships anchored in Tsingtau’s harbor. The navy built large kerosene tanks to service the 
various oil companies with branches within the Leasehold and also provided these firms 
with access to the special petroleum wharf, making the loading and unloading of their 
product quick, easy, and highly profitable. Designating a specific part of the port for oil 
resources also represented an important advance in safety, as this dramatically reduced 
the risk of the danger of a severe fire destroying large portions of the harbor and its 
storage facilities.  
On 1 April 1904, Tsingtau’s harbor officially opened to merchant shipping. 
Although much of the harbor remained under construction, Pier I could now receive 
commercial traffic and help increase regional trading with Shantung and other regions of 
China. Among the ships present for the opening were those belonging to the China 
Merchants Steam Navigation Company, whose ships stood at the ready to import rice to 
a wide area of Shantung. The presence of one of the leading trading companies in China 
at the port’s opening represented a major milestone, one that prompted the provincial 
governor of Shantung to send official representatives to commemorate this significant 
moment in the city’s history.378 To the colonial administration, the attendance of Chinese 
officials at the harbor’s opening ceremony was a critical step forward in ensuring the 
port’s viability and long-term success. As Governor von Truppel noted in his memoirs, 
the vast majority of trade that would pass through Tsingtau ultimately originated in-or 
                                                 
377 Denkschrift, 1903-1904, Staatsarchiv-Bremen, 3-R.1.g. 5. 
378 Oskar von Truppel, Nachlass, 3 June 1904, BA-MA, Nachlass Truppel N 244/20, Volume 2. 
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was destined to arrive at-somewhere in Shantung, and if the port hoped to prosper and be 
a major player in Chinese, East Asian, and, ultimately, global trade, the support of the 
provincial government signified a powerful vote of confidence in its ability to do so.379 
Attracting local trade to the new harbor was no easy task for the Leasehold 
government.380  At the time that construction on the new port facilities at Tsingtau had 
begun, the Chinese Imperial Customs Office reported that 360 to 540 tonnes 
(approximately 400 to 600 tons)-nearly sixty percent of the junk traffic that sailed in 
Kiautschou Bay-passed through the harbors located at the villages of Chiaochou and 
Taputou on the northwestern side of the bay.381  Although these figures may not 
represent an exceedingly high volume of trade in comparison to the levels of trade via 
steamers, the fact that many of the most prominent merchant families in China 
conducted the vast majority of their trade via junks made ensuring that this trade passed 
through Tsingtau instead crucially important to the colony’s commercial success. To 
secure this involvement from local and regional trading houses, the Leashold 
government needed to convince the directors of these firms that it was in their best 
interest to do so, rather than be forced into any shift in their trading practices.382 
By 1906, the Leasehold government had begun to achieve some success in its 
attempts to attract local trade to the new harbor, providing as many incentives as seemed 
                                                 
379 Ibid. 
380 The following chapter (Chapter IV) covers the specifics of local and international trade opportunities is 
greater detail. What follows herein is an overview of commercial traffic into and out of the harbor and the 
effects the colonial government’s efforts had in turning Tsingtau into a major commercial entrepôt on the 
Chinese coast. 
381Chinese Imperial Inspectorate of Customs: Tsingtao: Kiaochou Trade Report for the Year 1899, 26 
September 1900, BA-MA, 2431/60976. 
382 Truppel to RMA, Junk Trade in Kiaochou Bay, 27 May 1902, ibid. 
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practicable without outright subsidizing the junk trade. These measures included offering 
large amounts of storage at cheap rates, lower customs fees and duties in the small 
harbor, allowing the loading and unloading of cargo directly from bridges, quays, small 
fishing boats like sampans, or even directly from the beach, and establishing a customs 
sub-post in the small harbor so that junks did not have proceed to the main harbor at all 
if they did not wish.383 Although it took time for these measures to have a major impact 
on the junk trade, in 1911, Governor Alfred Meyer-Waldeck (1911-1914) reported  
coupled with serious damage that the village had suffered from flooding, Taputou 
seemed destined to be displaced permanently by the small harbor, likely within one to 
two years.384 Although Meyer-Waldeck’s prediction did not come to pass in the 
timeframe he had predicted, it was clear to members of the colonial administration such 
as Hermann Bökemann that “the diverting of traffic [to Tsingtau] now must be left to the 
passage of time and a rational policy of freight charges by the railway.”385  Nevertheless, 
just as the junk trade seemed to be shifting to Tsingtau permanently, the navy, under 
pressure from Berlin to further increase the Leasehold’s revenue, began levying docking 
fees at the Kleinhafen. Junk traffic began to suffer as a result, although with the advent 
of World War I, it is difficult to assess the exact long-term effects of this policy shift. 
Tsingtau further solidified its hold over local and regional shipping traffic 
through Kiaochow Bay by improving the transportation routes that passed through the 
                                                 
383 Denkscrhift 1906-1907, Staatsarchiv-Bremen, 3-R.1.g.5. 
384 Meyer-Waldeck to RMA, Monatliche Bericht – Dezember, 15 January 1912, BA-MA, RM 3/6746 and 
Meyer-Waldeck to RMA, Monatliche Bericht – Januar, 15 February 1912, ibid. 
385 Hermann Bökemann, “Über die Wirtschaft und Verkehr in der Provinz Schantung,” Koloniale 
Monatsblatter: Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialrecht und Kolonialwirtschaft, vol. 15, no 3: March 
1913, pp. 126-127. 
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Leasehold. In addition to the development of road and railroad networks discussed 
above, in 1905 a small steamer service began operating from Tsingtau to nearby ports in 
the province of Kiangsu (Jiangsu). This steamer route played a critical role in making 
Tsingtau a major player in regional trade by establishing direct small steam shipping 
connections to important hubs such as Nanking, the provincial capital of Kiangsu, 
Hangchow, and Shanghai.386 In fact, the large-scale success in developing shipping 
routes through Tsingtau was largely a product of the steady growth and increase in 
“modern” steamer shipping that began with these smaller regional routes and culminated 
in the large-scale overseas shipping operations that would connect the colony to ports in 
Japan, Southeast and East Asia, the Pacific Coast of the United States, India, and, most 
importantly, Europe. 
 Establishing long-distance shipping routes represented the greatest challenge for 
authorities in Berlin and Tsingtau. Although the German government repeatedly 
discussed acquiring a port in China throughout the 1890s and a devoted a considerable 
amount of planning for that eventuality (as shown in Chapter I), the suddenness of 
Tsingtau’s seizure in 1898 threw many of the navy’s longer-term plans into chaos. Upon 
occupying Tsingtau and the surrounding leasehold, the first problem to arise was how to 
provision and supply the city and the Germans now inhabiting it. With no other base in 
East Asia, the Imperial Navy was relegated to importing all the foodstuffs and other 
perishables it might need from other ports, mostly Shanghai. Consequently, the 
Reichsmarineamt chartered a ship from the German trading firm Siemssen, which agreed 
                                                 
386 RMA, Denkschrift 1904-1905, Staatsarchiv-Bremen, 3-R.1.g.5. 
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to run a weekly service from Shanghai to Tsingtau. Additionally, Otto von Diederichs, 
as head of the East Asia Cruiser Division, secured an arrangement with Carlowitz and 
Company to provide shipments of coal from Hong Kong.387 Though these original 
contracts were somewhat limited, they represented important foundation stones for 
Tsingtau’s growth as a trading center, as both Siemssen and Carlowitz would become 
major trading firms in the Leasehold, expanding their service routes to and from 
Tsingtau to include a host of ports along the East Asian seaboard and across the Pacific.  
As more overseas trading routes began to develop at Tsingtau, the port became 
an increasingly popular destination for coastal steamers. Until 1901, only the small 
shipping firm Diederichsen, Jebsen, and Company serviced the colony, as a result of 
successful lobbying in the Reichstag during the early months of Tsingtau’s founding. 
Diederichsen Jebsen agreed to provide two ships that would run between Tsingtau, 
Shanghai, and Tientsin. While these routes were of considerable importance in the early 
days of the colony, the company’s’ service was inadequate and relatively poor.388 In 
1901, however, Hamburg Amerika Linie (HAPAG), at the encouragement of the 
Hamburg Handelskammer, decided to expand its activities in East Asia, subsequently 
acquiring Diederichsen Jebsen, its ships, and trading routes. The company’s first order of 
business after this merger was to make Tsingtau a part of its postal shipping service.389 
In the ensuing months, HAPAG dramatically increased its services to Tsingtau and came 
                                                 
387 Diederichs to RMA, 30 November 1897 and Rosendahl to RMA, BA-MA, RM 3/6740. 
388 von Haenisch, Jebsen & Co., pp. 59. 
389 Staatsarchiv-Hamburg, 131-1 I 2209 contains a number of documents from officials at Hamburg-
Amerika Linie and the Handelskammer (Chamber of Commerce) about the merits of expansion into East 
Asia and the benefits it would bring the company and the city. 
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to have a dominant presence in the port over the life of the colony. Not to be outdone by 
HAPAG, however, Norddeutscher Lloyd, the other major shipping firm in Germany and 
HAPAG’s chief competitor, announced in 1903 the opening of regular shipping service 
from Bremen to Tsingtau, with direct ships leaving the colony roughly every three 
months, albeit on an unscheduled basis. HAPAG followed suit soon after, arranging 
unscheduled departures from Tsingtau that took place once per month, on average. At 
the same time, two other foreign non-German steamship lines opened regular steamer 
routes to Tsingtau, one from Japan (originating in Tokyo with stops at Nagasaki, Port 
Arthur, Shanghai, Hankow and Canton) and one from Great Britain.  
Despite the high level of competition from Japanese goods both in the Leasehold 
and throughout China, Governor Truppel played a leading role in encouraging another 
Japanese shipping firm, Osaka-Shosen, to begin shipping services to the Leasehold.390 
While such actions were directly in line with the navy’s desire to attract and support 
increased foreign trade in Tsingtau, German businesses in the Leasehold and throughout 
China roundly criticized Truppel for inviting this additional competition from Osaka-
Shosen, claiming that such an action would deal considerable financial harm to them. In 
support of the commercial community,  the Foreign Office even went so far as to make 
an official request that Tirpitz instruct Truppel that, while “we cannot block Japanese 
goods, but we should not pave the way for them either, simply because it provides 
temporary benefits to merchants in Tsingtau…in no case should we encourage direct 
                                                 
390 Kobe Consul to Foreign Office, 5 June 1903, PA-AA, R 18248. Today known as Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, 
ltd., Osaka-Shosen was (and remains) one of the largest and most influential international shipping 
companies in Japan. It inaugurated its first route to Tsingtau from Osaka in 1904. 
 205 
steamship connections between Japan and Shantung.”391 Although Truppel denied 
encouraging foreign shipping to establish lines to Tsingtau, he and the Imperial Navy 
took great pride in reporting yearly increases in the variety of shipping available at the 
port and the ever-rising numbers of foreign vessels that stopped there.  
By 1907, when both the Great and Small Harbors were fully operational, 
regularly scheduled ships ran from Tsingtau to ports all over the Far East including 
Vladivostok, Port Arthur, Fusan (Pusan), Newchang (Yingkou), Tientsin, Chefoo, 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, Canton, Kobe, Nagasaki, and Tokyo. Connections with ports on 
the west coast of the United States, including Seattle, San Francisco, San Diego, and 
Pearl Harbor, also became increasingly regular at this time. Though a regularly 
scheduled direct route to Europe had was not established in the first decade of the 
colony’s life, the first one began operation in 1908, run by a British shipping firm 
operating out of Newcastle, with several other companies following suit over the course 
of the next year, including HAPAG and Norddeutscher Lloyd.392 By 1911, Ernst 
Ohlmer, the Customs Director in Tsingtau from 1898 to 1914, was pleased to report that 
“a variety of ships can be found at the port which call regularly, competing for export 
cargo and affording direct connection, for goods and passengers, with the large 
European and American ports and Japan.”393 With the establishment of these new lines, 
shipping into and out of Tsingtau continued to grow at a steady rate, from 982 ships 
carrying a tonnage of 1,108,913 in 1907 to 1,733 ships with a tonnage of 2,679,319 in 
                                                 
391 Foreign Office to Tirpitz, 16 March 1904, PA-AA, R 18250. 
392 IMC, Returns, 1908, p. 129 and Returns, 1909, p. 133; Denkschrift 1908-1909, Staatsarchiv-Bremen, 3-
R.1.g.5. 
393 IMC, Decennial Reports, 1902-1911, p. 238. 
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1913. Despite growing competition from foreign powers, Germans still enjoyed a 
favored position in the colony, as nearly 43 percent of the tonnage clearing Tsingtau in 
1913 was German, in comparison to 31 percent for England and 18 percent for Japan.394  
Taken together, German efforts to connect Tsingtau to the rest of China and the 
world through a network of roads, railway lines, and shipping routes played a significant 
role in transforming the tiny fishing village into a thriving destination for businessmen, 
merchants, and travelers. When Germany occupied Tsingtau in 1898, the journey from 
Berlin or a port city such as Kiel, Bremen, or Hamburg might take several months, 
depending on the movements of naval vessels or a variety of multiple indirect steamship 
lines, train transfers, and roads. By the eve of World War I, however, Tsingtau could be 
reached via a number of routes, easily, efficiently, and at relatively low cost. Indeed in 
1912, when Fräulein M. Bochmann applied for a subsidy from the German government 
to help her establish a hair salon in Tsingtau, the official assisting her in this endeavor 
was able to suggest a variety of travel options-by rail and/or sea- that would bring her 
and her equipment to Tsingtau within three to four weeks, with tickets and related 
expenses running approximately 500-600 Reichsmarks.395 
This ease of travel and transport played a significant role in encouraging the 
growth of trade, industry, and tourism in the colony, a subject which will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapter. Such developments were critical in transforming 
                                                 
394 Denkschrift 1906-1907 and 1912-1913, Staatsarchiv-Bremen, R.1.g.no. 5. For a look at the growth of 
shipping in Tsingtau in the colony’s first decade, see Seeleman, Social and Economic Development, figure 
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breakdown of the number of ships from foreign states in each of the years between 1898 and 1909. 
395 Max Goldschmidt to M. Bochmann, 13 November 1912, BA, R1505-3. 
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Tsingtau into a German Hong Kong. In commenting on the effect of the newly-
constructed roads, railroads, and harbor on trade in the colony, Georg Schweitzer, a 
prominent writer with close ties to the Imperial Navy and a supporter of the German 
Hong Kong vision for Tsingtau, wrote: 
Each of these installations represent in themselves a continuity of development 
which are a solid foundation for their astonishing growth. Their influence reaches 
far beyond the borders of the Leasehold, especially in economic terms. The 
influx of German capital in the form of the roads, railway, the mining enterprises, 
and the harbor in Tsingtau is not only a real advantage for the province of 
Shantung, but for all of China. German policy towards China, finding in the 
Leasehold something of a focal point, is completely rooted in the realization that 
demands cannot be made from China, without first giving assistance.396  
 
The successful establishment of this infrastructure was central to connecting Tsingtau to 
the rest of China, East Asia, and the world. The development of industry, culture, 
education, and trade would need to follow to continue Tsingtau’s transformation into a 
German Hong Kong, but the city was clearly headed on the right track. 
  
                                                 




ESTABLISHING A MODEL ENTREPÔT: THE COMMERICAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF TSINGTAU 
 
In laying out plans for the Leasehold, One of Tirpitz’s primary objectives was the 
development of Tsingtau into an important center of trade and industry in northern 
China.397 The successful economic development of the colony, in Tirpitz’s mind, stood 
as a direct reflection of the entire colonial project, and thus the Navy’s ability to oversee 
and run an important facet of Germany’s projection as a global power and a leader in the 
imperial arena. Tsingtau’s transformation into a valuable trading port would not only 
bring increased revenue from international commerce, but also bolster and promote local 
and regional trade with China, turning Germany into an economic powerhouse in the 
region on par with its main rival, Great Britain. To accomplish this, however, Germany 
needed to overcome two major obstacles. First, Tirpitz, the Reichsmarineamt, and the 
colonial government had to foster an environment in which they could encourage the 
large German trading firms to establish branch offices in the colony. Secondly, to ensure 
positive economic development, the Leasehold government needed to establish a strong 
cooperative relationship with Chinese provincial authorities, especially customs 
officials. While Tirpitz and the naval administration championed this approach to 
Tsingtau and Germany’s overall relationship with China, such a vision conflicted with 
those of the Foreign Ministry and the commercial community, which preferred the 
                                                 
397 Tirpitz communicated this priority to Kaiser Wilhelm II from the very inception of the colony: 
Aufzeichnungen des Staatssekretärs des Reichmarineamts Tirpitz, 16 January 1898, BA-MA, RM 3/6999. 
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practices of imperialism that Germany and other European powers pursued in Africa and 
other regions in Asia and the Pacific. In these colonial contexts, European colonizers 
established “colonies of control,” large territories whose main purpose was to exploit the 
land for natural resources and the cheap labor force of the native population. 
Furthermore, these merchants and traders took advantage of their early presence in the 
colony by dictating the terms of economic modernization. Consequently, these 
commercial investors also derived great profit from the local populace’s desire for 
European goods, replacing indigenous barter with cash transactions that clearly favored 
the seller rather than the buyer.398 
This chapter examines the Navy and Leasehold government’s attempts to bolster 
industry, trade, and commerce in Tsingtau and the Leasehold in order to bring their 
vision of a German Hong Kong to bear and prove to its rivals-both domestically and 
internationally-that their take on imperialism was superior. In building up the colonial 
economy, Tirpitz and the colonial governors supported the establishment of a corporate 
system, establishing guidelines and regulations for businesses that would secure the fair 
competition and good business practices critical to providing for Tsingtau’s long-term 
economic success.399 In pursuing this avenue of development, increasing the 
involvement of the Chinese in Tsingtau was also critically important, and so this chapter 
also discusses the role the Chinese came to play in the economic growth of the German 
                                                 
398 Arthur J. Knoll and Hermann J. Hiery, eds. The German Colonial Experience: Select Documents on 
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colony. By the time the Tsingtau experiment ended in 1914, the colony was showing real 
signs of success in developing into an international hub of activity, prestige, and power. 
The Imperial Navy’s vision for Tsingtau, combined with good local conditions and some 
initial good fortune, seemed to be paying off, providing most, in not all, of the various 
leadership groups in the colony satisfaction that their respective objectives in the 
German colony in China were being met. 
 Having spent time in the Far East as the Head of the German East Asia Squadron 
from 1896 to 1897, Admiral Tirpitz had seen firsthand the challenges and opportunities 
that a colonial enclave in the East Asia could offer. Consequently, the head of the 
Reichsmarineamt recognized very quickly that, in order for Tsingtau to grow and 
prosper, Germany would need to take a more collaborative approach in dealing with 
Chinese. It would be important to interact and engage with the native population, rather 
than adopt the Foreign Ministry’s methods of demanding a nearly-servile acceptance of 
the harsh terms of the Leasehold Agreement that an unwilling Chinese government had 
been forced to sign. The Navy considered it Germany’s duty and right to be in China: a 
right because Germany was one of the leading industrial powers in the world and the 
possession of colonial territory abroad was an important projection of this power, and a 
duty because of the critical importance of sharing German capital, culture, and national 
character with others, particularly those who could benefit from German influence.  
With Tsingtau designated an open port, the free trade and minimal customs 
duties this offered was a major incentive for foreign investors in China, particularly 
British and American, but also Russian, French, and Japanese, to consider diverting their 
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commercial traffic through the city. Although such an opportunity intrigued these 
members of the western commercial community, they remained cautiously optimistic 
about the profits their firms might generate. German trading firms, however, saw the 
acquisition of Tsingtau and its status as a free port as a major boon to their economic 
interests, generating high hopes for the growth of their businesses under German 
authority.400  The news that the Reichsmarineamt would handle administration of the 
colony rather than the Kolonialamt or Auswärtiges Amt, however, tempered these high 
hopes, causing a great deal of consternation among the German business communities 
throughout China. German businessmen considered the new colony as a place where 
they could secure exclusive and favorable rights for generating great wealth and 
prosperity, much like the British regarded Hong Kong and the international community 
with Shanghai. Many German business managers in the region viewed the gubernatorial 
leadership of a career naval officer as antithetical to their commercial interests. At this 
early stage of Tsingtau’s development, German commercial leaders in China strongly 
considered-quite naively, as pervious chapters have shown-that the Imperial Navy’s only 
interest in a colony in China was to build a naval installation, ignoring the wishes of 
other interest groups who had pushed long and hard for a colony. These early investors 
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in Tsingtau drew upon the examples set by colonizers in Africa and other parts of the 
world in which European settlers exploited the racially inferior native population to 
acquire vast quantities of wealth and power seemingly overnight. Whatever vision the 
Imperial Navy and the governor spouted about the colony’s development would not 
easily deter these commercial interests from the pursuit of their own visons for 
Tsingtau.401 
Such was the general state of affairs that Rosendahl found awaiting him upon 
reaching the newly established colony on 16 April 1898, carrying with him a well laid 
out plan for Tsingtau. As early as his September 1896 report on the suitability of 
Kiautschou Bay for a German colony, Tirpitz strongly expressed his belief that 
economic development needed to be a central goal of Germany’s efforts to acquire and 
establish a successful colonial and naval base in China.402 Even after the German 
occupation, Tirpitz continued to emphasize the importance of Tsingtau’s commercial 
growth above all other aspects of the colony’s development. In a speech before the 
Reichstag in January 1899, for example, the Staatssekretär reminded the assembled 
representatives, “establishing a trade center is the true starting point for all planning and 
consideration for the leasing area. Such a trade center would certainly benefit the 
German national colony and, as a result, all other circles of Germany, directly or 
indirectly.”403 
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This pointed emphasis on Tsingtau’s economic development laid the foundation 
for an imperial vision that went beyond simply ensuring that the colony would be self-
sustaining, the achievement of which would be no small feat and a major boon for the 
German economy. Tirpitz desired a strong economy for the Leasehold in order to fulfill 
two key functions. First, by successfully creating a fully realized “German Hong Kong,” 
the Imperial Navy could demonstrate its important role in establishing Germany as a 
multi-faceted world power, not only strong militarily, but also economically and 
commercially as well. That it would be the Navy establishing and running this widely 
successful colony rather than the colonial office and succeeding at colonial 
administration where so many other states and offices had previously failed, would 
bolster the Reichsmarineamt’s power and prestige at home and abroad.404 Secondly, 
Tirpitz emphasized the establishment of a strong economy as the basis for generating 
financial profit. Although the Reich was willing to provide Tsingtau with the funds 
necessary to support and sustain it initially, this was, in Tirpitz’s opinion, not something 
that would remain practical in the long run, particularly since the German public 
remained skeptical of the benefits that a long-term government-subsidized colony might 
offer. By generating its own revenue, many of these problems could be resolved, with 
the bonus of creating a place of national pride, a singularly impressive expression of 
Germanness (Deutschtum) abroad.  
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In order to foster positive economic growth and establish Tsingtau as a base of 
economic activity in Shantung and beyond, two important conditions needed to be 
established: free trade and a free economy. The former was secured by establishing an 
appropriate system of tariffs and duties. The Imperial Navy strongly believed that, if 
Tsingtau was to become a major commercial center, it needed to be designated a free 
port.405 This was a key component of the navy’s policy in administering Tsingtau, not 
only due to the navy’s liberal orientation, but also due to the great success Hong Kong 
was beginning to enjoy as an international free trade port on the Chinese coast.406 
Additionally, naval leaders considered a tariff barrier between the Leasehold and 
Shantung’s interior as only a hindrance to trade within the province, reducing the 
colony’s effectiveness in strengthening Germany’s power and prestige in China and East 
Asia.407 The challenge, then, was to establish a customs system that would both provide 
overseas trade with easy access to Tsingtau, as well as provide for the free movement of 
goods between the port and the Chinese interior. 
 The most significant step in achieving freedom of trade was fostering a strong 
relationship between the Leasehold and the Chinese economy beyond Kiaochow’s 
borders. Tirpitz paid great attention to this issue from the founding of the colony, 
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desiring a customs agreement with China that placed Tsingtau on equal footing with 
China in respect to the collection of tariffs and customs duties.408 Tirpitz also pursued 
the establishment of a branch of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service (IMC) 
in Tsingtau to encourage Chinese merchants to move to, and conduct business in, the 
Leasehold. Although the IMC office exercised limited power, its presence in Tsingtau 
represented a significant compromise on the part of the colonial administration, as the 
Navy generally expressed a strong desire to remove any hint of Chinese sovereignty 
within the colony’s borders. Such a concession reflects the Navy’s strong interest in 
ensuring the commercial growth of Tsingtau and the Leasehold.  
 The Imperial Navy based its projected system of tariffs on a memorandum on 
customs duties drafted by the civilian Commissioner of Kiaochow (Komissar des 
Schutzgebietes) in early 1898.409 At Tipritz’s instigation, negotiations regarding the 
commissioner’s plan began in earnest between Ambassador Edmund von Heyking, and 
Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector General for the IMC. Although discussions lasted until the 
spring of the following year, Hart and Heyking were able to hammer out the basic 
principles of an agreement by September 1898. That the two sides came together so 
quickly stemmed from the fact that Germany’s willingness to allow China to establish a 
customs house at Tsingtau pleased Hart greatly, as this afforded the IMC a much larger 
role in the colony than he initially expected. The only thing standing in the way of 
opening a central customs office, then, was for the German government to submit 
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detailed procedural rules governing trade and customs in the colony.410 The first customs 
commissioner, Ernst Ohlmer, arrived at the new branch office in August 1898, and 
Tsingtau was officially declared open “to the trade of all nations” as part of the Land-
Use Ordinance of 2 September 1898.411  
 Despite this quick and early progress in establishing Tsingtau as a free port, 
Germany and China did not agree to a formal customs treaty until 17 April 1899, which 
did not take effect until the following July. Hart conducted his negotiations with 
Heyking largely independent of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, only presenting it with a 
finalized treaty to accept or reject.412 Nevertheless, the Zongli Yamen accepted the terms 
of the treaty on 26 April 1899, with the provision that Kiautschou would be referred to 
as a “Leasehold (Pachtgebiet)” rather than a “Protected Area (Schutzgebiet).”413 The 
agreement established the colony as a transit port for goods within the province of 
Shantung, granted Tsingtau the same status as the other treaty ports in China, and also 
secured tariff clearance for all goods destined for the Leasehold. The tariff system 
enshrined in the treaty preserved free access to the sea and the interior of the province, 
assuring Tsingtau would, as the Imperial Navy so ardently desired, have “all the 
advantages of a Chinese treaty port without losing its character as a free port.”414 In 
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doing so, the German government could build upon the foundational model that Hong 
Kong offered as a free port, but lacked in comparison to the other treaty ports. Such 
economic, trade, and customs freedoms created exceptionally favorable economic 
conditions in the colony, providing German and foreign companies with an incentive to 
invest in the Leasehold and establish new companies within the confines of the German 
territory. 
 Using the treaties the British signed with China regarding Hong Kong (notably 
the Treaties of Nanking and the Bogue) as a guide, Germany set up the entirety of the 
Kiaochow Leasehold to function, in essence, as free port. Goods that arrived by sea with 
a final stopping point within the German territory paid no duties upon their arrival in 
Tsingtau. This was the case whether the products were foreign or domestic goods, or 
whether their point of origin was a treaty port or a foreign one. If foreign goods arriving 
in Tsingtau had originated from another treaty port and already had their duties paid, 
these fees were refunded. Chinese merchandise and products shipped from another 
Chinese port and destined for a foreign port also paid no export duties. This reflected a 
subtle, but no less important, development upon the rights granted at other treaty ports, 
where Chinese goods had to be re-exported within one year in order to retain their 
exemption from export taxes.415 That Tsingtau offered this greater freedom from 
standard export procedures provided the port with the opportunity to become a central 
trade depot and key point of distribution for merchandise up and down the Chinese coast 
and between China, Japan, and European colonial enclaves throughout the Far East. A 
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final provision that secured Tsingtau’s status as a free port was a guarantee that produce 
grown in the Leasehold and goods manufactured from produce raised in or imported by 
sea into the Leasehold also paid no export duties, a key stipulation for the development 
of industry at the new German port. With these points enshrined in the new trade 
agreement, German officials ensured that Tsingtau, and the Leasehold as a whole, 
enjoyed all the advantages that came from being a free port and the rights and privileges 
that the British had secured for Hong Kong.416 
 Building upon the example that Britain had set with Hong Kong, Tsingtau also 
fulfilled many of the functions of a treaty port, such as those established at Shanghai, 
Canton, Ningpo, Fuchow, and Amoy, working with the provincial Chinese government 
to control goods entering and leaving the Chinese mainland. The Imperial Maritime 
Customs branch in Tsingtau collected its normal duties at treaty rates common in other 
treaty ports such as Shanghai and Canton.417  Like these other treaty ports, the colonial 
government charged no export duties on goods whose final destination was within the 
confines of the Leasehold. The IMC did, however, levy taxes on imports that crossed 
through the German colony on their way to locations in sovereign Chinese regions as 
well as on exports travelling from China to points abroad. In addition, the customs office 
charged coastal rates on import and export duties on Chinese goods that originated from 
another treaty port in China when those products left the Leasehold and entered the 
Chinese interior, often issuing receipts for those goods that had paid the export excise so 
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that they could again receive the coastal rate at another port. The customs house also had 
the power to sell transit passes for materials heading further into the Chinese interior, 
ensuring safe and unhindered passage to whatever markets they were headed. Although 
many of these taxes and duties were to be paid upon crossing into or out of the 
Leasehold, they were usually collected at the IMC customs house in Tsingtau, making 
the city a central hub and axis of trade in the region. Furthermore, the 1899 trade 
agreement also empowered German authorities to combat smuggling by “tak[ing] 
suitable measures to assist in the prevention of merchandise passing the German frontier 
when not provided with a permit or pass by the Maritime Customs Office.” In this 
regard, the customs treaty contained special provisions related to the sale and trade of 
opium, although these points were relatively moot as little, if any, opium ever passed 
through Tsingtau.418 
 Between the presence of the customs house in Tsingtau and its dual character as 
a free and treaty port, the German colony enjoyed advantages that made it equal to, and 
in many cases better than, Hong Kong as a trade entrepôt. Perhaps the most important 
benefit that Tsingtau offered over Hong Kong was that all goods that came from the 
interior and were consumed within Tsingtau or the Leasehold for any purpose were tax-
free. Furthermore, all produce and manufactures could travel into the interior from 
Tsingtau without having to be unpacked, inspected, and reloaded, a particularly 
significant provision since the vast majority of the transport of goods inland would be 
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via railroad. A final advantage that Tsingtau possessed over Hong Kong was that the 
German port could serve as a free depot for products produced within the province – 
these goods could be sorted, sampled, and finished within the confines of the Leasehold 
before their shipment to points domestic and abroad. 
 In negotiating the customs treaty, Heyking and his delegation had sought to 
ensure “a sharp limitation of the powers of the customs office and its personnel.” That 
Germany was able to secure these commercial advantages for Tsingtau without allowing 
the Chinese to encroach too greatly on the colony’s autonomy, particularly since a 
customs house would be located at the port, was a major victory. First and foremost, the 
Imperial Maritime Customs office in Tsingtau was “limited to the raising of customs and 
lacked administrative control over the harbor and the post office.”419 Furthermore, the 
customs treaty placed specific limitations on the IMC, stipulating that it "shall take no 
part in the collection or administration of tonnage dues, lighthouse dues, or port dues." 
The German legation in Peking and the colonial government in Tsingtau also retained 
considerable power over the choice of staff at the customs station as well as over how it 
conducted its daily business. According to the agreement, the Chief of the Maritime 
Customs office in Tsingtau and the members of the European staff “shall, as a rule, be of 
German nationality...[and] the Inspector General will inform the Governor of Kiautschou 
beforehand about all changes in the staff," after having secured the approval of the 
German legation in Peking. The treaty even went so far as to specify that "all 
correspondence between the customs office and German authorities and merchants shall 
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be conducted in the German language." As a final means of reducing Chinese control 
over trade and economy within the confines of the German colony, the IMC was 
required to assume the functions of the Chinese civil customs official (taotai) in a treaty 
port, making the IMC responsible for the collection of both native and foreign duties.420  
Despite the Reichsmarineamt's belief that Germany had been quite successful in 
securing a favorable trade agreement, German merchants, particularly those already 
well-established on the Chinese coast, were less than satisfied. Such displeasure led to 
constant battles over economic policy almost from the moment Rosendahl arrived as 
governor. While the settlers in Tsingtau recognized that their dreams of profit and 
fortune were being channeled into the plans for development, the main cargo departing 
the harbor of Tsingtau in the first year of the colony was empty beer bottles.421 Wilhelm 
Schrameier noted in his memoirs that "hardly any institution met with as much 
opposition as the custom arrangements, even as they were still under negotiation."422  
The German press at home and in China received a constant barrage of angry letters 
protesting developments during the customs negotiations, with considerable 
dissatisfaction directed at the plans for establishing a customs house in Tsingtau. One 
such letter in the 10 January edition of the North China Herald complained that "a 
Chinese Custom-house [in Tsingtau] will soon prove to be an intolerable obstacle to the 
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full development both of the import and export trades."423 A dispatch from a merchant in 
Tsingtau to the Hamburgischer Korrespondent that same month further added that "the 
customs office was a disadvantage to our location, it should be situated on the frontier, 
not here."424  
As a result of the growing number of complaints and protests from merchants in 
Bremen, Hamburg, and other German ports, Rosendahl came under intense scrutiny. 
With these objections to the new economic policy in the Leasehold showing no signs of 
abating, Tirpitz concluded that the governor was not working energetically enough to 
promote German economic interests in the colony. Between his lack of confidence in 
Rosendahl’s efforts and the high level of discontent from the commercial community, 
Tirpitz recognized he had little choice but to ask the Kaiser to dismiss Rosendahl and 
replace him with Jaeschke.425 Upon Jaeschke’s appointment, Tirpitz informed the new 
governor that the economic development of Tsingtau and the Leasehold was of primary 
importance to the colony's fate. In actively supporting the colonial economy, the local 
administration needed to pursue an active economic policy, which included continuing 
the work of forging as favorable a customs agreement as possible, securing the preferred 
treatment of businesses in the allocation and development of land in the colony,426 and 
also providing political and, if necessary, military support against Chinese authority.427   
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The attacks on the colonial administration regarding the negotiation and 
ratification of the customs agreement reflect an older attitude about colonial economic 
practices on the part of the foreign commercial community in China. These merchants 
and businessmen had no interest in hearing how Tsingtau was to be different from Hong 
Kong or the other treaty ports – that it would combine the advantages of both in its bid to 
equal or surpass Hong Kong – and that, in order to secure this objective, the colony 
needed to pursue new and different policies. This band of investors prima facie opposed 
any concessions to Chinese authority, a point made abundantly clear by their inability 
and unwillingness to offer any sort of well-reasoned argument against this new direction 
in policy or to articulate clearly the advantages offered by other possible arrangements. 
It did not matter that a harbor had yet to be built in Tsingtau and that their ships had to 
load and unload into lighters and sampans while still in the bay, or that the city, port, and 
harbor needed to follow a well thought-out and distinct plan of development that 
included the surveying and laying out of land for the construction of warehouses and 
storehouses.428  
The opposition of German merchants and traders is captured quite clearly in a 
report that the German consul in Shanghai, Dr. Wilhelm Knappe, wrote to the 
Auswärtiges Amt concerning the situation in Shantung. In his dispatch, Knappe noted 
that, in their hostility to the Navy’s economic policy, the commercial community in 
Tsingtau combined the more traditional fears of the Chinese that were prevalent in China 
and East Asia with an overall open hostility directed towards the native population: “The 
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merchants in Tsingtau worry that the German colony will be surrounded by customs 
houses not only of the Imperial Maritime Customs but also likin [linjin],” a form of 
internal tariff on goods in transit between provinces that the Chinese government 
employed to raise revenue for local governments. Business leaders further complained 
that, due to the Imperial Navy’s policies, “China has obtained all the advantages of an 
open port complete with customs house without having to contribute anything in the 
slightest to the cost.” In short, “the Chinese flag waves at Tsingtau, raised up with great 
fanfare by the highest officials of the colony.”429 
Nevertheless, the “victory” that the commercial community felt it had achieved 
in effecting Rosendahl’s recall proved to be a hollow one. Jaeschke was as unmoving 
and forceful as Rosendahl and arrived prepared with clear instructions on how to enact 
the Imperial Navy’s vision for Tsingtau while also satisfying the demands of other 
interest groups and, consequently, mollifying their opposition. Jaeschke embraced his 
new role and authority, even going so far as to publish his orders in the first Denkschrift 
he submitted to the Reichstag in November 1899: 
All measures adopted by the naval administration in Kiaochou [sic] had 
economic considerations as their main point of departure. Notwithstanding the 
place’s military and maritime importance as a naval station, its development as a 
trade-colony and important entrepôt for German merchants in East Asia will be 
decisive for its future…Out of these main ideas resulted two different 
administrative guidelines: 1) A [colonial] government as independent as possible 
from the home government departments. 2) Severe restraints on the part of the 
[colonial] government departments in relation to the regulation of trade and 
industry; duty-free and essentially free commerce; a decrease in the government 
administration in favor of far-reaching self-government in relation to the 
progressive development of the Leasehold.430 
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Despite Jaeschke’s intent to assuage the fears of German merchants and their supporters 
in the press, the publication of his orders did little to reassure the opposition; indeed, 
German merchants and traders continued their attacks on the governor throughout the 
life of the German colony. In a 1904 article about the economic conditions in Leasehold 
and Shantung, Professor Wilhelm Berensmann wrote, “merchants, instead of naval 
officers, should now occupy the governor’s estate in Tsingtau. This is not, I assure you, a 
plea directed at the failings of a single individual [Governor Oskar von Truppel], but 
against the system of development espoused by the Naval Government.”431 
Nevertheless, Tirpitz and the colonial administration remained committed to fusing the 
benefits of a treaty port with those of a free port; following the typical pattern of a treaty 
port in China was never in their plans.432 This firm commitment to their German Hong 
Kong ideal was admirable for its consistency, but it did not come without consequences. 
Naval leaders often had to devote considerable time and energy to calming flaring 
tempers in the commercial community so that they could accomplish the main goal for 
the colony that all involved were concerned with: developing German trade in Tsingtau 
and between the colony and Shantung. 
 Despite the fact that the naval administration insisted that Ernst Ohlmer, a native 
of Hanover, would serve as Commissioner of Customs at the Tsingtau branch of the 
IMC, Ohlmer did not grant German traders any special treatment. Having joined the 
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customs service at a young age in 1868, Ohlmer slowly but surely worked his way up the 
ranks until he received his appointment to the Tsingtau customs office. After such a long 
career at the IMC, Ohlmer saw himself as more of a representative of the Chinese 
government than as someone responsible for protecting German trade: “during his 
sixteen years tenure of office at Kiaochow, Ohlmer watched over China’s Customs 
interests at the port zealously and efficiently.”433 For its part, the colonial administration 
(as well as other German officials in China) treated Ohlmer as a member of the Chinese 
government and judged his behavior accordingly, despite his heritage.434 
 With the customs agreement settled and German merchants and traders satisfied 
that the colonial government was protecting their interests, the commercial development 
of Tsingtau began in earnest. In these early years, however, only modest growth took 
place, largely due to the fact that the colony still lacked both harbor facilities and 
connection to Shantung’s interior via road and rail. In 1899, 205 ships arrived in 
Tsingtau, with nearly half of those vessels belonging to the German steamship firm, 
Diederichsen, Jebsen, and Company.435 Most of these goods were not subject to customs 
duties (as they were generally intended for general consumption or the construction of 
the railroad), however, so any statistics related to their value or worth are not 
available.436 Nevertheless, what can be discerned from the information available is that 
certain foreign goods, particularly kerosene and raw and manufactured cotton, made 
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their appearance in Shantung and parts of northern China for the first time, a direct result 
of Germany’s presence in Tsingtau.437 Though the overall value of imports into Tsingtau 
in this first year was roughly 200,000 Taels (619,000 Reichsmarks), the Imperial Navy 
reassured the Reichstag that this modest sum formed a reasonable base from which trade 
and commerce could only grow, particularly once it had established better trade and 
communications networks in the colony, allowing for better regional integration with 
expanding trade networks across China and East Asia.438  
The freedom of trade that resulted from the customs agreement as well as the 
early growth in trade and commerce, though modest, created a set of economic 
conditions that provided incentives for German and other capital-intensive foreign 
companies to become financially involved in Tsingtau. Both the navy and private 
businessmen invested heavily in establishing new industries in Tsingtau, the Leasehold, 
and Shantung, all of which made valuable contributions to the development of the 
German colony. Although the difficulties involved with establishing modern industry in 
China limited the financial success of these enterprises and, as a result, the overall 
number of industrial undertakings remained comparatively small, the impact and 
contributions of these projects were critical to the growth of Tsingtau and a key 
component in establishing its position as one of the premiere colonial enclaves in the Far 
East. Furthermore, in recognizing that Tsingtau might never become a “modernized” 
European-style industrial outpost, the Navy and the colonial administration refocused its 
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“German Hong Kong” vision to create a hybrid industrial plan that emphasized uniquely 
German goods that could be produced in Tsingtau and sold regionally and 
internationally as well as working with the local Chinese population to develop and grow 
their own industries that sold high-quality mass-produced goods that would generate 
profits through trade, tariffs, and other duties. 
The most valuable industry established in Tsingtau was the harbor’s shipyard, 
which offered services to both naval and private vessels. The shipyard began operations 
in 1901 in a temporary location until the completion of the harbor, moving to its 
permanent location in the Großhafen between 1905 and 1907.439 A thoroughly modern 
establishment, the shipyard was one of the largest and most well-outfitted installations of 
its kind in East Asia, with over 1100 yards of docks and much of the newest equipment 
available; indeed, such a site was more likely to be found in Kiel or Newcastle rather 
than on the coast of China. One of the shipyard’s most prominent features was an 
extensive floating dock that could hold 16,000 tons, allowing it to serve as a dry-dock 
for multiple ships at once and thought to be one of the largest of its kind anywhere. The 
shipyard also possessed an electric crane that could lift 150 tons, allowing for even the 
largest ships visiting Tsingtau to receive the services it needed.440 Most of the shipyard’s 
employees were recruited from the local Chinese population; only the highest-ranking 
officials were German and/or officers in the Imperial Navy. The Chinese workers 
participated in a four-year apprenticeship program at the shipyard, where they received 
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training in technical fields as well as an education in the German language and other 
subjects related to their work at the yard. The shipyard rapidly grew into one of the 
largest enterprises in the colony, employing close to 1550 Chinese and 65 Europeans by 
1913.441 The shipyard was capable of building and overhauling ships, and much of its 
business (roughly 65 percent) was with the Navy, particularly keeping the East Asian 
Cruiser Squadron operating at peak performance and capacity. By the start of World 
War I, the shipyard had constructed twenty-two medium-sized sailing vessels, as well as 
another thirty-three smaller ships.  
Although the Imperial Navy operated the shipyard throughout the life of the 
colony, Tirpitz’s original intention was for the shipyard to be in private hands. Not only 
would this reduce the Navy’s operating budget for the colony-allowing funds to be 
directed elsewhere-but a successful privately-run enterprise like the shipyard would be 
an excellent showcase for how lucrative investment in the German colony could be. The 
navy made several attempts to interest investors-in 1901, when plans for the shipyard 
were approved, in 1905, when the harbor was completed and the shipyard expanded, and 
again in 1907, when the shipyard was fully and completely operational-but it was unable 
to secure an agreement. Tirpitz was particularly desirous that Friedrich Krupp AG, one 
of the largest and most globally prominent German firms and a staunch supporter of the 
imperial government-would handle the operation of the shipyard. Nevertheless, despite 
the Navy’s efforts to play up the nationalistic importance of running the shipyard and 
promises of considerable business from both the German and Chinese governments, 
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Krupp would not bite. In refusing the Navy’s final request in 1907, Gustav Krupp, the 
head of the Krupp Works, stressed that he fully understood that “buying the yard was not 
a matter which touched only on the purely business side of things, but also touches upon 
political and national issues.” Nevertheless, after the careful consideration of several 
studies it had conducted on the feasibility of running the yard, the company found that 
“the shipyard was simply too large and too valuable for the limited business 
opportunities available in the Far East. Therefore, from an economic point of view, [it is] 
not justifiable to buy and operate the shipyard.” Despite rejecting the navy’s offer, 
though, Krupp did agree to provide whatever equipment or materials the navy might 
need for the yard at a considerable discount in order to ensure that this enterprise would 
continue to provide its valuable services.442  
The financial aspects aside, the shipyard enjoyed a highly favorable reputation 
throughout the Far East for the quality and efficiency of the work performed there. 
Furthermore, with trained Chinese artisans, state-of-the-art facilities, and the active 
support of merchant shipping throughout East Asia, the shipyard provided important 
technical knowledge and practical training for thousands of Chinese throughout northern 
China. As modern mechanized technology began to become more prevalent throughout 
the region, the men trained at the shipyard for work in countless industries inside and 
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outside the Leasehold made valuable contributions to the rapid industrial development of 
Shantung.443 
In addition to supporting the shipyard, Krupp also provided the newest modern 
equipment for the slaughterhouse and sausage-works that began operation in 1904, 
despite again choosing not to operate these industries directly.444 Several other 
prominent international German companies followed this pattern of involvement in 
Tsingtau’s industry as well. Siemens offered considerable material support for the 
electric company both when it was established in 1899 and when the private company 
that accepted the offer to run Tsingtau’s electric company (the Dresden-based Kummer 
Electric Power) failed in 1901; Siemens agreed to buy out Kummer when it declared 
bankruptcy, but required the Navy purchase the plant in Tsingtau and run its daily 
operations as part of the sale agreement.445 Although such a decision does reflect 
reluctance by multi-national corporations to invest in Tsingtau as well as the limited 
financial success of such undertakings, these companies fully understood the broader 
implications of the importance of being involved in the growth and development of the 
colony, even as they sought to minimize their financial risks.  
The most important private industry in the Leasehold and Shantung by far was 
the SBG. Like many of the major industries in the German colony, it too struggled to 
turn a large profit, although its contributions to the economic development of Tsingtau 
                                                 
443 Bökemann, Stadtanlange, p. 480. Seeleman, Social and Economic Development of the Kiaochou 
Leasehold, pp. 271-274 provides a much fuller description and account of the shipyard-its establishment, 
growth and development, and place in the development of Tsingtau, the Leasehold, and Shantung. 
444 Denkschrift, 1903-1904, Staatsarchiv-Bremen, 3-R.1.g.5. 
445 Denkschrift, 1899-1900 and 1904-1905, ibid. See also, Seeleman, p. 295-298. 
 232 
cannot be understated. The main mining activities for the SBG took place at the coal 
fields located at Weihsien and Boshan, each of which had two main mining shafts and 
numerous smaller branch ones. Mining operations began in 1901, with further 
expansions in 1904 and 1907; by 1911, the SBG’s mining facilities were operating at 
their fullest extent.446 As was the case with many of the other industrial undertakings in 
the German colony, the SBG made use of “all the most modern equipment” to make the 
extraction and transport of minerals as efficient as possible.447 Such equipment included 
an automatic coal washer that cleaned and sorted the coal into four grades and which 
was considered a tremendous boon to German efforts to become leaders in the North 
China coal industry. Ohlmer, for his part, found this machinery an “ingenious 
contrivance…the only one of its kind in the Far East,” and the North China Herald 
reported that this “unique device [would] give Germany an immense advantage in the 
coal trade” in East Asia.448 The coal fields also had briquette factories on their respective 
premises which took the excess pieces from the washer and converted them into fuel 
briquettes for use in a variety of steam-powered engines. 
Initially, the SBG struggled to recruit laborers to work in the mines, largely due 
to the fact that the local population saw the coal fields as merely a place to pick up 
additional work when agricultural work was light. By 1905, the SBG recognized that the 
best way to recruit a steady stream of permanent laborers was to “improve to treatment 
of the workers.”449 Consequently, the SBG worked out an arrangement with Governor 
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Yuan and the provincial authorities in Tsinan in which, in return for the provincial 
government’s help in recruiting workers, the company would agree to hire laborers only 
from Shantung, pay them on a higher pay scale, offer better rates for accident insurance, 
and establish a fund to provide for the coal miners and their families in case of death. In 
addition, the SBG also built special residential “colonies” for the Chinese workers near 
the mines “to get secure hold of them and to break the influence of their villages.” By 
the SBG’s estimation, at least, these colonial villages were well laid-out, rent-free, and 
provided excellent health facilities.450 Although it is difficult to determine exactly how 
dramatically living and working conditions improved, the SBG’s efforts did seem to 
solve their labor shortage problems. By the time both minefields were fully expanded 
and operational in 1911, the SBG counted 8000 Chinese laborers in its workforce, 
supervised by 70 Germans.451 
Between the two coal fields, the quality of the coal extracted at Boshan was 
much higher than the coal from Weihsien. Weihsien’s coal produced too much residue 
when it burned, making it unsuitable for use in trains and steamships. Furthermore, the 
coal from this field was difficult to extract, as flooding in the mineshafts was a constant 
problem. In contrast, however, the coal from Boshan was easily mined and tended to be 
of extremely high quality: suitable for all types of use and even considered by some as 
an equal substitute for coal produced in Cardiff.452 In 1901, the first year of full mining 
operations for the two fields, the SBG produced 179,083 tons of coal, extracted mostly 
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from Weihsien; by 1913, however, that number had increased to 613,000 tons, with 
nearly two-thirds now coming from the mines at Boshan.453 
 Despite the SBG’s success in developing the two fields and increasing 
production of both high- and low-grade coal, the company struggled to turn a profit. This 
inability to generate financial success for its investors had mostly to do with the high 
costs of operating the mines and transporting the coal to the harbor at Tsingtau. As a 
result, the SBG sold its coal at a price too high to compete easily with coal brought in by 
sea from mines in Hoiping (Kaiping) and Japan. In response to this economic reality, the 
company tried to redirect its efforts to selling its coal in the interior of Shantung, but 
such efforts only stemmed their financial losses rather than producing large profits. The 
SBG was founded to sell its coal throughout East Asia and to European traders, and the 
local markets were much smaller and generated much less revenue.  
Although it is difficult to ascertain exactly why the SBG struggled to earn the 
considerable profits that its board of directors expected (particularly since smaller 
Chinese mining companies performed quite well), the best explanation may be that the 
German firm, in expecting that it could generate tremendous profits simply by using the 
most advanced information and technology available, allowed its undertaking to become 
too large and complicated. While the mines run by local competitors were smaller and 
simpler in terms of the equipment they used, they were better suited to meeting the 
economic realities of the Shantung market. In its desire to establish a large modern 
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enterprise capable of breaking into the international market from the outset (and perhaps 
pushed to do so by the Navy in order to make Tsingtau into a premier coaling station), 
the SBG invested too heavily in expensive equipment that required skilled workers that 
were difficult to obtain and train quickly. Nevertheless, the SBG’s impact on the colony 
was considerable, as it helped modernize the industry in northern China, providing 
skilled workers and engineers for the mines, and fueling the many modes of 
transportation into and out of the colony that were critical to helping Tsingtau achieve its 
position of prominence in China and the Far East. 
In addition to the SBG, German investors also tried to compete with established 
Chinese industries by establishing the German-Chinese Silk Production Company 
(Deutsch-Chinesische Seiden Industrie Gesellschaft, or DCSIG). Founded in 1902 with 
an initial investment of 1.8 million marks, the company aimed to establish a modern 
facility in Tsingtau that would reel, spin, and weave silk from the interior of Shantung 
and other parts of China.454 Although the administrative offices remained in Berlin, on 
26 May 1902 the company moved its official headquarters to Tsangkou, one of the stops 
on the Tsingtau-Tsinan railroad just north of Tsingtau, and the factory itself was fully 
operational by 1904. Much like other industrial enterprises established in the colony, the 
large factory at the center of the production complex- possessing a 5,000-square meter 
work area-used of the most modern equipment for spinning, throwing, and dyeing silk. 
The company also built considerable storage and transportation facilities at its complex 
as well as large covered courtyards, showrooms, and European-style living quarters for 
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the supervisory and European personnel. The DCSIG housed its Chinese employees 
(approximately 1500 in number) in one of two residential colonies: two barracks in 
which 650 non-married laborers lived, separated by gender, and a residential area with 
streets and small parks for workers with families.455 
In addition to laying out residential complexes that provided for the well-being of 
its workers-a measure enacted, in part, to convince Chinese labors to work for the 
DCSIG full-time, rather than seasonally-the company’s management also insisted on 
policies that would fulfill German ideals and ensure that the native population could 
partner with Germans in managing the company, sharing in Tsingtau’s economic 
success. The most important of these was providing long-term training and education of 
its personnel. Future managers and supervisors received instruction in every facet of 
production at the complex as well as on the principles of factory management and 
training. In an effort to attract upper and middle-class Chinese managers, younger 
workers and children received an education in a variety of subjects, including reading 
and writing (both Chinese and German), literature, geography, and mathematics, as well 
as practical training in a variety of technical subjects.456 Ernst Ohlmer described such a 
set-up as “a model of its kind that could bear comparison with any in Europe.”457 
The silk and dyed-goods that the DCSIG produced were extremely fine products 
that were in high demand throughout the Far East and Europe for sale and trade. Indeed, 
the popularity of Tsingtau’s silk became an object of considerable concern for American 
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merchants and businessmen, who found the German products cutting into the trade 
monopoly they had so carefully cultivated for themselves in China, particularly 
Shanghai. Even the advent of World War I and the trade embargoes that followed did 
little to stem this demand, as German silk manufactures continued to pour into neutral 
ports, smuggled in under the name of false companies.458 Despite the demand for such 
quality products, the efforts of the DCSIG, much like those of the SBG, to establish a 
profitable and modern European-style industry in Tsingtau fell short of its investors’ 
expectations. This was largely because production costs were 25 percent too high, 
resulting in prices 40 percent higher on average than many of the DCSIG’s 
competitors.459 In 1908, Chancellor von Bülow proposed the Reichstag provide a 
subsidy to support the company, but the measure ultimately failed due to charges of 
gross financial mismanagement by some of the company’s principal shareholders.460 As 
a result, the DCSIG’s board of directors brought in a consortium of rich Chinese 
businessmen to save the company. 461 The DCSIG now became a combined German-
Chinese venture, and would remain dominated by the new Chinese investors until Japan 
took over the corporation after World War I. 
Although two of the largest industrial undertakings in Tsingtau were unable to 
realize the financial success that the navy, imperialists, and the commercial community 
had hoped for, many German industries did find considerable financial success. These 
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companies fared much better primarily due to the fact that they were smaller and catered 
to more specific markets where the competition was not nearly as fierce. The most 
important, most profitable, and certainly most significant projection of Germany’s global 
reach was the beer company, the Anglo-German Brewery Company, which would, over 
time, become the Tsingtao Brewery Corporation, the name by which it is known today. 
The first European-style brewery in Asia, the company was established in 1904 with its 
headquarters in Shanghai (to circumvent Leasehold regulations that required any capital 
venture to offer large-sized shares to the public) by treaty-port denizens from multiple 
nations. The brewery shipped the first cases of “Germania” in 1905, and the beer quickly 
became popular in the Leasehold and across the Far East, with its only real competition 
coming from well-known European imports. The beer even achieved something of a 
following abroad, with profitable sales in the United States and throughout Europe.462 
The company continued to grow steadily throughout the life of the colony, and always 
generated excellent returns for its investors.463 
In addition to the brewery, all the building trades, including raw material 
production such as timber, quarries, and brickmaking, were remarkably successful, 
owing to Tsingtau’s rapid growth. Such industries were in particularly high demand in 
the European section of the city as well as along the beachfront where numerous hotels 
and tourist-based businesses were located. The German construction firms quickly 
earned an excellent reputation for the quality of their work, and were in high demand not 
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only in Tsingtau, but also throughout the Leasehold and China to build German- and 
European-style buildings. Other successful industries established in Tsingtau included a 
privately-owned shipyard, a salt works, machine shops, an automobile repair shop, print 
shops, a soap factory, a tannery, a pottery factory, a soda water company, two albumen 
companies, and a slaughterhouse and sausage factory, for which Krupp provided state-
of-the-art equipment. Straw braid also prospered as an industry in Tsingtau, particularly 
in the later years of the colony as straw hats, long a favorite in Germany and Europe, 
became increasingly popular in China following the 1911 revolution. Although 
Europeans-both British and German entrepreneurs opened shops using straw braids 
deemed unsuitable for export-were responsible for establishing the straw-hat industry, 
the local Chinese population continued to dominate the production of straw braid, 
largely maintaining it as a cottage industry in the Leasehold. Sensing a profitable 
marketing opportunity, the Singer Sewing Machine Company established a branch 
factory for the production of its machines, emphasizing their ability to produce excellent 
quality straw braid goods.464  
Additionally, in 1912 the Leasehold government supported the establishment of a 
straw hat factory that opened under German management, but with joint investment from 
German businessmen and wealthy former Chinese officials; most of the foreign capital 
came from two German merchants that manufactured straw hats in Bavaria.465 This 
shared German-Chinese venture represented the first and, by virtue of its establishment 
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so close to the start of World War I, only general manufacturing company in Tsingtau 
with the financial backing of investors from both countries, despite the duty-free 
advantages offered on the export of goods manufactured in Tsingtau. That it was the 
only capital venture of this type had more to do with German corporate laws that 
required the issuance of large shares to investors (usually 1,000 marks) than any 
problems that such an undertaking might have encountered in establishing a 
manufacturing plant in the colony.466 The late date of the foundation of this company 
speaks to the consistency of Tirpitz’s vision of a German Hong Kong, as he continued to 
push the advantages that the colony provided for ventures that specialized in the 
manufacture of raw materials produced directly within the Leasehold.467 Nevertheless, 
the straw braid industry, as well as silk and glass-making, were the most significant 
entrepreneurial endeavors-encouraged and supported by the colonial administration-on 
the part of the native population that further spurred the growth of the German colony.468 
Although Tsingtau experienced steady growth in industry and commercial 
activity during the mid and later years of the German occupation, the examples of the 
SBG and DCSIG reveal that such increases were uneven in the initial years after the 
agreement of the 1899 customs treaty. By 1904, it became clear to colonial leaders that 
they would not reach the level and type and industrial development they initially 
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expected. While the 1903 commercial register for Tsingtau recorded 51 private 
companies, nearly all these enterprises depended on government subsidies on some level 
to survive. Of these 51 ventures, six of them (12%) had declared bankruptcy.469 Private 
investment failed to take off, and exports and imports numbers were lower than 
predicted. Consequently, visions of Tsingtau as a prominent trading center began to 
shift. It was no longer viable to believe Tsingtau would achieve financial success 
through the import and sale of expensive European goods in the Far East and the export 
of exotic foreign products and cheap raw materials to Europe. Rather, the commercial 
community and colonial leaders began pushing a policy that Wilhelm Schrameier 
articulated in 1910 when he looked back at this early period in Kiaochow’s history: 
The thought of taking advantage of the decay of China is completely against 
anything Germany desires. Germany must embrace her trade interests. Germany 
is a power [in China] and has to guard her trade and industrial interests in China, 
and to develop them further. What we need for this trade is a prosperous, rich 
China; a country which finds increased prosperity in steady development. We do 
not need a country which hovers on the brink of ruin…This need then dictates 
the position of Germany with respect to China: Germany will, and must, be 
anxious to help the Chinese by all possible means.470 
 
In response to this change in vision for the German colony, Ernst Ohlmer sought, as 
early as 1903, to revise the 1899 customs agreement. Ohlmer’s aim in doing so was to 
draw Chinese import and export traffic to Tsingtau from other parts of Shantung and 
northern China. According to Ohlmer, the original tariff agreement made it impossibly 
difficult for Chinese traders, save for the largest trading houses operating on government 
contracts, to establish themselves in the colony. Therefore, he proposed restricting the 
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duty-free exemption granted goods entering the port of Tsingtau, a move that would 
effectively end any special provisions granted to German trading firms.471 Such a 
proposal certainly won the favor of Chinese merchants, who believed this would lower 
the costs of trading in Tsingtau, whereas the larger German companies already 
established in the Leasehold (particularly the SEG and the SBG) strenuously objected to 
this loss of favorable circumstances.472 
Nevertheless, the lack of success of the original plans for economic growth in 
Tsingtau made it necessary for the government to consider new possibilities. After the 
completion of the Tsinan-Tsingtau railway in 1904 and the harbor in 1906, the colonial 
government needed to show some level of economic success, more so than it had 
previously. The support of the German trading houses, hoping to benefit from a revival 
and increase in trade in the colony, for the proposals of Ohlmer and Chinese merchants 
won over the Leasehold government.473 As a result, in early 1905 Ohlmer began 
negotiations to revise the customs agreement. By the end of the year, the colonial 
administration had agreed to a revised customs agreement, whereby Tsingtau would no 
longer be designated a free port; in return, Tsingtau would receive a 20% share of the 
duties collected by the customs office.474 This new agreement represented a key shift 
both in terms of Tsingtau’s economic policy and in the navy’s and commercial leaders’ 
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visions for making Tsingtau into a German Hong Kong. After eight years of trying to 
implement a model that focused more directly on supporting solely German endeavors, 
colonial and business leaders increasingly turned their attention towards cooperating 
more fully with the native population. 
As a result of the new customs treaty and the shift in focus towards integrating 
Tsingtau more fully into regional commercial activity and the expanding commercial 
networks across the Far East, Chinese merchants came to play a far greater role in trade 
in the Leasehold’s interior. This development pleased the Imperial Navy, as it pointed 
out “all experience of European trade in East Asia shows that the development of a place 
on the China coast is fundamentally dependent upon the participation of the native 
merchant community…Therefore, as the navy has always said, the development of a 
lively and wealthy Chinese merchant group at Tsingtau will be of a clear benefit to 
German businessmen as well.”475 As the success of Chinese merchants and traders drew 
more foreign investment into the colony, the navy expressed great pride that “the most 
significant firm of the China trade” had arrived in Tsingtau and that “it is a good 
indication of the growing economic importance of Tsingtau that more and more foreign 
capital participates in the growing commerce.” The colonial government saw such 
commercial activity as “a positive factor in the opening of the colony and its hinterland, 
for it will also indirectly serve the development of German commerce and industry.”476 
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The colonial administration’s efforts to attract more local and foreign trade to 
Tsingtau paid off handsomely. As a result of the greater involvement of Chinese 
merchants and businessmen, commerce and business activity began a spectacular growth 
in Tsingtau, particularly upon completion of the railroad in 1906. By the end of 1907, 
Tsingtau had collected nearly 935,000 taels (approximately 2.8 million Reichsmarks) in 
customs duties, making the city the seventh largest port in China.477 Commercial firms 
were now exporting many of the manufactured goods produced in the colony and 
Shantung from the port of Tsingtau to many of the wealthy and prosperous cities in 
southern China and the Far East.478 Particularly valuable exports for both the national 
and international markets included silk (raw and manufactured), fruit, cabbage, and 
emerging industries in peanut products, straw braid, and related manufactured goods; in 
1907, the value of such exports reached over 10.5 million taels (31.5 million 
Reichsmarks). Key imports into Tsingtau were cotton, petroleum, sugar, dyes, and 
matches; domestic imports included wool, paper, and rice, the overall value of which 
totaled over 16 million taels (48 million Reichsmarks).479 Trade values continued to 
increase every year, especially after 1907, which represented something of a banner year 
in terms of annual growth.480 At the end of 1910, Tsingtau ranked behind only Shanghai, 
Canton, Tientsin, and Hankow in terms of the value and volume of trade passing through 
its harbor. 
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Due to the increased trade at Tsingtau’s port, the colony saw a flood of 
commercial firms establishing offices there. Initially, the vast majority were Chinese and 
German firms, although companies headquartered in France, Great Britain, the United 
States, Russia, and Japan also set up branches in Tsingtau. By 1911, Ohlmer reported 
that “most of the large China firms—German, English, and French—have now 
established branch houses or have agents here.”481 As the Chinese had nearly a 
monopoly on trade in Shantung’s interior, German companies generally focused on 
products that were in high demand within Tsingtau and the Leasehold.482 As it became 
easier to reach Tsingtau via road, rail and sea, larger firms from China and abroad also 
came to the colony, with an especial interest in boosting regional trade. In 1906, the 
United States appointed Wilbur T. Gracey to lead the first foreign consular office in 
Tsingtau (a significant and important feature of the other treaty ports), with the other 
major powers following suit soon thereafter. In 1907, as Chinese merchants continued to 
play a leading role in the leasehold’s trade, the members of the three largest trading 
guilds-the Jiran, Sanjiang, and Gunagdong Guilds-in the region built an impressive joint 
guild house in Tsingtau. Bolstered by the success of the joint guild, in 1909, the firms 
formed their own Chamber of Commerce (Handelskammer) based on German and 
European models.483 In 1913, the Tsingtau Chamber of Commerce added to its roster the 
Changyi and Haiyang guilds, both of which represented Chinese merchants primarily 
involved in international trade. The Chamber of Commerce and its associated guilds 
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maintained an excellent relationship with the provincial government in Tientsin and, as 
such, were able to exert considerable influence on trade policy as it pertained to the 
Leasehold.484 
This overall positive growth of commerce at Tsingtau certainly fulfilled the 
expectations of colonial, business, diplomatic, and naval leaders in China, and 
represented a special triumph for the navy, which had prioritized this goal from very 
early as a part of its justification for a German colony in China. Nevertheless, the 
German vision for Tsingtau’s economic success had its shortcomings. This was 
especially true in the case of the number of shares of German products imported into the 
colony, the one aspect of trade that most directly benefited Berlin. Although it is difficult 
to ascertain exactly where imported goods originated, German products generally 
accounted for 6 to 8% of all goods imported into Tsingtau. These German wares 
garnered approximately 3-4% of the market share in the Leasehold proper and Shantung 
more broadly. In both cases, these values were slightly higher than those for all German 
goods imported into to China. 485 Since the Navy’s vision for Tsingtau was based 
primarily on the growth and development of Tsingtau, Germany’s relatively minor share 
of the colony’s trade did not represent a major disappointment. Rather, the 
Reichsmarineamt trumpeted the widely positive and continual growth of the volume of 
commerce coming into port, a point of proud emphasis in the annual Denkschrifts.486 
The navy derived such satisfaction in part because its leaders recognized that a high 
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volume of business meant that trading firms and shipping companies, the types of 
business whose shared interests and success were of great importance to the colony, 
were realizing great profits. Even more important, the Imperial Navy viewed the 
continued increase in trade as the ultimate proof and vindication that Tsingtau and the 
Leasehold had indeed become a success, equaling and even surpassing the British (and, 
to a lesser extent, the Kolonialamt) in its ability to develop and run a viable and 
commercially successful colony: Tsingtau was fast becoming the German Hong Kong 
that so many Germans ardently desired.  
Though the Navy was quite pleased with this success, some leaders in Berlin 
were decidedly less so. Although they recognized that Tsingtau was seeing growth and 
increase in trade, little of this affected Germany’s bottom line: millions of marks were 
being funneled to and invested in the colony, and the empire was seeing a relatively 
minimal return in terms of profits. This was a point of particular emphasis by members 
of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), who generally opposed imperial ventures, 
preferring to focus on issues much closer to home. Leading SPD members, such as 
Mathias Erzberger, criticized the developments in China, expressing, “I do not deny that 
the imports and exports have risen sharply in the port, but this has not been to our 
[Germany’s] benefit. For all the money that we have spent on Kiaochow, much of it has 
been spent entirely for the advantage of the Japanese and the Chinese.”487 As a result, the 
SPD and their allies repeatedly called on the German government to abandon the colony 
                                                 
487 Stenographische Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages, 1908-1909, 21 March 1908, p. 
4175. 
 248 
and return the Leasehold to China.488 Members of the German business community, still 
smarting from the 1905 revisions to the customs agreement that put Chinese and foreign 
firms on a more equal footing with German companies in the colony, echoed of the 
SPD’s criticisms. They argued that the colonial government needed to do more to 
support German merchants and businesses and prevent the Chinese and Japanese from 
stealing the profits they desired. In an opinion piece for Ostasiatischer Lloyd in 1909, an 
unnamed business leader reminded his readers, “the economic basis of the colony lies in 
the trade with German goods produced and sold by German businesses. The lion’s share 
of this now is with the Chinese.” Consequently, he exhorted, “it is the duty of the 
merchants and companies to urge the government to use caution and restore the 
privileges we once had…the time is now!”489   
 Despite the discontent expressed by some of the parties directly tied to the 
colony’s success, Tirpitz was able to deflect any criticism and secure continued support 
for the navy’s way of managing the colony. In addressing the Reichstag following one of 
the many debates on state support for the colony, Tirpitz told the assembled 
representatives, “in my opinion, and that of the Reichsmarineamt, the economic 
development of Tsingtau has proceeded much faster than expected. Just yesterday I 
informed his majesty [Kaiser Wilhelm II] that, after fifteen years of existence, the British 
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still debated whether they should abandon the island [Hong Kong], while Tsingtau, after 
only eleven years, is now one the most prominent treaty ports in all of China.”490 
By the time Tsingtau and the Kiaochow Leasehold fell to a joint British-Japanese 
military force in late 1914, Tsingtau had grown from an isolated fishing village into a 
major port and leading industrial center in China. Between an efficient administration 
and up-to-date facilities for transportation, communication, and banking, industry had 
begun to flourish. Although many of the navy’s original plans for industry in the colony 
did not reach fruition, Germany investment in the colony was trending in a positive 
direction. German goods and services from Tsingtau were some of the finest available 
and were in high demand locally and abroad.  Germans themselves generated profitable 
returns in multiple industries, foreign investment and trade was on the rise, and the 
Chinese population also actively participated in the colony’s commercial and industrial 
development. While not every capital venture was a financial success, German investors, 
with their capital, skills, personnel, equipment, and international connections, brought a 
particular vision of economic modernization to Tsingtau that had legacies in the city’s 
history and identity. Indeed, by 1931, the last full year before war with Japan began, 
Tsingtau had grown into the fourth most important port in China.491 
  
                                                 
490 Stenographische Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages, 1909-1910, 27 March 1909, p. 
7776. 
491 Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism, p. 258. 
 250 
CHAPTER VI  
CREATING GERMAN IMPERIALISTS: THE EDUCATION OF, AND 
CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON, TSINGTAU’S RESIDENTS 
 
 On 25 October 1909, eighty-five Chinese males aged thirteen to eighteen 
attended the opening ceremonies for the newly constructed Deutsch-Chinesische 
Hochschule (German-Chinese College) in Tsingtau.  Selected from more than two 
hundred nominees from across China, these Chinese youths would constitute the first 
class of students at what the Naval Colonial Administration hoped would become the 
crowning achievement in the educational development of the leasehold, and the keystone 
in the education of Chinese elites in the German sphere of influence.  The opening of an 
advanced school would thus further the plans of the naval administration in creating a 
different type of colony from those established elsewhere in Germany, a German Hong 
Kong that was more in line with a liberal, commercial settlement in which native elites 
would play a prominent role in the life of the colony and be stronger advocates for 
German interests in China and the rest of East Asia.  After some initial difficulties 
bringing some of the “foreign” teachers in line with the school’s mission, the college 
began to flourish, marking a further step in the transformation of Tsingtau into the 
cultural and commercial center that many Germans in East Asia envisioned. 
 This chapter explores the origins of the German-Chinese College and its 
establishment as an excellent example of the German colonial project in China writ 
large. The lens of education provides one of the best examples of the shift in colonial 
policy towards Bildungsauftrag and of bringing the German Hong Kong model to bear. 
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Within that vision, however, existed considerable tension. At one level, there existed 
Sinophile Germans that believed the only way Tsingtau could surpass Hong Kong was 
by creating a Chinese elite capable of moving between both cultures and defending 
German interests in China and the Far East. At the same time, however, persistent fears 
of the “Yellow Peril” and doubts about a decadent and deteriorating ancient culture 
empowered a seemingly stronger group that wanted to foster a local elite that could help 
with the tasks necessary to keep the colony going, but little else. Not only was this 
anxiety racially based, but cultural as well. From the type of instruction offered, to who 
should attend each school, and what career paths students should pursue, no policy 
decision came without debate, protest, negotiation, and compromise. This chapter shows 
that the college was an integral part of the local administration’s vision for Tsingtau and 
that it represented a logical and crucially important advancement in the growth of the 
colony and the development of an imperial elite that would help further German interests 
abroad. 
 Although formally established in 1908, the roots of the German-Chinese College 
date back to the establishment of Tsingtau as a Germany colony, as a result of the 
successful creation of a number of lower-level schools within the German sphere of 
influence. From traditional Chinese clan schools to elementary, missionary, and trade 
schools, the educational system in the Leasehold flourished.  In many cases, missionary 
groups, such as the Weimar and Berlin Missions, originally founded these schools, but, 
over time, the colonial government gradually assumed control. As a result, the naval 
government reduced the emphasis on the teachings of a specific Christian faith—these 
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lessons were left to extracurricular activities—and instead sought to expand the overall 
curriculum and rigors of the academic content, in order to give the native population “a 
good education in the Chinese classics, within the framework of a thorough German 
education system.”492 
 From the earliest days of the colony, the naval administration gave considerable 
attention to the education of its residents, supporting the establishment of numerous 
lower-level schools. To administrators in Berlin and Tsingtau, a commitment to 
education was key to progress and prosperity, as it would foster a new generation of 
colonial leaders that would perpetuate the colonial leadership’s vision of a German Hong 
Kong. That the Chinese shared this view and had a long tradition of education led the 
naval administration to see vast potential in the local populace, so long as this ancient 
tradition could be closely tied to a more “advanced” German system of education. As a 
result, the naval government embraced providing a variety of education opportunities 
and alternatives for the local Chinese and German expatriate populations to choose from. 
In spite of the naval government’s wishes, however, it had to contend with the 
sinophobic sentiments of the merchant and middle classes, as well as the increasingly 
racist attitudes of German colonists.   
 According to a special supplement to the 1906 Denkschrift, early efforts to 
acquire financial support for creating a unified system of formal education fell short, 
despite the fact that leadership within the leasehold realized very quickly the benefits of 
such a plan. The reluctance to commit large quantities of money and resources partly 
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stemmed from the fact that there appeared to be little demand for developing the existing 
educational structures. Early surveys taken of the population indicated a sufficient 
number of traditional temple and clan schools were in operation to tend to the local 
population. Of roughly 246 clan, family, or temple schools that existed at the time of the 
this Denkschrift, 175 had been established within the first eight years of the colony’s 
founding.493 Nevertheless, as the Chinese Empire began to change in response to its 
domination by the West as well as the realization that the once-proud kingdom had 
fallen into disarray, calls for new methods of learning and teaching in the government 
schools began to grow increasingly loud. The leasehold government was certainly 
willing to recognize these demands and responded by establishing schools that turned 
away from a heavy emphasis on rote memorization of classical Confucian texts.  
 The first such school that offered a German-style education to Chinese students 
was established within the first year of the German occupation of Tsingtau. Although 
established by the colonial government, the school was placed under the aegis of the 
Berlin Mission, one of the missionary organizations that had a strong presence in 
Shantung for several decades prior to the German seizure of Tsingtau. The type of 
learning that took place in this German-Chinese school was relatively basic and limited, 
as the colonial administration founded the school for pragmatic reasons. Needing 
members of the native population to act as go-betweens with Chinese officials as 
Germany began to consolidate its presence in the Leasehold as well as to acclimate mid-
level workers to the demands of German and standards of German employers, 
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establishing some sort of a school for this type of training made great sense. Classes 
offered at the school, then, were held in German, and were designed specifically to 
“discipline [the Chinese]…and train translators for the Imperial Navy and colonial 
government.”494 Although limited in its scope and methodology, establishing a school of 
this type so early in the colony’s history provided an important foundation for the 
development of a variety of opportunities for the Chinese population to receive an 
education. 
 As the colonial government wished to provide the local Chinese population with 
a variety of choices when it came to developing the colony and the province of 
Shantung, abandoning the old style of education and replacing it with something new 
seemed to fit well with German interests. The need to develop a new system of learning 
meant that more “modern” theories of education could be introduced, something which 
Germany had become a leader in over the latter part of the nineteenth century. There 
existed considerable space, then, to introduce the local Chinese to German customs, 
traditions, practices, ideas, views, and interests. Nevertheless, the change to a German-
style form of education was implemented slowly, initially only at the most basic and 
elementary levels before seeing wider application in the years after 1905. 
 Initially, much of the impetus for building schools and educating the Chinese 
came from the strong missionary presence in Shantung, particularly the Weimar, Berlin, 
and Steyl (SVD) missions. These religious organizations were responsible for the 
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establishment of schools prior to the colonial administration’s decision to make 
education a point of emphasis in the Leasehold, providing the structure upon which the 
colonial leaders built. Although the Catholic SVD remained committed to its stated goals 
of providing Christian instruction and conversion, the missionary leadership of the two 
Protestant organizations placed a reduced emphasis on teaching the Christian faith, 
instead focusing on secular training.495 Of the two, the more liberal Weimar Mission 
made the largest contribution to secular education. Founded in 1884 by theology 
professors and pastors, the Weimar Mission (officially the General Evangelical-
Protestant Missionary Association, the Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantischer 
Missionsverein) was a liberal, nationalistic religious organization that sought “to 
distance [itself] consciously from the dominant ‘Pietistic’ strand of the [Protestant] 
missionary movement in Germany.”496 Rather than follow the lead of the other 
missionary groups in Shantung and the Leasehold by actively pursuing conversion to 
Christianity, the Weimar Mission adopted the Jesuits’ tactic of seeking influence through 
educated Chinese elites. Consequently, members of the Weimar Mission focused their 
efforts on developing strong ties with Chinese literati, translating notable European and 
American works of literature, and, most importantly, providing secular education to the 
children of high-ranking elites and those in prominent social orders. In putting its 
educational values into practice, the Weimar Mission concentrated its efforts on 
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establishing lower-level elementary schools in the colony. While these schools stayed 
close to the traditional five-year Chinese curriculum, the coursework also provided for 
German language instruction for the last two years of study.497  
 The Weimar Mission was active in the education of the colony’s residents nearly 
from the outset of the German occupation of the Leasehold. Upon the establishment of 
the mission’s station in October 1898, the mission’s founder, Dr. Ernst Faber (a well-
known sinologist and botanist in addition to his service as a missionary), worked closely 
with the colonial government to develop and improve the quality of life in the colony. In 
addition to establishing the first grammar schools, Faber was also responsible for setting 
up the first medical facility in the colony, a field hospital to help treat highly infectious 
diseases such as cholera and dysentery. Although Faber ultimately succumbed to an 
outbreak of cholera in 1899, he left behind a valuable legacy to Tsingtau and a lasting 
influence upon his successor, the sinologist, theologian, and educator, Richard Wilhelm. 
Under Wilhelm’s leadership, the Weimar Mission would continue to play an active role 
in the colony, particularly in the realms of health and education. 
 In addition to the Weimar Mission, the Berlin Mission was also a major player in 
providing educational opportunities in Tsingtau and the Leasehold. While the Berlin 
Mission was also of the Protestant/Lutheran confession, it was less of a “high church” 
organization. Instead, the Berlin Mission chose to focus on evangelizing and 
proselytizing to non-Christians in lower social orders. In addition to ministering to the 
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native Chinese, the Berlin Mission’s members were heavily involved in teaching, and 
were some of the first educators in the Leasehold after the German occupation, first 
arriving in Tsingtau on 15 April 1898. Initially, the Berlin Mission had a close 
relationship with the naval administration, as they helped satisfy a major demand for 
interpreters. Not only did the missionaries themselves serve as interpreters, but they also 
trained local Chinese to fill this role as well. As a result, control of the first “Chinese 
school” established by the colonial government passed into the hands of the Berlin 
Mission. Colonial leaders were quite generous in providing land to the mission for all of 
its hard work in training interpreters and serving as chaplains and pastors for Protestant 
soldiers and civilians in the colony. The Berlin Mission used this land not only to build 
additional schools and housing for teachers (both Chinese and German), but also the first 
church in Tsingtau for Chinese Protestants, completed in 1899.498 
 While the Berlin Mission played an especially prominent role in education in the 
leasehold in the first years of Germany’s official presence in China, its influence with 
the government began to decline in favor of the Weimar Mission. This was the case 
primarily because the Berlin Mission continued to emphasize conversion and the 
Protestant faith, while the Weimar Mission continued to focus on secular training and 
education. As the Berlin Mission began to deemphasize the training of interpreters in the 
Chinese School, the colonial government expressed its clear displeasure, telling its 
supervisors in Berlin that, “the government, which is not agreeable to this, will monitor 
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the situation and will, perhaps, start a second government school again,” and perhaps 
even withdraw full support of the Mission if matters did not improve.499 Somewhat 
chastened by these threats, the Berlin Mission did return to a greater emphasis on secular 
language training, although it was never able to recover fully from the rift with the 
government that had already started to form. Although the Berlin Mission continued to 
build and develop its own schools, the leasehold government slowly began to shift its 
support to the Weimar Mission, particularly in terms of the educational opportunities 
offered in Tsingtau, something the missionaries of the Berlin Mission was glad to leave 
to their Lutheran brethren. 
 Even as the Berlin Mission’s influence waned, it continued to build schools and 
develop its educational institutions. By 1912, the mission had established a seminary, a 
Gymnasium, eighteen elementary schools, and a kindergarten in addition to other less 
formally organized schools.500 At this time, the Berlin Mission’s seminary had produced 
ten graduates from its seminary, twenty-three Chinese teachers, and counted 423 
members of the native population as its students.501 While these schools were a crucial 
part of the educational choices available in Tsingtau, Due to its reduced influence with 
the colonial government, the Berlin Mission chose to focus the majority of its endeavors 
in education to areas outside the Leasehold’s borders, working closely with native 
residents in Shantung and other parts of northwestern China. 
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 The Weimar Mission further contributed to local education by opening the 
Deutsch-Chinesisches Seminar, a Gymnasium for boys, in 1901. Headed by Richard 
Wilhelm, the Seminar emphasized secular education, making it its mission “to give 
students a good education in the Chinese classics, within the framework of a thoroughly 
German education system.”502 The Seminar further united the Chinese and German 
educational models by adopting the curriculum laid out by the provincial government.503 
The instructors for classes in Chinese, math, physics, and chemistry were Chinese, 
whereas Germans taught German, philosophy, geography, and history. Students were 
divided into one of two tracks: the technical-mercantile branch or the civil service 
branch. The former track focused more heavily on practical application and experience, 
although students were expected to receive training in reading and writing Chinese, 
German, and (in rare cases) English.  Basic mathematics, as well as geography, and 
practical science were also taught. The civil service track emphasized preparation for the 
annual provincial exams given at the provincial capital of Tsinan.  High marks in these 
exams would qualify a student for further education at one of the institutions of higher 
learning in China as part of their training to enter the Chinese civil service.  The 
coursework was similar to that of the technical-mercantile branch, but emphasized 
additional language training, as well as more theoretical studies of history, Chinese 
philosophy, and advanced mathematics, science, and geography.504 By 1905, a number 
of students were taking, and passing, the provincial exams.505 Additionally, the Seminar 
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provided training for those students who did not wish to follow either track, but instead 
wished to teach in the colony’s elementary schools. Very quickly, the Seminar achieved 
a strong reputation within the Leasehold, Shantung, and much of northwestern China. In 
relating her personal experiences as a teacher at the Seminar, Luan Baode remembered 
that many prominent Chinese officials and elites sent their sons to the Seminar to receive 
an education.506 Much like the other schools founded in this early period of the colony, 
religion was noticeably absent from the curriculum. 
 In devoting so much effort and attention to a curriculum that emphasized an 
education in traditional Chinese disciplines, Wilhelm asserted that the exchanges 
between European and Chinese cultures should not be thought of as just the transmission 
of a “more advanced” European system of thought and understanding of the world, but 
rather as “an appropriation of our thinking and inner life, both religious and 
scientific…[with all the] contradictions and insufficiencies” that might entail.507 As for 
instruction in Chinese, Wilhelm found the language one of the “most significant literary 
languages,” filled with cultural importance and a valuable tool for learning. As a 
committed Sinophile who found Chinese traditions and history to be worthy of 
admiration, Wilhelm believed that the Chinese language was a crucial element in the 
development of the state and culture, describing the Chinese script as “the containers 
into which a highly gifted people has placed its entire mental labor and the best works of 
its soul for millennia.” While Wilhelm recognized that the most beneficial exchange was 
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infusing German culture into Chinese culture, he also praised those Germans who were 
willing to place their children into the local village schools, where they could obtain an 
excellent foundation in subjects like the teachings of Confucius.508  
As the Gymnasium began to grow, Luan Baode recalled how Wilhelm had 
devised a highly sophisticated program of cultural exchange and interaction, even going 
so far as to prepare necessary textbooks for instruction in subjects like German, history, 
and philosophy that would help the students further integrate the Chinese and German 
cultures.509 In this way, Wilhelm attempted to elucidate a different form of cultural 
imperialism that was subtler and less direct than those espoused by his contemporaries. 
Wilhelm’s belief in the value of Chinese culture ultimately led the colonial scholar and 
writer Paul Rohrbach, the former Settlement Commissioner for German Southwest 
Africa (1903-1906) who had come to Tsingtau in 1908 as an unofficial “cultural 
missionary,” to help Wilhelm establish a Gymnasium for Chinese girls in Tsingtau, the 
Schu-Fan (Shufan) School, in 1910.510 Much like the German-Chinese Seminar, the 
curriculum at the Schu-Fan School represented a combination of Chinese and German 
subjects, with learning in both languages, and was aimed at the daughters of members of 
the local Chinese elite. Furthermore, the Schu-Fan school soughtto provide its students 
with a “model for womanhood” –an idea communicated even by the choice of name for 
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the school—and to train especially talented and intelligent girls to become teachers for 
schools both inside and outside the Leasehold.511 
 Although the Weimar and Berlin Missions established many of the first schools 
in Tsingtau and the Leasehold, missionary leadership generally placed a reduced 
emphasis on teaching the Christian faith, instead focusing, for the most part, on secular 
training. Even as the Berlin Mission came to develop a more religious bent in its 
curricula, both missions sought to provide the Chinese with a broad basic education.512 
This made it easy for the local government to adopt the curriculum of these schools and 
expand the rigors of its academic content as the missionary presence dwindled and 
control over the schools passed into its hands around 1905. Whether students attended 
the Gymnasium run by the Berlin or Weimar Mission, they found considerable success 
passing the examinations required for further education or additional training. While the 
students that passed these exams could choose where they wished to go after graduation, 
a fair number remained in the leasehold to continue their studies or find employment.513 
 As the naval administration became more involved in education in the Leasehold, 
it continued to develop schools with rigorous curricula and training for the local 
population. By supporting this plan to introduce the Chinese to German-style education, 
colonial leaders acted not just from sinophilic interests, but also because many Chinese 
                                                 
511 “Schu-Fan-Schule: Deutsch-Chinesische Mädchenschule zu Tsingtau, Gründungsbericht 1911,” 17 
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youths in Tsingtau acquired a strong command of German very quickly.514 Despite 
occasionally strong opposition to its policies from merchants and low-level government 
officials stationed along the Chinese coast, the naval government found success enacting 
its educational policy. From organizing traditional Chinese clan schools to building 
elementary, missionary, and trade schools, the educational system flourished. While the 
course-work in the lower-level elementary schools still remained close to that of 
traditional Chinese schools, the naval administration had strong interest in making this 
type of basic education readily available. The colonial government opened the first of 
these grammar schools in 1905 and established twenty-seven more schools of this kind 
between 1905 and 1914.515 
 Although the majority of the teachers in these new schools were Germans who 
had received their training either in Germany or at the German-Chinese Teaching 
College that the Weimar Mission established in Tsingtau, older Chinese teachers who 
specialized in the Chinese classics and had strong reputations for their knowledge of 
Confucianism also supplemented their ranks. The Weimar Mission put such a system 
into place largely to help both the new schools and the young teachers gain greater 
acceptance from the sometimes skeptical native populace about the new methods and 
curriculum that had been instituted.516 Over time, however, those with more sinophilic 
interests used this mixed education system to advocate for greater synergy between 
                                                 
514 Reichstag, Minuten 1900-01, p. 2894, BA, R 1001/6548. 
515 “Denkschrift über Einrichtung chinesischen Schulen in Schutzgebiet,” 10 November 1907, QMA, B1-4-
94; Tsingtauer Neueste Nachrichten, 31 March 1912; Weicker, Kiautschou, p. 190. 
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Chinese and German methods of education as they called for the joint education of both 
Chinese and Germans in institutions of higher learning. 
 The naval government’s interest in and support for developing good schools with 
rigorous coursework for the local Chinese and the success of these students reveals a 
great deal about the administration’s vision for Tsingtau. The governing elite showed no 
fear that educating the Chinese would be detrimental or a threat to the existing ruling 
order.  In fact, the Germans in charge saw it quite differently. The fostering of 
educational opportunities reflected a desire to train the Chinese youths to help their own 
people decide for themselves which type of development path to take for the colony, 
and, colonial leaders hoped, China as well.  Indeed, this distinctive educational policy 
was embraced as a counterweight to the demands and desires of the other colonial 
powers in China. Providing the natives which choices regarding education also left 
considerable space for German cultural influences to permeate their everyday lives, as 
many of the instructors were trained in the newest German pedagogical methods.  
Nevertheless, these schools did not completely abandon traditional Chinese teachings, 
instead adopting large parts of the curriculum laid out by the Chinese government in 
Peking as well as incorporating elements of traditional Chinese teachings, providing 
some level of fusion of the modern with the ancient past.  In this way, then, Tsingtau 
could become a wholly German cultural center that emphasized everything that was best 
in its heritage, whether German or Chinese, ancient or modern. 
 In addition to developing the Chinese side of the educational system, the colonial 
administration also had a distinct vision for German children living in East Asia.  As 
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strong as the desire was for transforming Tsingtau into a Chinese educational center, the 
impetus to make it into the preeminent place for the education of German children was 
perhaps even more powerful.  From early on, the naval administration devoted 
considerable time and money to supporting a “German School” in Tsingtau.  The initial 
impetus for founding the school came from a union of interests that included parents of 
young children in the colony, merchants, and colonial and naval leaders, all of whom 
banded together to establish a Schulgemeinde. This organization undertook the 
responsibility for securing a location for the school as well as the hiring of the first 
teachers. The German School officially opened its doors on 12 February 1899, having 
enrolled five students taught by three teachers.517 From administering the school to 
constructing larger school buildings and subsidizing the school’s budget, the local 
government maintained a vested interest in the education of German students.  
 By 1901, barely two years after the first German School was founded, the 
colonial government decided to upgrade the status of the school to that of a 
Realgymnasium, changing the schools name to the Imperial Government School.  
Consequently, students no longer received just a basic education, but rather could choose 
to follow an educational path devoted to classical education or more scientific training.  
Furthermore, this training would not just encompass “German” or “Western” education, 
but would also provide training in the Chinese language and Chinese classical 
literature.518  In this way, the local administration hoped that the German children in the 
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leasehold (and those from other parts of East Asia) could gain valuable perspective on 
the native population, thus allowing them to be more successful in furthering German 
interests once they became more involved in the colony.  Such an argument was a key 
part of a bid from Governor Truppel to push for additional funding from the German 
government in Berlin to support further expansion of the school and its curriculum in 
1905.519  Although the Reichstag was initially hesitant to approve further government 
expenditure for the Government School, additional pressure from Tirpitz and the 
Reichsmarineamt finally convinced Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow to grant a 
government subsidy.520   
 The quick success of the Realgymnasium and the further expansion of the 
curriculum resulted in excluding girls from the school. The first solution to this problem 
was the establishment of an all-girls boarding school by the Roman Catholic Franciscan 
Sisters Mary.521 Although the Sisters welcomed girls of the Protestant faith with open 
arms and promised that questions of religion and faith would not be a central facet of the 
school, Protestant parents still remained uneasy about sending their girls to a convent 
school.522 While Protestant parents did send their girls to the convent school with some 
reluctance and a good deal of protest (particularly after 1905), this problem was rectified 
fairly quickly with the establishment of a government school for girls in 1908.523  
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Consequently, according to Wilhelm Schrameier, Tsingtau now possessed two places 
where Germans could learn about German Kultur and China’s ancient traditions.524 
 The success of both Chinese and German schools in Tsingtau in the early years 
of the German colony played a major role in the establishment of the German-Chinese 
College (Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule) in 1908. The origins of a German institution 
of higher learning in China date back to 1903 when the Sinologist Alfred Forke 
suggested to the Auswärtiges Amt and the Prussian Ministry of Culture that it would be 
to Germany’s advantage to establish a German college in Tsinan.525 The idea for 
founding a college was first proposed in a 1905 report from the Acting Governor of the 
Leasehold, Paul Jacobson, to the Reichsmarineamt.526 Although the document has 
Jacobson’s signature on it, the authorship of this document is uncertain, and recent 
scholarship suggests that Wilhelm Schrameier, influenced by recent conversations with 
Richard Wilhelm, most likely composed the report.527 If Schrameier was indeed the 
author of report as important as this one, it is indicative of the high level of influence 
that China scholars, academics, and related members of the German China interest group 
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most likely author of this document. 
 268 
were able to wield in colonial affairs by 1905. The timing of this report, then, is not 
insignificant, as it was at this time that colonial policy in China began to shift as interest 
in the colony grew and the German Hong Kong vision of empire became more 
prominent. Schrameier’s 1905 proposal was quite comprehensive in its conception of 
Chinese education in the colony. He conceived of a broad-based system of schools that 
would begin at the elementary level and culminate with the best students studying at 
college or university. In doing so, Schrameier argued, Germany could achieve something 
greater than even the British had in Hong Kong. He suggested that, rather than just “be 
limited as [the British] in Hong Kong in seeking out those Chinese students who see 
education only as the tools for an easier life, we should act in a comprehensive manner 
on the [Chinese] mind and character as the means to saturate the entire province, 
Tsingtau and the Shantung hinterland that depends economically on Tsingtau, with 
German knowledge and German spirit [mit deutschem Wissen und deutschem 
Geiste].”528 At the time of this proposal, Schrameier envisioned the highest levels of 
education providing only coursework based on the current curricula employed by 
colleges and universities in Germany; more traditional Chinese education would be 
addressed at the elementary levels. Financial and business interests in the colony also 
lent their support to Jacobsen/Schrameier’s proposal. Shortly after the Reichsmarineamt 
received Jacobsen’s report, Ernst Ohlmer, wrote to his superior, Hermann Freiherr von 
Stengel, the head of the Reichsschatzamt (1903-1908), suggesting that, due to the rapid 
increase of exports from Tsingtau as well as immigration there, founding a technical 
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school in close proximity to Tsingtau would be highly desirable, especially as such a 
school would help strengthen the Shantung region against Japan’s growing influence.529 
Furthermore, the appointed representative of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in China, 
Heinrich Cordes, wrote to Alfons Mumm von Schwartzenstein, the German Ambassador 
to China (1900-1909), suggesting that a technical college in Tsingtau would defy 
Japanese efforts to extend control and influence over Shantung and the northwestern 
regions of China.530 
 One of the major motivating factors for the establishment of the college, in fact, 
stemmed from a crisis arising over the admission of Chinese students to the German 
schools.  In 1906, Li Hsinen desired that his two sons attend the Realgymnasium in order 
to provide them with the best education possible.  Li was a prominent member of the 
local Chinese elite in the Leasehold, serving as the editor of Kiaochow Pau, one of 
Kiaochow’s Chinese language newspapers, as well as the foreign liaison for the 
Hamburg-based civil engineering company C. Vering.531 While the local government 
administration was fully supportive of Li’s request (in fact, they encouraged Li to have 
his sons sit for the entrance examination), many members of the German middle class in 
Tsingtau vehemently opposed this. They filled the editorial pages of the Tsingtauer 
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Neueste Nachrichten with letters to the editor: “by admitting Chinese students,” one 
letter read, “‘German’ identity would be polluted.” Quoting Wilhelm II, another 
exhorted its readers to “guard your German ways and character, your most holy 
possessions.”532 The newspaper itself-which had always fashioned itself as the voice of 
business interests and the middle class-supported these views, publishing editorials 
denigrating the colonial government’s desire to have Chinese students admitted to the 
German schools. In one such editorial, the newspaper presented a list of all of the 
Chinese schools established by German officials (either government or missionary) and 
then asked 
is the German side not doing enough? Do our Chinese ‘friends’ have even the 
smallest cause to have demands for more from us? They now observe the utmost 
restraint towards the activities of German colonists in the higher Chinese 
schools…can they demand more of us than we can possibly give in consideration 
of the education of our own youths in Tsingtau?533 
 
The colonial government defended its decision in the pages of the Tsingtauer Neueste 
Nachrichten, claiming that, as Chinese elites saw the benefits and superiority of German 
education, they would also desire this for their children. Furthermore, colonial leaders 
argued, as they were only considering allowing the children of elites to enter the German 
schools, the number of Chinese students would be limited, and these children were far 
removed from the character and habits of Chinese servants and coolies. Educating the 
children of elites with a German curriculum would also fulfill the desires of German 
businesses and organizations with heavy investment in China to see promising Chinese 
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youths receive an education in Germany. Finally, and perhaps mostly importantly, 
supporters of the naval administration pointed out that Li Hsinen (the man whose actions 
sparked the whole controversy) was in fact educated at a university in Germany and was 
the epitome of what they hoped the education of Chinese youths in German schools 
would achieve. This plan, the colonial leaders argued, would ensure the creation of 
German-educated Chinese interlocutor class that would defend and support German 
interests not only at the provincial level, but also at the highest levels of the Chinese civil 
administration in Peking.534 
 Nevertheless, the colonial administration remained undeterred in its attempts to 
expose the Chinese to German culture in such a way that they could study and imitate 
the German example, providing the native population with a key place in the 
development of Tsingtau and the Leasehold in the process. If it would be too difficult for 
the German population to accept Chinese children attending the same school as their 
own, then the government would find other opportunities for the native population to 
pursue higher education. 
 Although it was not yet possible in 1906 for a Chinese youth to ascend to the 
highest level of education in Tsingtau, the colonial government, with support from 
missionary organizations and major industry representatives, was able to provide a 
variety of educational choices for the native population. These included three girls’ 
schools, four trade schools (the Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft Repair Works, the 
Naval Dockyard School, the Roman Catholic Railway School, and the Chinese-German 
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Silk Industries Corporation school), and six elementary schools.535 These educational 
opportunities certainly provided their students with a solid foundation in the most 
important subjects (and often teaching the skills necessary for a specialized trade) while 
also introducing them to some of the benefits of German Kultur. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of these schools in leveraging German influence in the colony and 
leasehold to the benefit of furthering German power and prestige was still somewhat 
limited, even as officials grew increasingly sinophilic after 1905. 
 The impetus for change in the advanced education of native elites came from a 
surprising source: Arthur Graf Rex, Mumm’s replacement as the Ambassador to China 
(1906-1911).  Rex, along with his colleague and successor as Generalkonsul in 
Shanghai, Wilhelm Knappe, was a strong advocate of pursuing an active and engaged 
cultural policy in China in order to strengthen Germany’s economic and political power 
in China and East Asia. Rex and Knappe both wrote numerous reports to their superiors 
at the Auswärtiges Amt about founding German educational institutions in China, 
campaigning vigorously to raise public interest in such projects. In 1906, for example, 
Knappe gave a speech to the German-Asiatic Society in Berlin about establishing a 
medical school in Shanghai, as well as a gymnasium-level school that would provide 
Chinese students with the knowledge and language skills to study at German 
universities.536  
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 Normally at odds with the Leasehold government, Rex saw an excellent 
opportunity for utilizing Tsingtau’s position to further German interests in East Asia by 
building a German-Chinese university in the colony.537  In a 1907 report to his superiors 
at the Auswärtiges Amt concerning the education of Chinese students in Japan, Rex 
argued that it would be  
a grave mistake not to use the occupation of Kiaochow on a large scale.  If we do 
not teach the Chinese western Kultur, then some other country will teach 
theirs…A high school, a technical school, or a trade school should, in my 
opinion, be established immediately…The Chinese wish to learn, they will, then 
use the opportunity offered them in Tsingtau.538 
 
Rex’s desire to develop some form of institute of higher learning for the Chinese 
stemmed from the fact that more and more educated Chinese elites exhibited a strong 
aversion to studying at foreign universities. Consequently, he believed the time was right 
to exploit this sentiment and leverage the German presence in China to create a more 
modern, western ruling class that would exhibit great sympathy to, and support for, 
German interests in China and Asia.539 In February 1907, Rex had preliminary 
discussions with the head of the Chinese Ministry for Education, Zhang Zhidong (1904-
1909), about the university project, and found Zhang enthusiastic. Consequently, Rex 
vocally campaigned for the creation of an educational center in Tsingtau.540  
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 Truppel and the rest of the colonial administration in Tsingtau responded 
favorably to Rex’s suggestions.  Both Schrameier, and Truppel were open to establishing 
a German school for Chinese in the Leasehold, but initially believed a school that 
directly served the colony’s interests (such as a marine academy) would be a better 
option. Although Schrameier supported establishing a college in principle, he worried 
that the financial risks of such an undertaking would outweigh the benefits, particularly 
since the Reichstag had recently cut back on the number of imperial subsidies it would 
grant the colony.541 This reduction in imperial grants was the result of a general fiscal 
belt-tightening by the imperial government following a worldwide financial crisis in 
1905-1906. As part of its plan to reduce its financial commitments, the Reichstag voted 
to reduce expenditures abroad and encourage its colonies to be more self-sufficient.542 
Nevertheless, supporters of a German-Chinese university continued to push the German 
government for the necessary support. In explaining the importance of this education 
project to Chancellor von Bülow and the need for the Reichstag to grant additional 
funding to this undertaking, Rex asserted, “the college in Tsingtau is…an undertaking 
that would bring an enormous economic advantage to Germany.”543 
 To Schrameier and Rex, the most logical answer was to establish a school based 
on “foreign” universities established elsewhere in China, particularly the University of 
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Hong Kong.544 In response to Rex’s suggestion and Schrameier’s enthusiastic support-by 
1910 Schrameier was calling the German-Chinese College the “cornerstone of 
Germany’s ‘influence policy [Beeinflussungspolitik]’ in China545-Tirpitz immediately 
approved this proposal, viewing it as directly in line with the Imperial Navy’s vision of a 
German Hong Kong.546 Tirpitz even went so far as to endorse this course of action to 
Chancellor von Bülow, telling him,  
for my part, I have been considering such ideas for a number of years, [and], in 
fact, I intend, for the purposes of the political considerations already mentioned 
by the Envoy [Rex], to go ahead and provide immediately the necessary 
administrative support from the Leasehold in order to create an educational 
institution on a greater scale in the interests of our influence in China.547  
 
Recognizing the significance of the effect that such an institution could have in 
advancing German interests in East Asia, Tirpitz emphasized the significance of working 
with the Chinese government on this project, writing, 
It also seems especially important as a prerequisite for the viability and 
especially the desired political effectiveness of the planned educational 
institution that, from the outset, the Chinese central government as well as the 
most important provincial governors understand clearly the intentions and 
advantages of the planned institutions and become interested in the same, that 
they allocate suitable school materials and, as far as possible, contribute directly 
to the recognition of subsequent examinations in Tsingtau and the subsequent 
advancement of local students. Furthermore, I would consider it acceptable and 
even desirable to permit responsible Chinese authorities to be responsible in the 
preparation of the curriculum, etc., from the very beginning.548 
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In his vision for this new educational facility, Tirpitz outlined the importance of 
including certain branches of education in the school-a Realschule, a technical school 
that included departments for shipbuilding, machine-building, engineering, railroad 
engineering and mining, a school of medicine, schools of forestry and agriculture, and, 
finally a school of law-all of which would contribute directly to building a German-
educated interlocutor class capable of advancing German interests. In this way then, 
Tirpitz argued, “the most direct political influence would come from this educational 
institution.”549 Furthermore, Tirpitz believed that the establishment of a university in 
Tsingtau would also bring about long-desired economic advantages.550  
 The 1906-1907 Denkschrift emphasized the assessments of Tirpitz, Rex, 
Schrameier, and other supporters, stating that a strong investment in education was a 
“cultural undertaking that the other powers [Mächte] had taken up only in part for 
several years on a modest scale.” Coupled with the favorable reaction to the German 
educational system by the Chinese Study Commission that toured Europe in 1906, 
establishing a school of higher learning in Tsingtau was “a field of operations in which 
Germany could expect fruitful results in every respect.” Consequently, such a venture in 
developing the cultural life of Tsingtau would provide “proof that Tsingtau is meant to 
be a center for all forms of peaceful German aspirations in East Asia in amicable 
agreement with Chinese authorities.” This project would be the first of many that, the 
Denkschrift asserted, would provide the Chinese with examples of German know-how 
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that they would find useful in sharing some management of the Tsingtau and the 
Leasehold.551 
 Although the initial desire was to provide a fully Western education to Chinese 
students, views on China and its culture were already shifting at both the local and 
higher levels of government, paving the way for an educational institution that could 
accomplish much more. In one of his memoranda to the Auswärtiges Amt in early 1908 
about the proposed idea of a German-Chinese university, Rex reported that “the entire 
population wants to civilize [sic] modernize itself.”552 That Rex stated that the Chinese 
were interested in “modernizing” rather than “civilizing” represents a significant 
departure from earlier envoys like Heyking and Ketteler in terms of their perceptions of 
China. German officials serving the Foreign Ministry in China no longer viewed the 
Chinese as decadent and barbaric, but rather as a people who had once been at the 
pinnacle of civilization and were still capable of joining the Western world, once 
properly brought up to speed. The unity of purpose expressed in Peking, Tsingtau, and 
Berlin is a strong indication of the dramatic shift in policy taking place that would 
ultimately lead to the development of Tsingtau into a German Hong Kong that had 
already begun in 1904. 
 Given the title of Special Commissioner (Sonderkommisar) and tasked by the 
naval administration to help negotiate the establishment of a “model” university in 
Tsingtau, Dr. Otto Franke, the legation-secretary at the Chinese embassy in Berlin and a 
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professor of Chinese history at the University of Berlin, sent numerous reports to 
Truppel concerning the success of the British-founded Hong Kong University.553  In 
these dispatches, Franke discussed the ways in which the university’s board of directors 
secured funding from the native and colonial governments, the overall curriculum, and 
the ways in which the university benefited British interests abroad – all matters of 
extreme importance to the German ruling elite that supported the foundation of a 
university.554 This movement for developing the education of Chinese in Tsingtau 
coincided with an increasing desire to find new ways to achieve German geopolitical 
goals beyond military and diplomatic might. That is, to make use of the principles of 
Bildungsauftrag: to achieve German aims by modernizing and enhancing Chinese 
culture.    
 In negotiating the creation of the new school of higher education in Tsingtau, 
Franke quickly discovered that the native elite shared the colonial government’s interest 
in this project.  As the colonial government began its project, the central government in 
Peking was also in the middle of reforming the Chinese education system, a process that 
had begun with a series of reforms in 1904-1905, when Zhang Zhidong was just starting 
his tenure as the Minister of Education. As part of these reforms, Zhang called for the 
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Franke began meeting with Zhang Zhidong to discuss the parameters of the new university in Tsingtau, 
both the Auswärtiges Amt and the embassy in Peking tried to assert its authority over Franke. In response, 
Tirpitz attempted to portray Franke as an official representative (Landesbeamter) of the Leasehold. In the 
end, however, the Auswärtiges Amt claimed victory, forcing Tirpitz to abandon his efforts. Stichler, Das 
Gouvernerment Jiaozhou, 268ff. 
554 Copies of these reports can be found in BA-MA, RM 3/7001. Included in these documents is a copy of 
the 1905-1907 course catalog from the University of Hong Kong.  The catalog itself is filled with 
marginalia from both Truppel and Tirpitz relating to the topics mentioned above. 
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phasing out of repeated examinations of civil servants based purely on the knowledge of 
ancient Chinese texts in favor of a more modern system of national degree-granting 
universities.555 Zhang’s efforts were largely responsible for laying out the foundations 
for the opening of the modern Nanjing University.556 In his report on the foundation of a 
German-Chinese university, Franke stated that the Chinese officials such as Zhang 
expressed a clear desire for “a German model institute for higher scientific education.  
Later they could use this example to change the still developing higher education 
system, still in its early stages of development.”557  In reporting to the head of the 
Chinese State Council (i.e. the chief advisors to the Emperor) on the status of the 
negotiations for the establishment of an institution of higher learning, Zhang expressed 
clearly the value and importance of this project: “the establishment of this institution will 
greatly benefit the future of our educational system. It also can be used for diplomatic 
purposes.”558 That local officials were strongly vested in this project spurred the 
Leasehold government to think even bigger about what an institution of higher education 
could accomplish.  The crisis over the admission of children of Chinese elites to the 
Realgymnasium was still fresh in the minds of Truppel and his associates, and it seemed 
                                                 
555 William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971). In contemporary German documents Zhang Zhidong’s name is rendered as Chang Chih 
Tung. 
556 One of the oldest and most prestigious institutions of higher learning in China today, the earliest origins 
of Nanjing University date to 258 A.D., when it was established by Emperor Sun Xiu of the Eastern Wu 
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557 Otto Franke, “Die deutsch-chinesische Hochschule in Tsingtao, ihre Vorgeschichte, ihre Einrichtung 
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558 Zhang Zhidong, Minister of Education, to the Chief Minister of the State Council, 14 August 1909, 
First Historical Archive-Peking, Qingdai junji zouzhe dang (Reports to the Great State Council in the 
Qing Period), Number 179643. 
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that an institution of higher learning would be the perfect way to circumvent the narrow-
minded opposition of the local middle classes and allow the German’s ruling elite to 
continue to pursue its long-term vision for Tsingtau and the Leasehold.  The timing was 
right to take another step forward in enriching the cultural life of the colony.559 
 This interest in the establishment of a thoroughly modern and western university 
was somewhat of a departure from what Rex had imagined.  Rex’s vision for an institute 
of higher learning in Tsingtau was much simpler and more basic: the establishment of a 
technical school that would train Chinese how to work German machinery employed in 
local industries important to Germany.  The naval government in Tsingtau, agreeing 
with von Tirpitz’s original vision for a college and influenced by Richard Wilhelm and 
other German intellectuals, saw the prospects of a new school differently. Falling in line 
with German policy vis-à-vis the school project, Rex explained to Zhang in a meeting on 
15 February 1908 that the German government was “anxious to introduce, through 
Tsingtau, German culture to the Chinese, [and] that we [the German government] hope 
that, through the association of the Germans of Tsingtau with China, we might begin [to 
establish] a closer economic and intellectual exchange between both lands.”560 
 Following Franke’s discussions with Chinese officials in Tsingtau and the 
provincial capital at Tsinan, the Leasehold government agreed to the construction of the 
Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule. The college would combine the colonial 
government’s new program of cultural interaction and fusion with the educational 
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reforms that Zhang, who had served as the point person in the Chinese government’s 
negotiations with the naval administration, had proposed. With these basic principles 
established, Franke and Zhang Zhidong entered into more detailed discussions about the 
Hochschule at the end of May 1908.561 Although Zhang was readily willing to make 
concessions about the enrollment of students and how degrees would be recognized, he 
and Franke also engaged in protracted discussions about such key issues as the exact 
location of the school, how it would be organized, and also its status as both a foreign 
university and within the hierarchy of Chinese schools of higher learning.562 As a result, 
both sides were forced to compromise and make concessions on several key points.  
 For Franke and the Germans, the two most important points were that China 
would share in providing financial support for the school, and that graduates of the 
college received degrees that would be regarded as on par with those awarded by foreign 
(European or American) universities.563 Zhang and his representatives foresaw no 
difficulties in convincing the Chinese government to provide 40,000 marks for the 
establishment of the school as well as an additional 40,000 marks annually for the next 
ten years to help offset its operating costs; if the college proved to be a success, the 
Chinese government would consider increasing this allocation.  
                                                 
561 Franke, “Die deutsch-chinesische Hochschule,” p. 204. 
562 In the first meeting between Franke and Zhang, Zhang and his representatives were quite insistent that 
the new school not be located in Tsingtau, but rather in Shantung’s provincial capital, Tsinan. When, in a 
subsequent meeting, Franke explained that this point was not up for negotiation, the Chinese delegates, as 
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importance; Franke to Tirpitz, 18 July 1908, BA, R9208/1258. 
563 Ibid. 
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 While Franke was pleased by this development, he found that ensuring the new 
school’s status would be equal to that of a foreign university would be much more 
difficult. Although there existed solid legal grounding for denying the new school the 
title of “university” according to imperial statutes, Franke also surmised that, due to 
Zhang’s “treasured memory of the old literary examination system, [Zhang believed] 
Peking, and only Peking, could have a school with the privileged title of Imperial 
‘University,’ to which all ‘colleges [Hochschulen]’ in the country had to send their 
students.”564 Such a contention raised grave concerns on the part of Franke. For, if this 
new German-Chinese institution were to be granted a status equal only to other 
“colleges” in China, “a graduate must, if [for example] he wants to acquire a degree in 
literature, first apply for admission to the ‘university [the Imperial University of 
Peking],’ which has the sole authority to grant a degree; then, he must submit a degree 
audit.” This consequently, granted an unequal advantage to students who studied the 
same subjects at foreign universities, as they were eligible simply to take an examination 
to have their degree recognized.565 While there was perhaps some truth to Franke’s 
suspicions about Zhang’s motivation for not granting the new school the title of 
“university,” Zhang’s reasons had solid grounding as well, namely that there existed, in 
his opinion, “a serious risk that the basic knowledge of Chinese subjects would be 




insufficient…resulting in the province teeming with graduates unfit…to pursue further 
study [at the Imperial University] or be entrusted with an important civil service post.”566 
 Nevertheless, despite Chinese objections to such an important point for Franke 
and the German representatives, the two sides were able to reach a compromise. 
Although Franke had to concede that the new school in Tsingtau would not be 
recognized as a “university” by the Chinese government, he received assurances from 
Zhang that graduated who were unwilling or unable to attend the Imperial University of 
Peking would be eligible to enter the civil service and that they would receive equal 
consideration for such posts, a promise that Zhang made sure to emphasize in his report 
back to the Emperor’s Council of State.567 Despite the fact that such a concession 
seemed to be a major defeat, Franke was quick to point out that Zhang left this point 
open for further debate. Since China was still very much in the process of reforming and 
modernizing its educational policies, there was a high likelihood that the school’s 
official status could be enhanced or amended. Furthermore, as Franke reminded Tirpitz, 
“this institution has already received privileges that no other foreign educational 
institution in China has, which includes the only school so far to receive any state 
accreditation at all, the Anglo-American Union Medical College in Peking, which was 
established on a much smaller scale.”568 As a result, the Deutsch-Chinesische 
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Hochschule was granted the title “Institution of Higher Learning for Advanced Studies 
with Special Character,” in recognition of the school’s function and its special rights.569 
 The other major point of contention that arose concerned the organization of the 
college, both administratively and in terms of the composition of the faculty. Zhang was 
quite pleased with the fact that missionaries would not play an active role in the 
educational program and that Chinese subjects would have an established place in the 
curriculum, policies that did not exist in any other foreign-established schools in 
China.570 Although he agreed that schools of higher education in China needed to be 
“reorganized according to German models and rely on German teachers,” Zhang was 
firm in his conviction that Chinese teachers be responsible for instruction in “purely 
Chinese sciences.”571 Consequently, he found it disconcerting that the Chinese exercised 
no control over the school or in the teaching of classes. According to Franke’s original 
proposal, those individuals that would be responsible for overseeing the new school 
would be nominated by the German Government and the Chinese government would 
have no input in the selection process. Furthermore, during the administration of the civil 
service examinations, representatives of the Chinese Ministry of Education would be 
present only as proctors. Zhang felt that both of these points in the German proposal 
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“contradicted the principles of our ministry,” and posed a serious risk of producing 
graduates that would be unfit for holding any positions of authority within the civil 
service or in the colony or provinces.572 As a result, the Chinese officials insisted on the 
appointment of a Chinese director of the school, even if it meant that he would share 
equal responsibility with one appointed by the German government as well. 
 A lively debate followed concerning the appointment of a Chinese co-director of 
the school, as both sides were initially unwilling the compromise. Franke, in accordance 
with earlier instructions from Tirpitz, found it wholly “unacceptable for the Chinese to 
have direct participation in the management and administration of the institution.”573 
While it is possible that a part of this reaction was influenced by racist fears of the Gelbe 
Gefahr, the attitudes of Franke and Tirpitz towards the Hochschule (not to mention to 
strong sinophilic impulse that had existed since at least 1905) and its importance to 
building a stronger relationship with the Chinese makes this unlikely. Rather, it was 
more practical concerns relating to the day-to-day running of the institution that were at 
the forefront of Franke’s mind. As this was a German project intended primarily to 
advance German aims, Franke and his superiors would certainly prefer not to have to 
share power with others who may not share the exact same visions or aims. 
 Nevertheless, in order to garner the financial and institutional support necessary 
to ensure the success of the school, Franke agreed to share administrational 
responsibilities with native elites in Tsinan.  While the day-to-day management of the 
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college fell to a representative of the colonial government in Tsingtau, officials in Tsinan 
appointed an Inspector of Studies that was in charge of supervising the Chinese teachers, 
as well as the performance and behavior of the students. Furthermore, the governor of 
Shantung appointed the teachers of any subjects in Chinese and the Tsinan Ministry of 
Education had the final say in approving German teachers.  The ministry was also in 
charge of the rigorous process of selecting which students would be allowed to attend 
the Hochschule every year.  In exchange, officials in Peking and Tsinan granted full 
approval to the more “modern” curriculum proposed by the German government.574  
This had the added benefit of giving the new school greater legitimacy in the eyes of 
Chinese elites and reassured applicants, particularly those that lived within the German 
sphere of influence, that they would still be able to attain entry into the employment of 
the Chinese government, whether in Shantung, the Leasehold itself, or in another 
province.  
 The school would offer a variety of high-level coursework and opportunities that 
fit well with the Naval Administration’s vision for Tsingtau: to present a variety of 
models for the Chinese to choose from and imitate as they worked in tandem with 
Germans in pursuit of their interests.  The plan for the college did not come without 
some compromise, however.  While Truppel and Franke had hoped that Germans and 
Chinese would attend school together, the trade houses and businessmen again raised 
objections that drew the attention of both Chinese elites in Tsinan and in the Reichstag. 
Consequently, Truppel and his supporters agreed that the new college would not be 
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comprised of an ethnically mixed population.  Rather, the Realgymnasium would 
continue to provide a high-quality advanced education to German students and the new 
Hochschule would see to the needs of qualified Chinese students.575 
 The college was divided into two branches: a lower division that provided a six-
year curriculum that would prepare students for entry into the higher division, where 
they would focus on one of four courses of study: jurisprudence, medicine, engineering, 
or forestry and agriculture.  While in the lower division, students’ coursework mirrored 
that of the best universities in Germany, but also conformed to the requirements of the 
Chinese Imperial school system.  As a result, Chinese students would receive an 
excellent modern education, while also still being able to meet the qualifications for 
entering the Chinese civil service should they choose to do so.  In addition to the study 
of Chinese and Chinese classics, students took required courses in English, German 
language and literature, history, geography, mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology, 
zoology, botany, health science, and geology.  Although there was no specific language 
requirement to enter the school, students were expected to master German quickly 
thorough three years of intensive study; all lectures, with the exception of the Chinese 
classes were conducted in German.576  After the six-year curriculum was completed, 
students sat for an examination given by a representative of the Tsinan Ministry of 
Education.  Successful completion of the exam allowed students to continue to the upper 
division of the Hochschule, attempt to transfer to a different college or university, or 
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pursue a variety of career paths.  Most students, however, chose to continue their studies 
in Tsingtau.577  After four to five years of study in one of the four university-level fields, 
students were able to sit for the hsü-jen examinations in Peking, which would qualify 
them for entry into the civil service and other high-ranking occupations as members of 
the Chinese elite.578   
 One of the appeals of the new college curriculum was the practical training 
offered in the upper division, which was a key facet of the Leasehold government’s 
overall plan and vision for the colony.  During their final semester at the Hochschule, 
students were brought to various parts of the Leasehold and the province of Shantung 
itself in order to observe firsthand the types of problems they would confront and need to 
resolve.579  In this way, the members of the new generation of the native elite would gain 
valuable practical experience and training as well as develop a greater awareness of local 
problems such that they might be more likely to remain in the province and Leasehold 
and work closely with the German administration in furthering the growth and 
development of Tsingtau, Kioachow, and Shantung. 
 The Hochschule officially opened its doors to eighty-five students in 1909 and, 
after some initial difficulties related to the teachers imported from Germany—three of 
the original eleven teachers struggled to accept that the Chinese students should be 
taught/trained just like German ones—the school saw rapid success.  By spring 1911, the 
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to a local branch of the Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft to view machines and equipment. 
 289 
school had expanded the number of teachers from fifteen to twenty-three and the number 
of enrollees had expanded to 170.580  Additionally, the college received a number of 
upgrades to its facilities, particularly in the construction of medical laboratories 
(including a brand new bacteriology lab), libraries, a teaching hospital, and even an 
observatory, most of which was subsided in part of by the governments in Tsingtau and 
Berlin.581  Furthermore, German industries also generously donated teaching materials, 
equipment for technical training, and other objects to the college’s permanent 
collections.  Although this was a major boon to the students, Chinese businessmen also 
found these new collections to be extremely useful, as many would visit the Hochschule 
to consult materials and discuss their use and practical application.582  In the following 
academic year, the number of attendees at the college grew to 318, even though the 
school had only planned to house 250.  Many students that had been admitted, in fact, 
had to be turned away temporarily, and encouraged to return the following semester, 
once the annual examinations thinned the student population.  While the plan never 
came to fruition due to the advent of World War I, Governor Meyer-Waldeck had put a 
plan into motion that would result in further expansion of the college so that it could 
accommodate at least 500 students.583 
 Similar to the way in which war interrupted the expansion of the Hochschule, the 
success of the graduates is somewhat difficult to track, since many of them saw their 
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careers interrupted, particularly if they remained within the Leasehold during the 
colony’s surrender.  Nevertheless, evidence suggests that a number of graduates did 
extremely well and that the college was successful.  Supporters of the German colony 
championed the Hochschule as integral to elevating the German colony to a high status 
in the eyes of the government for its achievements in spreading German knowledge and 
culture and furthering German interests overseas.584 Professionally, many graduates 
chose to remain in Shantung, if not the Leasehold itself.  Of the graduates of the 
engineering program, many found immediate employment with the railroads that were 
currently under construction, such as the Hankow-Szechuan Railway.  One graduate of 
the program in jurisprudence found considerable success working in the Court of 
Appeals in the Leasehold and, as a result of his accomplishments and superb legal 
training, earned an immediate appointment as a judge in the provincial courts.585  The 
medical program was perhaps the most successful and crucial for the further 
development of Tsingtau as the issue of health and health services become a chief point 
of concern for the Leasehold government, particularly due to the advocacy of many 
graduates of the Hochschule. 
 The administration of educational institutions in Tsingtau provided the colonial 
government with an excellent opportunity to put its vision for a German Hong Kong into 
practice.  Chinese and German elites were provided with a host of educational choices 
that emphasized the same advances in education that were being implemented in 
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Germany.  This functioned as an important method for presenting German culture as a 
model of “advanced civilization” for the Chinese to emulate as they sought to modernize 
their country.  It also helped maintain and remind a new generation of German elites 
how to preserve their heritage and expand their Heimat.  This structure, however, came 
with a distinct twist based on the colony’s location: the study of the Chinese language 
and Chinese classics.  This curricular focus provided an important space to integrate the 
two cultures and promote understanding between natives and non-natives that would—
the naval government hoped—help further German interests in China and East Asia.  In 
this way, a new generation of ruling elites could work together in more of a partnership 
in order to, in the words of Paul Bensel, transform Tsingtau into “the Pearl of the East as 
well as our overseas territories, and striking proof of our colonization abilities; a place 
where German knowledge and skill passed into the grateful hands of the Chinese.”586 
 Within this educational milieu, the Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule was the 
crowning achievement of what colonial leaders in Tsingtau sought to provide.  The 
college was a critical facet of the overall vision for creating an international port and 
cultural center. The benefits and opportunities offered to both native and foreign elites 
were manifold, and the contributions the colonial government’s liberal educational 
policy made to the colony’s growth were key in transforming Tsingtau into a German 
Hong Kong.  
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CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSIONS 
IF YOU LEAVE NOW, IT’S OVER: THE LEGACY OF TSINGTAU AND THE 
PURSUIT OF A GERMAN HONG KONG 
 
 On the eve of World War I, Tsingtau had begun to emerge as the model colony, 
culture center, and trading entrepôt that colonial leaders, supporters, and investors had 
desired since long before the Kiaochow Leasehold had ever passed into German hands. 
The infrastructure built in Tsingtau and the Leasehold had taken on a thoroughly modern 
character, leading contemporary writers to designate the city as the “Brighton of China,” 
“Kiel of the Far East,” and “the Summer Resort of the Orient.”587 As a result, Tsingtau 
became an attractive draw to visitors and tourists alike seeking the enjoy the benefits that 
this European-like enclave on the East China Sea derived from the financial involvement 
of Chinese and Western investors.588 While many of these businesses and trading firms 
never earned the tremendous profits that they dreamed of or felt were their right as 
colonizers, the end result was that the German colony in China was not the financial 
millstone that Germany’s overseas territories in Africa and the Pacific had become. The 
native Chinese population was moving closer to being equal (though never full) partners 
with the Germans, as the increase in cross-cultural interactions, advanced educational 
opportunities, and establishment of modern Chinese-run businesses and trading houses 
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in the last ten years of the colony clearly demonstrates. While the vision of creating a 
German Hong Kong in 1897 was maddeningly broad and ill-defined across the various 
colonial interest groups from the navy to the German-Chinese commercial community to 
the Foreign Office and various middle managers on the ground in the Leasehold and 
China, by the colony’s final years, a clearer picture of what this vision meant was 
coming into focus. 
The first seven years of Tsingtau’s existence was marked by bitter conflicts with 
the Chinese as Germans in the Leasehold and in Berlin, influenced more strongly by 
Sinophobia than Sinophilia, attempted to remove any trace of Chinese sovereignty, 
expanding Germany’s authority in the areas of Shantung outside the Leasehold, and, 
generally speaking, pursuing the harsh practices of colonial domination prevalent in 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Near East. While such practices succeeded in firmly 
ensconcing Germany’s presence in Shantung and allow Germany to make further claims 
to its arrival as a global power, these initial years were marked by uneven growth and 
only moderate development within the colony.  
After 1905, as sinophilic discourse and the internal dynamics among the various 
middle managers of empire, particularly middle-class Germans such as translators and 
sinologists, began to reemerge and dominate the strains of Sinophobia that were 
common during the first years of the colony, new native policies took root in Kiaochow 
and Tsingtau. While the proximate cause for such a shift was the changing global power 
dynamics and alignments that forced Germany to confront the reality that its overseas 
holding in China was extremely vulnerable to conquest, the end result was that, by 1914, 
 294 
native policy had undergone a dramatic change. Despite this change, however, German 
interaction with the native population remained contradictory, as Germans remained 
ambivalent about the native population’s role in the colony and what it meant to “deal 
with the Chinese.” Social life in the colony, for example, remained largely segregated, as 
most hospitals, schools, clubs, recreational facilities, and the colony’s legal system all 
provided separate services for Chinese and Germans. Nevertheless, residential areas of 
Tsingtau saw an increasing mix of native and western businesses and residents, 
particularly among the middle and upper classes, the commercial community in the 
colony saw increasing investment and leadership from the Chinese, schools like the 
Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule were promoting cross-cultural exchange and creating a 
successful interlocutor class of well-trained and educated Chinese, and prominent 
members of the colonial community such as Richard Wilhelm, Otto Franke, and 
Wilhelm Schrameier were bridging cultural divides. Such growth and development had a 
considerable impact on the Tsingtau community, as criticism from more liberal Germans 
in Tsingtau even forced the Tsingtau-Klub, firmly committed to barring the Chinese 
from entrance into its ranks, to allow the native population to use its facilities and 
participate in tournaments offered there, albeit separate from its German and European 
members. 
 By 1914, then, Tsingtau was moving further and further away from possessing a 
purely colonial nature such as might be found in Africa or even India. Annual profits 
were on the rise, and the city had grown from just a few hundred residents in 1897 to 
over fifty-five thousand in 1913, of which only approximately 3500 were of German 
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origin.589 Although Chinese elites never gained right fully equal to those of Europeans, 
many of the wealthier Chinese were allowed to participate in the election of advisors to 
the colonial governor’s European-Chinese Advisory Board, a unique feature of self-
government that existed in no other European colony. Following the Republican 
Revolution of 1911-1912, the influx into Tsingtau of Chinese elites associated with the 
Qings resulted in the partial repeal of laws barring Chinese settlement in the European 
district of Tsingtau, providing for greater mixed zones of contact between Europeans and 
Chinese.  
Perhaps most importantly, the Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule, the culmination 
of the colonial government’s work with the progressive Weimar Mission, offered a 
variety of educational opportunities unlike those that other educational institutions in 
East Asia could provide. Students followed curricula that blended ancient and modern 
and western and eastern learning and studied under German and Chinese teachers, all 
while earning degrees that were recognized by the government in Peking, granting 
graduates access to taking the entrance examinations at the national university. In the 
Faculty of Law and Political Economy, students studied both European and Chinese 
legal forms, “encouraging a process of transculturation in which the Chinese would fill 
in German legal forms with Chinese contents and Germans would earn from Chinese 
legal traditions.”590 Middle class translators and sinologists, who tended to admire and 
identify with the Chinese Mandarin, had come to play an increasingly important role in 
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colonial administration in the last decade on the colony, working with and alongside the 
colonial government and the German Legation in China. Not only did the Imperial Navy 
encourage this change in orientation and policy, but the Auswärtiges Amt and the Peking 
Legation (two of the stronger critics of the navy’s administration of Tsingtau) also did 
so, as they agreed Germany needed to move away from direct colonial rule in China and 
instead embrace methods that would influence China as a potential ally rather than 
simply cajole it into supporting German policies and objectives. 
Had developments in Tsingtau and the Leasehold continued apace, then, it is 
quite possible, as George Steinmetz has argued, that “Kiaochow might have eventually 
lost its colonial character altogether.”591 Nevertheless, with the start of World War I and 
Tsingtau’s capitulation in the late fall of 1914, Germany’s colonial project in China 
came to an abrupt and unplanned end. Although it is impossible to know what might 
have become of Tsingtau had the developments that occurred in the second decade of its 
existence continued into a third or fourth decade, the Germans who has envisioned 
making a colony based on the British Hong Kong model were in a position to bring that 
vision to fruition.  
Indeed, this model of economic modernization and cultural influence had a 
lasting legacy in the city’s history, particularly its own understanding of its role in 
China’s emergence as a leading power in the world today. Present-day Qingdao’s story 
after the colonial government surrendered to Japan after a siege lasting nearly two 
months is distinct and unique among the former European colonies. While the city and 
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Leasehold, as well as the rest of Shantung, remained under Japanese occupation 
throughout World War I and following the Paris Peace Conference, the entire territory 
passed back into Chinese hands following the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-
1922. While under Chinese control, Tsingtau continued to grow and develop, remaining 
one of the most important cities on the Chinese coast, becoming the fourth wealthiest 
port in China by the 1930s. In 1936, following the rising tide of nationalism and 
militarism in its upper ranks, the Japanese Empire again seized and occupied Qingdao in 
the lead up to the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).592  
As the city remained under Japanese control from 1938-1945, the Showa Empire 
transformed the city into an important industrial zone of development and one of the 
main bases of operation for the Japanese fleet. Indeed, after the United States helped 
liberate the city from Japanese occupation, the Kuomintang (KMT) government allowed 
the United States Western Pacific Fleet to use Qingdao as its headquarters, an 
arrangement that lasted until 1949 when the Communist Party of China took control of 
the government and the Red Army captured Qingdao.593 During both periods of Chinese 
control (before 1939 and after 1945), the houses and villas that wealthy Europeans 
occupied during the colonial period became the residences of members of the Chinese 
political elite, the most well-known of which were Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, who made 
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the former German governor’s mansion their home while staying in the city. Indeed, 
Mao thought so highly of the governor’s villa that he hosted many Socialist/Communist 
world leaders there, including Nikita Khrushchev, Josip Broz Tito, Fidel Castro, Leonid 
Brezhnev, and Ho Chih Minh, among others.  
Even after the Communist Revolution in 1949, Qingdao remained one of 
northern China’s most important cities. In 1984, China’s central government initiated a 
new policy encouraging foreign investment in order to keep pace economically with the 
rest of the world’s powers, designating Qingdao one of the country’s zones of national 
economic development. Possessing the third largest container terminal in mainland 
China (and thirteenth largest worldwide), the city of Qingdao today has become one of 
China’s most concentrated and competitive opening areas throughout China, the core 
area of the Shandong peninsula’s manufacturing base, and the new economic center of 
the prefecture-level municipality of Qingdao.594 In 2005, Qingdao hosted 1,935 foreign-
funded projects-of which 50 were projects with investment from 30 Global Fortune 500 
companies-with foreign expenditures totaling 12.68 billion dollars; German firms, 
including ABB, Bayer, BASF, Degussa, Hapag-Lloyd, Metro, OBI, Siemens, RDM, 
SAACK, KLINGSPOR, and Heinz Jansen, led 141 of these capital ventures.595 
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The German architecture and buildings that were one of Tsingtau’s hallmarks 
remain a defining feature of Qingdao’s old city. The Bismarck Barracks that once 
housed the III. Seebataillon is now one of the main administrative building of the Ocean 
University of Qingdao (one of the institutions of higher education in the city that claims 
to be the direct heir to the Deutsch-Chinesische Hochschule), and the governor’s 
mansion has served as a museum on the city’s history since 1996.596 Qingdao has also 
embraced once again its reputation as a premiere resort and tourist destination, one its 
particular claims to fame in the later years of the colony when it was known as the 
“Brighton on the East China Sea.”597 The German architecture and cultural remnants of 
the city’s colonial period are a central facet of Qingdao’s tourist marketing. Historical 
plaques appear on nearly all of the German buildings in the city, with information 
provided in Chinese, English, and German; the same is true of the main streets in the old 
part of the city, as street signs display both their colonial German and contemporary 
Chinese street names. The presentation of the German colonial legacy that the Tourism 
and Cultural Relics Bureau presents shows little anti-imperial or anti-German spirit, 
embracing this important period in Qingdao’s history rather than repudiating it. The 
Tourism Bureau draws attention to the many developments that the Germans introduced 
including the modern railroad and harbor, the first modern sewer system, the progressive 
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and liberal-minded education system, and the cultural institutions that remain to this day. 
The decision in 1993 to expand and modernize the railroad station while maintaining the 
appearance of the original German station on the entrance’s façade represents a decision 
to “incorporate and depoliticize the colonial past rather than erase or criticize it.”598 The 
most important and significant appropriation of the German colonial legacy is the 
Tsingtao Brewery, the successor to the original Germania Bräuerei founded in 1904 and 
the first of its kind in China and Asia. Tsingtao Beer is ubiquitous today throughout the 
world and especially in Chinese restaurants, and the brewery remains a dominant 
presence in Qingdao. 
Despite how easily it appears that China has come to terms with this facet of its 
colonial past, Chinese historians remain critical of Germany’s conquest and rule over 
this region. These scholars point to the fact that Germany’s seizure of the Leasehold 
initiated a new era of European conquest and western hegemony that resulted in the 
further humiliation and subjugation of one of the world’s most esteemed and ancient 
civilization.599 In pushing for a fuller discussion and debate of European imperialism in 
China, Chinese intellectuals have argued that China needs to pursue a “decolonization of 
consciousness,” and reconsider “the appropriateness for China of the forms of modernity 
that were introduced or imposed in the context of nineteenth-century imperialism.”600 
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Over the course of a mere seventeen years, the very idea of turning the tiny 
fishing village of Tsingtau into a German Hong Kong represented an important step 
forward in the methods and means of imperial rule. Rather than focus on full domination 
of an extensive territory where the native population would be subjugated to the harsh 
treatment and exploitation of its western conquerors-a vision of empire in full force 
throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-colonial leaders in Tsingtau 
pursued a vision of empire predicated on developing a central colonial base that would 
prove attractive to both native and foreign populations and provide the basis for exerting 
control and influence in less direct and more informal ways. By making Tsingtau into a 
premiere destination and cultural center on the Chinese coast and in east Asia, not only 
could Germany claim its primacy as a world power, but also demonstrate to the world 
that it was at the forefront of early efforts of globalization.  
The German Hong Kong project reflected a spectrum of engagement on both 
sides, from Chinese elites who enjoyed living or spending time in Tsingtau to Germans 
who wanted to develop a modus vivendi with the Chinese all the way to people on both 
sides who distrusted or disliked each other.  Despite these ambiguities, however, both 
parties recognized certain core ideas that could help define the German Hong Kong 
vision, even as it remained difficult to pin down its exact meaning. Rather than create a 
colony that would just funnel raw materials and manufactured goods to Germany, local 
elites-both German and Chinese-would create an international port, cultural center, and 
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military base: a rich and prosperous city the other Great Powers would envy. Tied up 
with this vision of an East Asian commercial center was the idea of extending the 
German Heimat and the global projection Germanness abroad. The idea of a German 
Hong Kong elicited an image of Tsingtau as an integral part of the German empire, as 
much German as Hamburg, Bremen, or Munich. As a result, not only Germans, but 
Europeans, Americans, Japanese, and Chinese would find it desirous to travel to and do 
business in Tsingtau, enhancing the city’s reputation and prestige as a thoroughly 
modern, culturally developed, and prosperous locale that fused the best features of 
European modernity and Chinese tradition. 
In making Tsingtau a significant colonial enclave, the colonists formed large 
diverse networks as they positioned Tsingtau as crucial to Germany’s emergence as a 
global power. To meet their expectations, the colonials created a vast network of 
associations, forming a society that continued to emerge and change.  The colonists 
believed they were a valuable piece of the Empire and crucial to its claims as a world 
power, seeing Tsingtau as a port that would rival and even surpass the great centers of 
Asia: Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Tokyo. Through migration, exile, trade, and 
changing cultural social, and political realities, Tsingtau become a complex and highly 
diffuse zone of contact. Within this area of interaction, Germans and Chinese found 
places where different social groups and networks could exercise, contest, negotiate, and 
cooperate in demonstrating their power and agency. In governing Tsingtau, the 
Leasehold Germany had to move beyond the simple practices of formal colonialism that 
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had predominated throughout the nineteenth century in order to gain greater control over 
global resources and power and secure its position as a Weltmacht. 
As Sinophila began to reemerge and exert its influence in guiding the governance 
of Tsingtau and the Leasehold, more and more Germans became China enthusiasts. 
Surrounded by China on all sides, Germans came to see themselves as following the 
example set by previous conquerors of China, particularly the first Manchu rulers who 
established the Qing dynasty.601 Much like the middle-class Sinologists in German 
China, “those earlier Asian ‘colonists’ had shifted from a hostile or indifferent approach 
to China to one of self-assimilation.”602 The more that individuals like Wilhelm 
Schrameir, Richard Wilhelm, or Emil Krebs engaged and interacted with the native 
population, relinquishing their superiority as colonizers in the process, the more that 
these colonial leaders came to see that their understanding of China intersected with the 
native interlocutors they sought to create. Such developments, then, challenged colonial 
leaders to move beyond simply following the formal model of nineteenth century 
colonialism and embrace the more complex and nuanced practices of empire that the 
German Hong Kong vision evinced in the race for global resources, power, and prestige. 
As a result, the conditions that existed in China and the realities of governing the 
Kiaochow Leasehold challenged German leaders in Tsingtau to reevaluate and reform 
imperial policies in the pursuit of a new model for imperial power projection. 
Consequently, a more diffuse and flexible form of empire emerged in the last decade of 
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the Germany’s colonial rule in China. Despite the short-lived nature of the project and 
the difficulties in evaluating its success or failures as a result of its abrupt end with the 
start of World War I, Tsingtau and the pursuit of a German Hong Kong represented a 
significant step forward in the history and practices of empire. This small colonial 
enclave on the East China Sea provided an example of a different path for how an 
imperial power might control its overseas territory, moving away from direct control to a 
form of imperial rule that depended on cultivating and working with a carefully 
constructed interlocutor class of native subjects that could help rule and push forward 
imperial policies and objectives.  
By 1914, Germany had laid the groundwork for the successful creation of its own 
Hong Kong, a vision that has legacies in the city’s further development in the twentieth 
century and in how it understands, presents, and comes to terms with its complex past. 
While still an “unset pearl in East Asia” on the eve of World War I, contemporary 
Qingdao has emerged as a major axis of power in the Far East today, as important a city 
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